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The first-person dream-frame nar­
rative served as the most popular 
English poetic form in the later Mid­
dle Ages. In The English Dream 
Vision, Stephen Russell contends that 
the poetic dreams of Chaucer, Lang-
land, the Pearl poet, and others 
employ not simply a common exter­
nal form but one that contains an 
internal, intrinsic dynamic or strategy 
as well. He finds the roots of this dis­
quieting poetic form in the skep­
ticism and nominalism of Augustine, 
Macrobius, Guillaume de Lorris, 
Ockham, and Guillaume de Conches, 
demonstrating the interdependence 
of art, philosophy, and science in the 
Middle Ages. 
Russell examines the dream vision's 
literary contexts (dreams and visions 
in other narratives) and its ties to 
medieval science in a review of medi­
eval teachings and beliefs about 
dreaming that provides a valuable 
survey of background and source 
material. He shows that Chaucer and 
the other dream-poets, by using the 
form to call all experience into ques­
tion rather than simply as an authen­
ticating device suggesting divine 
revelation, were able to exploit con­
temporary uncertainties about 
dreams to create tense works of art. 
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INTRODUCTION

m he following is a study of the late medieval English dream vision and, like any study of a poetic kind or form, certain presuppositions lie behind it. The purpose of this intro­
duction is to make these presuppositions explicit and to argue, at 
least provisionally, that they are valid ones. The basic assumptions, 
then, are these: 
that the term "dream vision" refers to a definable and recognizable set of 
literary works, and that medieval dream vision writers were aware that 
they were making this certain kind of poem (and not simply using a set 
of unrelated conventions); 
that an understanding of the dynamics of the dream vision will tell us 
something worth knowing about the poems.1 
The first assumption—an obligatory one for genre studies— 
requires a sort of double vision. On the one hand, a genre is a set of 
tactics or details or motifs, conventions which, in the right combina­
tion, cause a poem to be of a certain kind. When enough of the 
required motifs or images are present, in, for example, The Divine 
Comedy, then the poem looks like a dream vision to the modern 
reader. Does the presence of enough such motifs, however, make 
The Divine Comedy a dream vision? Does the presence of some of 
the motifs, as J. V. Cunningham has discovered in the General Pro­
logue of the Canterbury Tales,2 make this poem somewhat of a 
dream vision? 
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On the other hand, a poet's choice of a genre is a self-conscious 
one, and the resulting poem is, at least in that poet's mind, a ro­
mance, a pastoral, an elegy, or a dream vision. When such a poet, as 
Deguileville, for example, excludes (or botches) some of the motifs 
which seem crucial—the dreamer in La Pelerinage de la Vie Hu­
maine makes up parts of the dream report which he has forgotten— 
does this affect the genre of the poem? To cite another example, 
Long Will wakes up at the end of Passus Six of Piers Plowman and 
then falls asleep again and dreams the remaining passus; does this 
matter? Finally, Boethius, Martianus Capella, Alanus de Insulis, and 
Dante do not report falling asleep at all and make no references to 
dream lore in the prologues of their poems; are these poems dream 
visions? 
There are no simple answers to these questions, but there are safe 
answers, answers suggested in my first assumption: to be a dream 
vision (or to be a poem of any predefined kind), a poem must both 
contain certain motifs and be the product of a poet's intention to 
follow a tradition or imitate a generic model. 
This complex and rigorous set of requirements is necessary in this 
case beause the dream vision in late medieval English literature is 
more than a conventional frame or an obsolescent authenticating 
device. In the hands of Chaucer and Langland and the Pearl poet, the 
dream vision genre with its accompanying rhetorical effects is es­
sential to the themes and contents of the poems and not simply a 
convenient fiction. In adopting the special, problematic discourse 
created by Cicero and explicated by Macrobius, the discourse 
bounded and defined by Boethius and Dante, Guillaume de Lorris, 
Chaucer, and the others wrote poems ipso facto about reference, 
authority, the limitations of the human intellect, and the contin­
gency of earthly knowledge, contents, and concerns enhanced and 
actually enabled by the dream vision form. 
This interdependence of form and content is the reason for my 
second assumption—that looking at these poems as dream visions 
will tell us something important about them. The dream vision had 
its origin in the gaps, the interstices of two parallel taxonomies in 
medieval thought, taxonomies of real and literary dreams. An un­
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derstanding of the way the poems invaded and deconstructed these 
two taxonomies will help us look again at the ostensible subjects of 
the poems and to see these subjects in powerful new, though thor­
oughly medieval ways. 
No medieval writer ever used the term "dream vision" or dis­
cussed this kind of poem, but this fact should neither surprise nor 
daunt us when we remember how generally casual medieval writers 
were about kinds of poems. Chaucer, the medieval English poet who 
talks more about literary kinds than any other, uses a notoriously 
eclectic set of terms. He sees Troilus and Criseyde as a tragedy (III, 
1786) and promises a few lines later to work next on "som come-
dye," presumably a reference to the Canterbury Tales} On his other 
works, sadly, Chaucer is less specific: in the Retraction to the Can­
terbury Tales, he refers to his dream visions—Book of the Duchess, 
Hous of Fame, Parlement of Foules, and The Legend of Good 
Women—simply as "books," a term he seems to be using to differ­
entiate these works from "songs and lecherous lays" (13-19). In the 
Prologue to The Legend of Good Women, he refers to his dream 
visions once more, but this passage sheds only limited light on the 
problem of how he saw the dream vision: 
He made the book that hight the Hous of Fame, 
And eke the Deeth of Blaunche the Duchesse, 
And the Parlement of Foules, as I gesse, 
And al the love of Palamon and Arcite 
Of Thebes, thogh the storye ys knowen lyte; 
And many an ympne for your halydayes, 
That high ten balades, roundels, virelayes; 
And, for to speke of other holynesse, 
He hath in prose translated Boece, 
And maad the lyf also of Seynt Cecile. 
He made also, goon ys a gret while, 
Origenes upon the Maudeleyne. 
(F, 417-28) 
Elsewhere, Chaucer refers to his dream visions either as "books" or 
"things." All that can be learned from this is that Chaucer did not 
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have a single term which he used exclusively to denote his dream-
frame poems: they are "books," a category that includes not only the 
dream visions but also integated works like the Troilus (Retraction) 
but not the Canterbury Tales, to which he never refers except in the 
plural (both in the Retraction and also, implicitly, in his references 
to the Knight's and Second Nun's Tales in the Prologue to the Leg­
end of Good Women). 
Chaucer refers to two other dream visions in his poetry. In the 
Prologue to the Legend of Good Women, he is accused of translating 
the Romaunt of the Rose, a work so despicable to the God of Love 
that it requires no generic label. In the Retraction, Chaucer claims to 
have translated "the book of the Leoun," presumed to be a (lost) 
redaction of Machaut's Dit du Lyon, a dream vision. Thus, Chaucer 
seems consistently to use the term "book" to refer to major works, 
including dream visions, which have a definable structure and an 
obvious integrity: the category includes the Troilus and his transla­
tions of other people's dream visions. He does not use the designa­
tion "book" to refer to his translations of Pope Innocent's De misera 
humanae conditionis or of Boethius' Consolation of Philosophy, 
even though this second work is clearly a forerunner of the dream 
vision. 
Chaucer, then, seemed to know what he meant by "dream vision": 
it was a "book," an artistic integrity like the tragedy of Troilus; it was 
a poetic artifact with the standard Chaucerian persona and not a 
prose treatise like those of Innocent and Boethius; it was a form 
more complex (though less concretely defined) than those of the 
balade, roundel, or virelay; and the "book" was always identified by a 
representative or metonymic item such as the house of Fame, the 
"deeth" of Blanche, or the lion. The evidence is tantalizing but in­
complete; even late in life and during the tense reign of Richard II, 
he would refer to these early books in the Retraction, a list which 
included a memorial to the wife of John of Gaunt, no royal favorite. 
To be sure, they were "enditynges of worldly vanitees," he says, but 
he "revokes" these juvenalia with a pride and satisfaction which 
shows he still thought highly of them. 
Even if, perhaps, there was no medieval word for this kind of 
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"book," an empirical look at the structure or shape of the dream 
vision reveals the form to be a conscious design and not merely a 
collection of motifs. At the simplest level, a dream vision is the first 
person account of a dream; the dream report is usually preceded by a 
prologue introducing the dreamer as a character and often followed 
by an epilogue describing the dreamer's reawakening and recording 
the dream report in verse. The prologue, though typically short and 
allusive, is by far the most conventionalized and formulaic part of 
the dream vision. Along with establishing the frame narrative, the 
purpose of the prologue seems to be to introduce the character of the 
dreamer-poet. It is here that the reader often learns that the dream­
er was distressed or concerned about some unnamed problem or 
worry, such that he found it hard to get to sleep on that fateful night. 
Though readers are encouraged and emboldened to guess the na­
tures of these distresses—Chaucer's love languor at the opening of 
the Book of the Duchess is patently obvious—it appears to be obliga­
tory that the poet-dreamer not tell. The dreamer (or soon-to-be­
dreamer) sometimes represents himself as a poet in the prologue 
and sometimes mentions that he tried to divert his mind by reading 
or meditation to get to sleep. Chaucer, for example, meditates on the 
daisy (the Legend of Good Women) or reads the story of Ceys and 
Alcione (the Book of the Duchess). 
Following this introductory frame narrative, the dream report 
begins. The dream is usually a record of a debat or less formal con­
versation with one or more characters, sometimes real, sometimes 
allegorical. Usually there are several interlocutors and various topics 
of conversation: Pearl, with its singular figure of authority and 
tightly focused dialogue, seems the exception rather than the rule in 
its imitation of Boethius. There seems to be no particular narrative 
shape to this, the heart of the dream vision: motifs described by 
others such as the hortus conclusus, preternatural light, talking 
animals, or a personified figure of authority are common but not 
obligatory.4 Chaucer's dream visions, for example, sometimes have 
earthly settings (the Book of the Duchess, the Parlement ofFoules; 
also Piers Plowman); sometimes unearthly (the Hous of Fame, the 
Legend of Good Women). They sometimes feature preternatural 
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animals like the talking birds of the Hous of Fame and the 
Parlement of Foules, while elsewhere the animals are either realis­
tic details, emblematic or allegorical, like the whelp and the hart in 
the Book of the Duchess} The dream reports can be self-consciously 
allegorical (Piers Plowman, Skelton's Bouge of Court, or the Roman 
de la Rose), superficially naturalistic (the Book of the Duchess), or 
set in the "real" other world of Christian eschatology like Pearl and 
other visions related to the apocalypse (such as the Hous of Fame). 
In all of this, the only constant seems to be the complex central 
figure of the dreamer-narrator-character: unlike most absent, om­
niscient, impersonal medieval narrators, the dreamer is always a 
character in his dream narrative.6 
This dream report makes up the bulk of the poem and, at its 
conclusion, there is often a brief framing epilogue describing the 
reawakening of the dreamer and occasionally offering interpretive 
comments on the dream report. This conclusion often reminds the 
reader of the identity of the poet and the dreamer: sometimes the 
identification is symbolic, as when a dream event turns into a wak­
ing one (the tolling bell of the Book of the Duchess or the river 
crossing of Pearl); sometimes it is explicit, as with the dreamer's 
intention to produce a verse redaction of his experience (the Book of 
the Duchess again and Deguileville's Pelerinage de la Vie Hu­
maine). In any case, the concluding frame gives the poems a techni­
cal (or "formal") closure that the dream reports themselves fre­
quently lack. The dream report of Pearl, for example, seems 
enigmatic and violently interrupted by the jueler's attempt to cross 
the river, but the epilogue makes it clear that, though the dream 
was cut off, the poem is finished and esthetically complete. Like the 
couplet of a sonnet, the concluding frame asserts the architectural 
finish of the artifact and challenges the reader to perceive its artistic 
closure. 
This description is the last and best proof that the dream vision 
was a "kind of poem" in the minds of medieval artists. If dream 
poems were nothing more than collections of unrelated and op­
tional motifs, then we should expect to find these motifs throughout 
the poems. In fact, the typical motifs are clustered at the beginning 
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of the poem: the introduction to the dreamer, the dreamer's allusive 
distress, his insomnia and diversions, and his appearance as the cen­
tral character in the dream report all suggest that the motifs work 
together to help determine the structure of the poem. 
The first dream vision in Western literature is the Somnium Sci­
pionis of Cicero, and unlike other first instances, this mysterious 
work exerted a profound, though accidental, influence on the devel­
opment of the form through the later Middle Ages. This dream, 
recounted by Scipio Africanus the Younger at the conclusion of 
Cicero's Republic, seems to be a conscious imitation of "Vision of 
Er," the death ecstasis at the end of Plato's Republic. Following his 
Greek model, Cicero ends his examination of the ideal state with the 
vision of a universe which embodies cosmological versions of the 
very ethical and political principles just prescribed for the perfect 
state. In doing this, Cicero replaces the magic of Er's extracorporeal 
journey to the spheres with a more quotidian dream; the frame he 
uses to introduce the dream, however, damages the dream's credibil­
ity as a revelation or ecstasis. On landing in Africa, Scipio recalls, he 
spends an evening with King Masinissa of Numidia, an old friend of 
his late grandfather, Scipio the Elder: 
Post autem apparatu regio accepti, sermonem in multam noctem pro­
duximus, cum senex nihil nisi de Africano loqueretur, omniaque eius non 
facta solum sed etiam dicta meminisset. deinde ut cubitum discessimus, 
me et de via fessum, et qui ad multam noctem vigilassem, artior quam 
solebat somnus complexus est. hie mihi—credo equidem ex hoc quod 
eramus locuti; fit enim fere ut cogitationes sermonesque nostri pariant 
aliquid in somno tale, quale de Homero scribit Ennius, de quo videlicet 
saepissime vigilans solebat cogitare et loqui—Africanus se ostendit ea 
forma quae mihi ex imagine eius quam ex ipso erat notior; quern ubi 
agnovi, equidem cohorrui; sed ille: 'ades' inquit 'animo et omitte timo­
rem Scipio, et quae dicam trade memoriae. 
And later, after we had dined amidst regal state we prolonged our talk 
until far into the night. The old man would talk about nothing except of 
Africanus and remembered not only all that he had done but all as well 
that he had said. Then, when we had parted to take our rest a sleep much 
deeper than was usual fell upon me, for I was very weary from my jour­
ney and had stayed awake until very late. And then—(I suppose it was a 
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result of what we had been talking about; for it happens often that the 
things that we have been thinking and speaking of bring about some­
thing in our sleep. So Ennius relates in his dream about Homer, of whom 
in hours of wakefulness he used so often to think and speak)—Africanus 
stood there before me, in figure familiar to me from his bust rather than 
from life. I shuddered with dread as I recognized him but he said, "Be 
calm, Scipio, and have no fear, but fail not to remember the things that I 
shall tell.7 
Effectively, what is introduced here is the day-residue dream of a 
great man, Scipio Africanus the Younger. The introduction implies 
that the details of the dream (if not the entire experience) are the 
products of the exhausted mind of an impressionable young man 
who has spent the night hearing stories of his adoptive grandfather. 
Scipio himself says as much in comparing his experience to that of 
the poet Ennius; the comparison firmly suggests that neither 
dream, inspired by waking thought and surrounded by coinciden­
ces, ought to be taken seriously as a revelation.8 Indeed, Scipio takes 
care to mention that his namesake appeared to him in resemblance 
to a statue the younger man remembered; this is a telling little de­
tail, for Scipio the Younger, who was two when his grandfather 
died, would not have remembered him in life. Even Macrobius, 
whose Commentary on the Somnium preserved the text for the 
modern world, sees the frame as self-consciously fictional and not 
supernaturally revelatory.9 
What follows this introduction is a spectacular but fairly predic­
table vision of the great world in the Platonic affective tradition, a 
vision designed to legitimize Cicero's conservative republican 
virtues oipietas and civic obligation. The elder Scipio, the dreamer's 
guide in the ecstasis, concludes by drawing a crisp moral lesson from 
the rapturous vision of the spheres: 
cum pateat igitur aeternum id esse quod se ipsum moveat, quis est qui 
hanc naturam animis esse tributam neget? inanimum est enim omne 
quod pulsu agitatur externo; quod autem est animal, id motu cietur inte­
riore et suo; nam haec est propria natura animi atque vis; quae si est una 
ex omnibus quae se ipsa moveat, neque nata certe est et aeterna est. hanc 
tu exerce in optimis rebus! sunt autem optimae curae de salute patriae, 
quibus agitatus et exercitatus animus velocius in hanc sedem et domum 
suam pervolabit, idque ocius faciet, si iam turn cum erit inclusus in cor­
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pore, eminebit foras, et ea quae extra erunt contemplans quam maxime 
se a corpore abstrahet. 
Since then that which is self-moving is everlasting, who would dare 
deny that this is the essential nature given to living spirits? For every­
thing that is set in motion by an outside force is without a spirit within it, 
but that which is animated by spirit is moved by its own power within, 
for this is the essential property and power of spirit,—which, since it is 
the only thing among all things which moves itself, cannot have had a 
beginning nor can it ever have an end. Devote this, then to the highest 
tasks! Of these surely the noblest are those on behalf of one's fatherland: 
a spirit dedicated and devoted to these will swiftly wing its way to this, its 
own abode and home. And more swiftly will it speed here if, while still 
prisoned in the body, it soars above it and fixing its gaze on things 
beyond, it rids itself as much as is in its power from the body.10 
The work thus continues to draw moral lessons from the vision, 
seemingly unimpeded by the problematic nature of the dream; des­
pite the introductory section which casts the dream into doubt, the 
moral lessons drawn from the visions of history and of the Platonic 
cosmos are responsible and salutary. In part, this is because it is a 
responsible man who dreams the vision; by this point in the Repub­
lic, Scipio the Younger has been established by Cicero as a stoic 
Republic saint, moral touchstone of a fast-fading golden age. The 
dream of such a person, even if it is nothing more than the product 
of his mind freed in sleep from the constraints of rationality and 
day-to-day existence, is a precious possession: dreamer valorizes 
dream. At the same time, though, the evident piety and moral prob­
ity of the vision is a credit to the mind that produced (received?) it: 
dream valorizes dreamer. So the reader is left with a vision of the 
other world that need not be taken literally to be appreciated or 
treasured (as this work certainly was). Even if the Somnium Scipio­
nis is nothing more than a day-residue dream, it is nonetheless valu­
able both for the truth it obviously tells and because it is a great 
man's dream.11 
It is unlikely that Cicero analyzed the rhetoric of the Somnium 
Scipionis in this way, or even that he was fully conscious of the 
formal issues which his choice of a dream frame raised: Macrobius' 
suspicion that he chose the dream frame to avoid the intrusive in­
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credibility of Er's out-of-body experience seems entirely reasonable. 
More important than his motives for his choice, though, was its 
effect: in changing the frame from apotheosis to dream, Cicero 
complicated and psychologized the visionary experience. Surely 
dreams are more commonplace than visions, even in the ancient 
world;12 more surely, though, dream intelligence is less credible, less 
dramatic, more dangerous than messages in waking visions. In fact, 
after Cicero (and after the Macrobean Commentary to which the 
Somnium Scipionis was always appended), a remarkably strict dis­
tinction in visionary literature is established between the somatic 
experience and the waking vision. As I will illustrate in detail later, 
the poet's choice of a waking vision suggests that the didactic mes­
sage of the vision is the poet's priority; the choice of the dream as 
frame is based on psychological, affective, and rhetorical motives 
antithetical to the visionary's purpose in writing. 
Surely it is such considerations that lay behind Boethius' choice of 
a frame narrative for The Consolation of Philosophy. A century 
after Macrobius, Boethius begins his treatise by approximating the 
drama of the Somnium Scipionis but, conscious of the ambiguity of 
the dream, he soon departs from his Ciceronian model: 
Carmina qui quondam studio florente peregi, 
Flebilis heu maestos cogor inire modos. 
Ecce mihi lacerae dictant scribenda camenae 
Et veris elegi fletibus ora rigant. 
Has saltern nullus potiut pervincere terror, 
Ne nostrum comites prosequerentur iter. 
Gloria felicis olim viridisque iuventae 
Solantur maesti nunc mea fata senis. 
Venit enim properata malis inopina senectus 
Et dolor aetatem iussit inesse suam. 
Intempestivi funduntur vertice cani 
Et tremit effeto corpore laxa cutis. 
Mors hominum felix quae se nee dulcibus annis 
Inserit et maestis saepe vocata venit. 
Eheu quam surda miseros avertitur aure 
Et flentes oculos claudere saeva negat. 
10 
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Dum levibus male fida bonis fortuna faveret, 
Paene caput tristis merserat hora meum. 
Nunc quia fallacem mutavit nubila vultum, 
Protrahit ingratas impia vita moras. 
Quid me felicem totiens iactastis amici? 
Qui cecidit, stabili non erat ille gradu. 
I who once wrote songs of keen delight am now by sorrow driven to 
take up melancholy measures. Wounded Muses tell me what I must 
write, and elegiac verses bathe my face with real tears. Not even terror 
could drive from me these faithful companions of my long journey. Poe­
try, which was once the glory of my happy and flourishing youth, is still 
my comfort in this misery of my old age. 
Old age has come too soon with its evils, and sorrow has commanded 
me to enter the age which is hers. My hair is prematurely gray, and slack 
skin shakes on my exhausted body. Death, happy to men when she does 
not intrude in the sweet years, but comes when often called in sorrow, 
turns a deaf ear to the wretched and cruelly refuses to close weeping eyes. 
The sad hour that has nearly drowned me came just at the time that 
faithless Fortune favored me with her worthless gifts. Now that she has 
clouded her deceitful face, my accursed life seems to go on endlessly. My 
friends, why did you so often think me happy? Any man who has fallen 
never stood securely.13 
This prologue shows that Boethius had a clear understanding of the 
visionary tradition. Like Cicero, he shows quite clearly that his 
dreamer was distressed and preoccupied prior to his visionary expe­
rience. The poignant lyricism of this first metrum, in fact, far better 
captures the distressed state of the visionary than Scipio's pale 
prose. For precisely these reasons, Boethius departs radically from 
the dream conventions in the first prosa: 
Haec dum mecum tacitus ipse reputarem querimoniamque lacrimabi­
lem stili officio signarem, adstitisse mihi supra verticem visa est mulier 
reverendi admodum vultus, oculis ardentibus et ultra communem homi­
num valentiam perspicacibus . . . 
While I silently pondered these things, and decided to write down my 
wretched complaint, there appeared standing above me a-woman of ma­
jestic countenance whose flashing eyes seemed wise beyond the ordinary 
wisdom of men.14 
11 
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Unlike Cicero, Boethius specifically chooses to keep his visionary 
awake, and his reasons for doing are serious and telling. Unlike the 
Somnium Scipionis, the Consolation of Philosophy is to be a treatise 
with a first-person narrator, and this structural change so weakens 
the didactic impact of the dream vision that Macrobius must sup­
press the dream frame to give his text any semblance of seriousness. 
To explain, in the Somnium Scipionis, we noted the mutual valori­
zation of dream and dreamer; this happens only because Cicero and 
his audience already reverenced both Scipio and the doctrines he 
espouses. In Boethius, however, the change to the first person, the 
highly emotional state of the visionary, and the searching investiga­
tive program of the poem, taken together, preclude immediate val­
orization of either the vision or the visionary. Thus, were Boethius 
to begin his poem and say in his own voice that he is in complete 
despair and then to report his inspired consolatory experience, the 
delicate balance would shift too far in the direction of the subjective. 
The dream vision, quite the opposite of Boethius' form here, ex­
plodes the delicate balance of credibility: however precious a dream 
vision might be, it must perforce always be indeterminate, always 
remain suspended between the two poles, neither assuredly somatic 
nor assuredly divine. 
In general, the implicit distinction visible in the opening of the 
Consolation of Philosophy is carefully maintained by visionary 
poets ever since. From Martianus Capella through the Chartrean 
naturalists and Dante to the allegorical visionary poets of the six­
teenth century, the balance between objective (didactic) and subjec­
tive (somatic) is a careful one. In the next chapter, we will see that 
the two poles of this opposition—the dream as an event in third 
person narratives and the waking vision—developed and conserved 
well-defined ontological statuses throughout the Middle Ages. 
In this very restricted sense of the dream vision, the form does not 
reappear until the eighth century in Anglo-Saxon England. Dreams, 
apocalypses, visions, and other somatic and marvelous reports were 
very common in French and Neolatin literature, but it is not until 
the Old English "Dream of the Rood" that the full complexity and 
ambivalence of the form reappears. The "Dream of the Rood" is a 
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striking dream dialogue between the dreamer-narrator and the 
Rood and an imaginative exploration of its crucial but inglorious 
part in God's plan of redemption. But it is finally even more: in the 
last analysis, it is a profoundly psychological poem, an exploration 
of faith and despair which purposely calls the status of the dream 
into question. Phrases early in the dream-report (there is no intro­
ductory frame) suggest that the dreamer-narrator feels despair and 
shame over his sinfulness, a state that makes him a poignant ana­
logue to the unwilling, shame-ridden instrument of the Savior's 
death: 
Beheoldon ]?aer engeldryhta feala 
faegere J?urh forSgesceaft; ne waes J?aer hum fracodes gealga, 
ac hine J?aer beheoldon halige gastas, 
men ofer moldan, and eall J?eos maere gesceaft. 
Syllic waes se sigebeam, and ic synnum fah,

forwundod mid wommum.

I beheld there a host of the angels of the Lord 
fair from their creation; this was no felon's gallows 
but beholding it there were holy spirits, 
men of the earth and all this splendid creation. 
Wondrous was the victory-tree and I stained with sin 
wounded with defilement.15 
The poem goes on to suggest a typological relationship between the 
narrator and the Rood; both are shameful but the same redemption 
that transformed the Rood can glorify the sinful dreamer: 
On me beam Godes

J?rowode hwile; for ]?an ic )?rymfaest nu

hlifige under heofenum, and ic haelen maeg

aeghwylcne anra ]?ara j?e him bi5 egesa to me.

Iu ic waes geworden wita heardost,

leodum laSost, aer j?an ic him lifes weg

rihte gerymde, reordberendum.

On me the Son of God

suffered for a time; therefore, now in glory

I tower under Heaven, and I can save

any one who is in awe of me.

13 
INTRODUCTION 
Long ago I was made to be the crudest of torments, 
hateful to men, but that was when I opened up 
the true way of life for men.16 
Like the Somnium Scipionis, this poem evades the question of the 
authenticity of the dream; there are hints that the dream may be a 
projection of the dreamer's guilty conscience, but these hints do not 
obtrude on the traditional theological sentence of the vision. 
Dreamer and dream are mutually valorized here: the humble 
dreamer comes to terms with his sin in the dream, while the inher­
ent worth of the dream credits the consciousness that conceived it. 
Despite this native facility with the dream vision form in the Old 
English period, the dream vision masterpieces of the fourteenth 
century owe virtually nothing to rich, primitive works such as "The 
Dream of the Rood," Cynewulf's "Elene," or to the story of Caed­
mon's dream in Bede. The later works, the poems of Chaucer and of 
the alliterative revival in the second half of the fourteenth century, 
are the direct descendants of the remarkably original invention of 
Guillaume de Lords, Le Roman de la Rose. While Roman source 
studies ably demonstrate Guillaume's wide reading (to say nothing 
of Jean de Meun's encyclopedic vision), the originality of the idea of 
the Roman remains completely intact: even comparisons with the 
poems of Machaut, Froissart, Houdenc, and other early French wri­
ters of vision-poems cannot account for the grand blasphemy, the 
extraordinary deadpan, and finally the profound beauty of this 
poem. More to our present purpose, no poet before Guillaume de 
Lorris understands and exploits the rich ambiguity of the dream 
frame, the mutual valorization of dream and dreamer, and the 
strange energy of the self-conscious dream report: 
Aucunes genz dient qu'en songes 
n'a se fables non et mencpnges; 
mes Ten puet tex songes songier 
qui ne sont mie menc.ongier, 
ainz sont apres bien aparant, 
si en puis bien traire a garant 
un auctor qui ot non Macrobes, 
qui ne tint pas songes a lobes, 
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anc,ois escrit l'avision 
qui avint au roi Scypion. 
Qui c'onques cuit ne qui que die 
qu'il est folor et musardie 
de croire que songes aviegne, 
qui se voudra, por fol m'en tiegne, 
quar endroit moi ai ge fiance 
que songes est senefiance 
des biens as genz et des anuiz, 
que li plusor songent de nuiz 
maintes choses covertement 
que Ten voit puis apertement. 
(1-20) 
Many men sayn that in sweveninges

Ther nys but fables and lesynges;

But men may some swevenes sen

Whiche hardely that false ne ben,

But afterward ben apparaunt.

This may I drawe to warraunt

An authour that hight Macrobes,

That halt nat dremes false ne lees,

But undoth us the avysioun

That whilom mette kyng Cipioun.

And whoso saith or weneth it be

A jape, or elles nycete,

To wene that dremes after falle,

Let whoso lyste a fol me calle.

For this trowe I, and say for me,

That dremes signifiaunce be

Of good and harm to many wightes,

That dremen in her slep a-nyghtes

Ful many thynges covertly,

That fallen after al openly.17

The key to the passage is Guillaume's mention of Macrobius and the 
Commentary on the Somnium Scipionis. As we shall see in chapter 
3, Macrobius does assert the existence of divine, revelatory, or pre­
monitory dreams, but Macrobius would hardly have considered this 
dream a revelatory one, given its context and circumstances. If any­
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thing, the mention of Macrobius puts this present dream into even 
more question, for Macrobius' prime example of the anxiety- or day 
residue-dream—the lover's dream of possessing his beloved—is the 
very dream to which Guillaume here calls Macrobius to witness. The 
use of the Commentary as intertext or context thus puts Guillaume's 
opening strategies into sharp relief; invoking the authority of Ma­
crobius makes the choice Guillaume offers his readers—"Let whoso 
lyst a fol me calle"—a legitimate one.18 
So, as in the other cases, there is good reason here to doubt the 
revelatory nature of the dream, but at the same time the content of 
the dream valorizes the dreamer as a worshipper of the God of Love, 
just as the dream of the rood valorized the dreamer in that poem. 
The same situation, in which neither the dream nor the dreamer is 
trustworthy in isolation but each justifies the other when taken to­
gether, inheres in the artificial courtly ambience of the Roman de la 
Rose. For the follower of courtly love, a true lover's dream is ipso 
facto an object of value, while the stately,,masque-like decorum of 
the dream is a credit to its dreamer. 
The Roman de la Rose is the single most important work in the 
history of the dream vision in the later Middle Ages. By grafting a 
moribund doctrinal form onto the mischief and vigor of courtly love, 
the Roman brought new life to the poetic form and turned it, once 
more, inward, focusing its energies not on messages from beyond 
but on tensions within. Guillaume de Lords could give his readers 
lush religious ecstasy one moment, light and disreputable burlesque 
the next, and could enclose all within a frame that blithely defers all 
questions of source, credibility, and authority. 
Thanks to Guillaume, the dream vision form with all its subtleties 
became the undisputed poetic fashion in France and later in England 
during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Scores of greater 
and lesser poets adopted the form, and related literary kinds such as 
the Neoplatonic ecstasis experienced a rebirth throughout Europe. 
De Planctu Naturae, the Anticlaudianus, and the Divina Comme­
dia each share, to some degree, the ancestry of the love visions of 
Froissart and Machaut, but these works move away from the inten­
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sity of the dream vision toward other identities and for other poetic 
effects. The famous opening lines of the Divina Commedia, for ex­
ample, suggest the initial situation of the dream vision but do so 
only obliquely: 
Nel mezzo del cammin di nostra vita 
mi ritrovai per una selva oscura, 
che la diritta via era smarrita. 
Ahi quanto a dir qual era e cosa dura 
esta selva selvaggia e aspra e forte 
che nel pensier rinova la paura! 
Tant' e amara che poco e piu morte; 
ma per trattar del ben ch'i' vi trovai, 
diro de l'altre cose ch'i' v'ho scorte. 
Io non so ben ridir com'i' v'intrai, 
tant' era pien di sonno . . . 
Midway in the journey of our life I found myself in a dark wood, for the 
straight way was lost. Ah, how hard it is to tell what that wood was, wild, 
rugged, harsh; the very thought of it renews the fear! It is so bitter that 
death is hardly more so. But, to treat of the good that I found in it, I will 
tell of the other things I saw there. 
I cannot rightly say how I entered it, I was so full of sleep at the moment I 
left the true way; but when I had reached the foot of a hill, . . . 19 
Clearly, from these first lines, Dante does not have the dream vision 
in mind. The verb "ritrovai" is nicely ambiguous and seems to sug­
gest a sleep, but the reader soon learns that the sleep, like all else in 
this dream landscape, is figurative. Only a figurative or allegorical 
life's journey could have a "mezzo" and only after a metaphorical 
sleep could the Wayfarer find himself in this backdrop. Dante is not 
interested in his frame, as Scipio, Guillaume de Lorris, and other 
dream vision writers are; in a real sense, the Divina Commedia does 
not have a frame, preferring instead the less comforting and forgiv­
ing wrench of the reader's perspective from the earthbound to the 
polysemous.20 This dislocation, the tracklessness of the dark forest, 
stands in contrast to the (actually overdetermined) conventional 
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prologue of the dream vision, just as the mysterious Wayfarer con­
trasts with the conventionalized and languishing dreamer. Dante 
certainly wants us to mistrust his simulacrum, but he wants this 
mistrust to be on a moral, not a narrative level (and he wants the 
mistrust to develop slowly through the early cantos of Inferno). The 
dreamer's debility, so critical an element in the dream vision, here 
calls the Wayfarer's moral probity into question, not his credibility.21 
While poems like the Commedia and the allegories of the Char­
trean Naturalists spring in part from the same creative ferment that 
inspired Guillaume de Lorris, his true heirs were the great English 
dream vision poets of the fourteenth century. Chaucer, the most 
prolific English writer of dream visions, wrote complex poems 
which drew deeply on the wide French love vision tradition of which 
Guillaume was the flower. The Book of the Duchess, usually 
thought to be Chaucer's first major poem, is the most French of 
Chaucer's dream poems and alludes to Froissart's Paradys d'Amours, 
Machaut's two Jugement poems and the Dit du Lyon, and of course 
to the Roman. The Parlement of Foules also traces its ancestry to 
the Roman but also owes much in theme and technique to Jean de 
Meun and to the Chartrean Naturalists. While the Hous of Fame 
clearly echoes Dante and Classical models, it too is finally a work 
after the Roman de la Rose, in which the unreliability of the narra­
tor becomes the crucial counter in a web of disreputed and disrepu­
table authorities. Only the anthology of lives of the Saints of Cupid, 
called the Legend of Good Women, a work often thought to have 
been commissioned by the court and one in which Chaucer's interest 
seems to have failed, employs the frame but fails to develop it as a 
psychological motif. 
Outside London, the dream frame narrative experienced an 
equally remarkable renaissance in the alliterative revival of the four­
teenth century. Poems such as Pearl and Piers Plowman use the 
imagery of courtly love, personification allegory, estates satire, and 
eschatology within the flexible poetic form. Later writers in the 
Chaucerian tradition such as Lydgate, Dunbar, James I, and Skelton 
continued to use the frame into the fifteenth century for amorous 
and satiric purposes but, with the new vogue of Italianate lyric mod­
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els in the late fifteenth century, the form essentially disappears in 
the antiquarian voice of Edmund Spenser, to subsist marginally in 
the Renaissance and beyond as the bankrupt vehicle of ecstatics, 
mystics, and political satirists. We can only speculate about the rea­
sons for the dream vision's demise, but poetry's new devotion to 
human emotion and Protestantism's new suspicions about dreams 
must surely have made the form seem plodding and mechanical. In a 
literary environment where life is a dream, where Prosperos and 
Redcrosses live in poems, the line between this world and the 
mind's own habitat need not be drawn before art can begin. 
19 

CHAPTER ONE 
DREAM AND APOCALYPSE

he dream vision is often placed under the general heading 
of revelation literature or is considered as merely an un­
surprising development of the general fascination with 
dreams in Classical or Biblical narratives, but this classification is 
too general and actually blunts the special dynamics of the form as 
Guillaume de Lords, Chaucer, and the rest understood it.1 Though 
the form borrows much from revelation literature and from the 
many narratives of antiquity which feature dreams as events, its 
origins lie elsewhere, in the psychology, philosophy, and literary 
theory of the late Middle Ages. Nonetheless, to understand the im­
pact of the late medieval dream vision we must perceive its special 
relationship to the apocalypse and to the dream-as-narrative-event, 
because these two "real" categories define the ontological space 
which the dream vision occupies. 
For the dream vision is a self-conscious anomaly, an unaccount­
able and "impossible" experience, unlike the apocalypse and the 
somatic dream. It exists, we shall see, in the space between the liter­
ary categories of apocalypse and narrative dream. As an analogy, 
consider Todorov's definition of the fantastic: 
In a world which is indeed our world, the one we know, a world without 
devils, sylphides, or vampires, there occurs an event which cannot be 
explained by the laws of this same familiar world. The person who expe­
riences the event must opt for one of two possible solutions: either he is 
a victim of an illusion of the senses, of a product of the imagination—and 
21 
DREAM AND APOCALYPSE 
the laws of the world then remain what they are; or else the event has 
indeed taken place, it is an integral part of reality—but then this reality is 
controlled by laws unknown to us. Either the devil is an illusion, an 
imaginary being; or else he really exists, precisely like other living 
beings—with this reservation, that we encounter him infrequently. 
The fantastic occupies the duration of this uncertainty. Once we 
choose one answer or the other, we leave the fantastic for a neighboring 
genre, the uncanny or the marvelous. The fantastic is that hesitation 
experienced by a person who knows only the laws of nature, confronting 
an apparently supernatural event.2 
In Todorov's definition, the "neighboring genres" of the uncanny 
and the marvelous are both directly apprehensible: the first is finally 
seen to acquiesce in the laws of nature while the second does not. 
The fantastic, in Todorov's definition, neither affirms nor violates 
those laws of nature: it is somehow neither A nor not A. And its 
power as a literary mode directly derives from its impossible, anom­
alous hesitation or suspension between comprehensible ontological 
statuses. 
It is a similar notion of hesitation, of suspense, that characterizes 
the dream vision, and a similar assault on law, on category, on tax­
onomy that characterizes its effect.3 The purpose of this chapter and 
the next is to present and analyze the two twin medieval taxonomies 
within which or above which the dream vision is suspended. Here I 
will examine the literary context of the dream vision, the two ap­
prehensible poles of dream-as-narrative-event and apocalypse be­
tween which the dream vision existed. In the next chapter I will 
describe the development and maturity of a parallel psychological or 
scientific taxonomy of dreams and visionary experiences derived 
from Macrobius and Patristic sources and will show that the literary 
form consciously and deliberately beggars both of these systems of 
classification to achieve its unique poetic effect. 
Both this chapter and the next will include texts and examples 
familiar to medieval writers like Chaucer, but they will also include 
examples utterly #«familiar to them. The reason for discussing such 
texts as the Oneirocriticon of Artemidorus of Daldis or Gilgamesh 
or the Oresteia is to show that the literary and oneiric classifications 
of dreams and visions which the dream vision deconstructs are not 
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only ancient and ubiquitous but also essential for the rational order­
ing of experience in any culture. 
The Dream-as-Narrative-Event 
As a motif in narrative literature, the dream is as old as literature 
itself. In fact, the earliest extant work of literature, the epic of Gil­
gamesh, King of Uruk, is a surprisingly appropriate place to begin a 
characterization of the dream as an event in third person narratives. 
A representative use of the dream as a message from the gods (a 
"theogonic" dream) is this passage at the beginning of the narrative, 
following the report of Gilgamesh's dream foretelling the coming of 
the wildman Enkidu: 
Now Gilgamesh got up to tell his dream to his mother, Ninsun, one of 
the wise gods. 'Mother, last night I had a dream. I was full of joy, the 
young heroes were round me and I walked through the night under the 
stars of the firmament, and one, a meteor of the stuff of Anu, fell down 
from Heaven. I tried to lift it but it proved too heavy. All the people of 
Uruk came round to see it, the common people jostled and the nobles 
thronged to kiss its feet; and to me its attraction was like the love of 
woman. They helped me, I braced my forehead and raised it with thongs 
and brought it to you, and you yourself pronounced it my brother.'4 
The situation seems simple—the goddess Ninsun sends her son a 
dream telling him to expect Enkidu, a monstrous alter ego with 
whom Gilgamesh must do battle before the two "brothers" become 
friends and set out on their adventures together. This interpretation 
is obvious to the reader, who has reached this point in the narration 
after reading of the gods' displeasure with the hero, his wildness, his 
recklessness, and his need for an equal "like him as his own reflec­
tion, his second self, stormy heart for stormy heart."5 Further, in the 
passage immediately preceding the dream report above, the magic 
lover of Enkidu tells him that Gilgamesh will be informed of his 
coming in a dream. 
The difficulty of course is that the dream fails to do this, fails to 
communicate its intended message to Gilgamesh, who must turn to 
the source of the dream to ask what it (she) meant. Thus, given the 
fact that the dream is so enigmatic that it fails to impart its message 
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and serves only as the occasion for Gilgamesh to ask Ninsun to 
interpret it, why then include it at all? Why not simply have Ninsun 
tell her son to expect Enkidu? 
The answer to this question is crucial to our understanding of the 
dream as a narrative event, for this "unnecessary" and ineffective 
dream produces many of the same psychological and esthetic effects 
as does the Book of the Duchess or Pearl. First and most important, 
the dream is here, however paradoxically, a device of literary real­
ism: in Gilgamesh, the gods speak, at least initially, not in clouds or 
apparitions but through a medium that each of us has experienced. 
Considered in this way, dream-events bridge the gap between the 
highly favored hero and us lesser folk and thus allow the pleasure of 
vicarious adventure to be found in primitive narratives such as Gil­
gamesh. In this perspective, the fact that Gilgamesh cannot unravel 
his dream is not at all remarkable—we cannot usually unravel our 
dream-messages from the gods either. This tiny fact allows readers 
the momentary thrill of wild imaginings; if they could but re­
member and interpret their dreams as Gilgamesh can, then perhaps 
the riddles of their lives could be solved and they too could hear the 
arcana verba, a privilege allowed to none on earth. 
The second psychological effect of the dream is almost as impor­
tant as the first, and one which builds on the matters of interpreta­
bility and enigma just introduced. We have seen that the text of 
Gilgamesh is constructed so as to make the dream immediately ap­
prehensible to readers but not to the dreamer himself, who must 
rely on the interpretive powers of his goddess-mother. The obvious 
effect of this structure is to enhance the readers' pleasure by prede­
termining their intellectual superiority to the hero: not only can 
readers imagine themselves in Gilgamesh's situation; they can imag­
ine themselves handling it better. This sense of superiority will be­
come a conventional element in the dream vision throughout its 
history—Amant, Geffrey, Margery's father, Long Will, and Skel­
ton's Drede all share an absolute inability to see what is right there 
in front of them. The ultimate use of this motif, that of the naive-
obtuse-unfit narrator in the dream vision, is far more sophisticated 
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than it is here, but the early interpretive superiority of readers to 
dreamer in the dream vision plays a crucial role in suspending the 
poem between forms. 
These two qualities, the realistic depiction of communication 
with the gods and the element of enigma (if only for the dreamer), 
are common to most uses of the dream in primitive or Classical 
narrative literatures. Their combination for dramatic purposes is 
nicely illustrated in the report of Clytaemnestra's snake dream in 
Choephori. At the grave of Agamemnon, Orestes asks the chorus 
why Clytaemnestra has ordered funeral offerings for the man she 
murdered: 
Chorus: 
I know, child, I was there. It was a dream she had. The godless woman 
had been shaken in the night by floating terrors, when she sent these 
offerings. 
Orestes: 
Do you know the dream too? Can you tell it to me right? 
Chorus: 
She told me herself. She dreamed she gave birth to a snake. 
Orestes: 
What is the end of the story then? What is the point? 
Chorus: 
She laid it swathed for sleep as if it were a child. 
Orestes: 
A little monster. Did it want some food? 
Chorus: 
She herself, in the dream, gave it her breast to suck. 
Orestes: 
How was her nipple not torn by such a beastly thing? 
Chorus: 
It was. The creature drew in blood along with the milk. 
Orestes: 
No void dream this. It is the vision of a man. 
Chorus: 
She woke screaming, out of her sleep, shaky with fear, as torches kindled 
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all about the house, out of the blind dark that had been on them, to 
comfort the queen. Now she sends these mourning offerings to be 
poured and hopes they are medicinal for her disease.6 
The principal curiosity of this passage from Aeschylus is that Cly­
taemnestra evidently did not understand the meaning of her dream, 
which is so clear to both Orestes and to readers. The simplest expla­
nation for this lack of insight on her part is that, like her victim 
Cassandra, Clytaemnestra is cursed with prophetic powers from 
which she cannot benefit, powers manifest in haunting, fatalistic 
realizations apprehended by all but the seer. This dream, like that of 
Pilate's wife in the Gospels (see page 32), is not a revelation or a 
warning from on high but a vaguely decorative taunt, almost a di­
vine tease. The gods clearly approve of Orestes' plan of revenge and, 
in effect, participate in it by supplying psychological torment for 
Clytaemnestra. At the very least, the gods use the dream to under­
score the ineluctability of the events to come. The effect of this 
dream is, then, like that of Gilgamesh's: to make visible to readers 
the immanent divine order controlling the narrative. The dreamer, 
even if he is a hero, is regularly denied this intelligence by divinities 
who keep the evidence of their intervention hidden from actors and 
reveal it only to seers, on whom wise heroes rely for information 
and advice. 
Clytaemnestra's dream illustrates yet another use to which the 
dream was regularly put in ancient (and medieval) narratives: 
dream events serve as substitutes for depictions of the inner life of 
characters. Literature has always been faced with the problem of 
describing the inner turmoil of characters in narratives; actions 
need motives and characters, if they are to be realistic, must some­
how be provided with reasons for doing the things they do. The 
literatures of various periods have developed various conventional 
mechanisms to meet this need, such as psychomachia, the dramatic 
aside or soliloquy, and the modern convention of the omniscient 
narrator. The dream-event was often used as another such mecha­
nism, a device especially useful in accounting for unexpected or 
remarkable decisions or transformations in characters (and a mech­
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anism, by the way, neither more nor less artificial than any other). 
Clytaemnestra's offering at Agamemnon's grave and Ebeneezer 
Scrooge's Yuletide metamorphosis are both explained or "covered" 
by dramatic dream events. Especially for cultures that lacked popu­
lar terminology for (or interest in) the inner life, ones which lacked 
words like "tension," "emotion," and "motive" borrowed from 
physics and metaphors like being "torn between" two courses of 
action, dreams were a useful device for imposing (if not achieving) 
psychological realism. There may have been others available, such 
as the portent ("In hoc signo vinces") or the apparition, but the 
dream is far more interesting and dramatically rich because its ori­
gins are so ambiguous: Scrooge's disclaimer to Marley about undi­
gested beef and Clytaemnestra's "I accept nothing from a brain that 
is dulled with sleep"7 both testify with Pertelote's dissertation that 
dreams can have mundane causes. On one level, these mundane 
causes allow dreamers to discount their dreams while readers do 
not; more importantly, though, the ambiguity of the dream allows 
authors to portray powerful, even obsessive motivation in charac­
ters without needing explicitly to resort to supernatural agency or to 
the hyperbolic language that so often invades poetry during and 
after the Renaissance. 
The most extended treatment of the dream as a narrative event in 
Greek literature must be the crucial series of dreams in Book Seven 
of Herodotus' History. A long and painful session with his advisors 
had finally convinced Xerxes that it was unwise to lead an army into 
Greece: 
When he had thus made up his mind anew, he fell asleep. And now he 
saw in the night, as the Persians declare, a vision of this nature—he 
thought a tall and beautiful man stood over him and said, "Hast thou 
then changed thy mind, Persian, and wilt thou not lead forth thy host 
against the Greeks, after commanding the Persians to gather together 
their levies? Be sure thou doest not well to change; nor is there a man 
here who will approve thy conduct. The course that thou didst determine 
on during the day [i.e., to attack, a decision Xerxes reached before the 
Council], let that be followed."8 
The dream troubles Xerxes, but on its authority alone he does not 
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change his mind about the invasion; thus, the next morning, on the 
advice of his uncle Artabanus, he announces once more that he will 
not lead the Persian host against Greece. 
The next night, Xerxes receives another dream visitation, and 
this time the interlocutor is perturbed that his earlier advice was 
ignored by the king: 
Son of Darius, it seems thou hast openly before all the Persians re­
nounced the expedition, making light of my words, as though thou hadst 
not heard them spoken. Know therefore and be well assured, that unless 
thou go forth to the war, this thing shall happen unto thee—as thou art 
grown mighty and puissant in a short space, so likewise shalt thou 
within a little time be brought low indeed.9 
This second visitation rattles Xerxes, who sends for Artabanus and 
recounts to him the oracular experiences he has had now for two 
nights. Artabanus is highly sceptical but finally accedes to a rather 
harebrained test of the dreams' value: he agrees to wear Xerxes' 
robe and crown and to sleep on the king's couch to see if he too 
might receive the dream. Artabanus sensibly objects that a prescient 
god might conceivably recognize that the sleeper isn't^Xerxes but, in 
the end, falls asleep on his nephew's couch and, sure enough, dreams 
a dream himself: 
Thou art the man, then, who, feigning to be the tender of Xerxes, seekest 
to dissuade him from leading his army against the Greeks! But thou shalt 
not escape scathless, either now or in time to come, because thou hast 
sought to prevent that which is fated to happen. As for Xerxes, it has 
been plainly told to himself what will befall him, if he refuses to perform 
my bidding.10 
The awakened Artabanus, not surprisingly, now argues passionately 
for the invasion, convinced that the three dreams proceeded from 
the gate of horn, the gate of true revelation. 
And of course the dreams did reveal that the Persian invasion of 
Greece was fated, though it was no less fated that the invasion 
should fail. Thus, the Greek historian records what we must take to 
be a case of monstrous divine duplicity, the gods sending a tantaliz­
ing invitation to the haughty enemy of the Greeks, an invitation 
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which, when followed, humbled him before his divinely favored 
enemies. 
A look at the dream-event in Scripture reveals both similarities to 
the Greek examples and profound differences as well. The dream in 
the Old Testament is still a device of literary realism, but it is one 
from which most of the ambiguity, enigma, and hence danger, have 
been removed. The dream in the Bible is typically symbolic like the 
examples just considered, but the Biblical dreams are normally in­
terpreted both by their dreamers and by others without difficulty, a 
change owing (in part, no doubt) to the revolutionary Hebrew con­
ception of a benevolent god, a deity lacking the capriciousness and 
perversity of the Olympians and other primitive gods. Jacob's dream 
at Bethel is a representative example: 
Viditque in somnis scalam stantem super terram, et cacumen illius tan-
gens caelum: angelos quoque Dei ascendentes et descendentes per earn, 
et Dominum innixum scalae dicentem sibi: Ego sum Dominus Deus Ab­
raham patris tui, et Deus Issac: Terram, in qua dormis, tibi dabo et se-
mini tuo. 
(Genesis 28: 12-14) 
And he saw in a dream a ladder standing upon the earth with its top 
touching Heaven. Angels of God ascended and descended it, and, resting 
against the ladder, the Lord said to him: "I am the Lord God of Abraham 
your father and the God of Isaac. The land on which you sleep I give to 
you and to your progeny."11 
Jacob's comment on awakening, "Vere Dominus est in loco isto, et 
ego nesciebam" ("Truly the Lord is in this place, but I did not real­
ize it"), identifies the dream as a true vision of God and not as a 
meaningless everyday dream. 
The dream of Jacob's ladder is fairly representative of the use of 
the dream as a narrative event in Scripture. It is at once believable 
and special because, while all of us have dreams, few of us have 
dreams which are so strikingly communicative. It is true that this 
dream is a sign of Jacob's special favor with God; it is, however, also 
true that, like the dreams of Gilgamesh or Clytaemnestra, this 
dream functions as a source of motivation in literature that had no 
vocabulary for describing the powerful impulses that move charac­
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ters in religious narratives. It would not have done to say simply that 
Jacob got the feeling that Bethel was an especially holy place; the 
Scripture writer needs (for various reasons) to exteriorize this intui­
tion by giving it a divine origin. Like the voice of God speaking 
through the mouths of the prophets, the dream motif is a technique 
for normalizing and exteriorizing—for "realizing" in the original 
sense of that word—the sure and special presence of God. 
In its enigma too, this dream resembles the Sumerian and Greek 
examples. As a symbolic artifact, this dream is not appreciably 
clearer than Gilgamesh's or Clytaemnestra's dreams: all are figura­
tive with specific personal applications which must be grasped by 
their dreamers. Their principal difference lies in the mere fact of 
their interpretability—Jacob understands his dream because God 
sees to it that he does. This is not, I stress, owing to the transparency 
of Jacob's dream or to the opacity of the others but is a fact of the 
narrative. Perhaps the Jews are smarter than the Greeks or Sumer­
ians, and perhaps God inspires them—it is never explained; in 
whichever case, whenever a Jew or another person in favor with 
God has a dream in the Old Testament, the favored dreamer can 
regularly figure out what it means. When an enemy has a dream, 
that is frequently another matter. 
The implications of this difference—interpretability—are im­
portant ones for the dream vision. In Western Judeo-Christian reli­
gious narratives, the dream is not regularly enigmatic or elusive: the 
God of the Jews and Christians did not regularly play games with 
humans as the Olympians did. Thus, to claim that the late medieval 
dream vision draws on the enigmatic excitement of the Scriptural 
dream is somewhat misleading. The enigma of dreams in the Mid­
dle Ages (as in the Bible) generally lay not in what God was saying 
but in whether or not it was God that was talking; that is, in whether 
the dream had earthly or divine origins. Old Testament writers 
regularly condemned dream interpretation as a form of magic and 
paganism because (we may infer) Yahweh does not treat His people 
so contemptuously as to speak to them in riddles. When the God of 
Abraham your father and Isaac decided to speak to one of His crea­
tures, He did so openly and explicitly. 
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In Greek literature and in the Old Testament, then, we may gen­
eralize that dreams were used to show the dreamer's favor with God 
and to move stories along in a way that would not strain credibility. 
Everyone dreams, yet few of us can remember our dreams in great 
detail and fewer still of us can rehearse our dreams so that their 
relevance to our life and its decisions becomes clear. In the nonscrip­
tural examples, the dreamer needs another party to explain the 
meaning of the dream, a fact which permits folk like Elektra or 
Chryses or Ninsun to interpret them or remain silent for their own 
gain or to the ruin of wrongdoers. The God of the Old Testament, 
consistently more personal and paternal, communicates with peo­
ple in the same way, although His enigmatic dreams are almost 
always interpretable to those who receive them. 
The Gospels also contain many premonitory and prophetic 
dreams and, as a rule, these dreams are even less ambiguous and 
mysterious than the Old Testament examples (and considerably less 
arresting as narrative events). An angel appears to Joseph in Naza­
reth, for example, to lay to rest any doubts he had about his pregnant 
fiancee; this dream, with deft comic touches added, became a favor­
ite feature of medieval plays of the Annunciation. The two best ex­
amples of this sort of dream event, though, are those granted to 
Joseph and to the Magi, dreams warning them of the danger to the 
Christ Child: 
Et responso accepto in somnis ne redirent ad Herodam, per aliam viam 
reversi sunt in regionem suam. (Matthew 2: 12) 
And, following the advice which came to them [the Magi] in a dream, 
that they not return to Herod, they returned to their own land by another 
route. 
Domini apparuit in somnis Ioseph, dicens: Surge, et accipe puerum, et 
matrem eius, et fuge in Aegyptum, et esto ibi usque dum dicam tibi. 
Futurum est enim ut Herodes quaerat puerum ad perdendum eum. 
(Matthew 2: 13) 
The Lord appeared to Jospeh in a dream, saying: Arise and take the boy 
and his mother from here until I tell you to return, for Herod is going to 
seek out the boy to kill him. 
These are not ordinary dreams, either to us or to medievals, and the 
very terminology used to describe them seems to underscore this. 
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Specifically, the warnings were not the dreams: the preposition "in" 
in both cases tells us that the extraordinary communications occurred 
"in" (i.e., during) sleep or dreams, taking advantage of the spiritual 
or psychic openness which, it was commonly believed, was a prop­
erty of sleep.12 
If these dreams seem somewhat shrouded in mystery, in special 
phrasing that seems to set them apart from our own everyday 
dreams, the dream of Pilate's wife seems more commonplace, more 
fully realizing the ambiguity of the Greek examples. As he sits in 
judgment on Jesus, Pilate receives a message from his wife: 
Sedente autem illo pro tribunali, misit ad eum uxor eius, dicens: Nihil 
tibi, et iusto illi: multa enim passa sunt hodie per visum propter eum. 
(Matthew 27: 19) 
Even as he sat in judgment on Jesus, his wife sent a message to him: 
Have nothing to do with this just man, for I have learned much about 
him in a dream today. 
This dream is an important contrast to the wonderful dreams of the 
beginning of the New Testament, the passages "in somnis" just 
considered, for this dream is a true quotidian premonition, a myste­
rious, in some ways egregious, piece of divine intelligence. Pilate's 
wife appears in no other place in the Gospels, and the mention of 
her dream at this point in the Passion serves no narrative purpose 
other than to heighten the drama and pathos of a scene that needs 
more of neither. Indeed, the dream is, in its narrative, actually more 
than egregious: if Pilate had heeded his wife's warning and had not 
turned Jesus over to the Jews, then the Redemptive act, the center of 
human history, would have been thwarted. This fact alone should 
call the origin of the dream into question. 
In some ways, this dream is like Clytaemnestra's dream of the 
snake, little more than a gratuitous reminder that the readers are 
witnessing important events fraught with theological significance, 
tensions that express themselves in premonitions. The phrase, "per 
visum," itself suggests this nonauthoritative origin, or at least it 
would have to medieval readers. Visum was a technical term in me­
32 
DREAM AND APOCALYPSE 
dieval oneiromancy which never referred to a divinely inspired 
dream; a visum was normally characterized as a hallucination or 
daydream or (in its more sinister sense) the incubi or bogeymen 
experienced in the moments between waking and sleep.13 This 
would mean, at least to a medieval reader of the Bible and of dream 
visions, that the dream of Pilate's wife was not one of those special 
and rare communications from God but was something more mys­
terious and exciting, perhaps Satan's last attempt to frustrate Salva­
tion History by preventing the sacrifice of the Son of God. 
The complexity and suggestivity of the dream motif in narrative 
is best illustrated in Roman literature. In ways that the writers of 
Scripture could not, the Latin poets used the dream as an effective 
dramatic device—taunting, premonitory, yet always ambiguous. 
One of the best examples of the dream as a narrative event in Latin 
literature can be found in Book Four of the Aeneid: Aeneas' dream 
on the night before he leaves Carthage illustrates fully both the 
power and the enigma of the motif. Earlier in the book, in a waking 
vision, Aeneas receives a scolding from Mercury: 
tu nunc Karthaginis altae 
fundamenta locas pulchramque uxorius urbem 
exstruis? heu, regni rerumque oblite tuarum! 
ipse deum tibi me claro demittit Olympo 
regnator, caelum et terras qui numine torquet, 
ipse haec ferre iubet celeris mandata per auras: 
quid struis? aut qua spe Libycis teris otia terris? 
si te nulla mouet tantarum gloria rerum 
[nee super ipse tua moliris laude laborem,] 
Ascanium surgentem et spec heredis Iuli 
respice, cui regnum Italiae Romanaque tellus 
debetur. 
Are you 
now laying the foundation of high Carthage, 
as a servant to a woman, building her 
a splendid city here? Are you forgetful 
of what is your own kingdom, your own fate? 
The very god of gods, whose powers sway 
both earth and heaven, sends me down to you 
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from bright Olympus. He himself has asked me 
to carry these commands through the swift air: 
What are you pondering or hoping for 
while squandering your ease in Libyan lands? 
For if the brightness of such deeds is not 
enough to kindle you—if you cannot 
attempt the task for your own fame—remember 
Ascanius growing up, the hopes you hold 
for lulus, your own heir, to whom you are owed 
the realm of Italy and the land of Rome.14 
Such an experience has very little to do with the medieval dream 
vision; it is closer, oddly enough, to the divine visitations of the New 
Testament than to the Hous of Fame. Mercury does not speak to 
Aeneas in a dream; the passage is represented as an apparition, 
which always marked a privileged communication from a divine 
protector. Further, the message of the vision is not truly premoni­
tory but rather speaks of Aeneas' fated future with casual assurance. 
Aeneas is represented as dragging his feet in the divinely ordered 
plan for the founding of Rome: he is an insider, a full and fully 
informed participant who needs to be reminded of his special role. 
Later in the same book, Aeneas has a dream. On the evening 
before he is to leave Carthage, he sleeps on the stern of his ship and 
sees Mercury again: 
Aeneas celsa in puppi iam certus eundi

carpebat somnos rebus iam rite paratis.

huic se forma dei uultu redeuntis eodem

obtulit in somnis rursusque ita uisa monere est,

omnia Mercurio similis, uocemque coloremque

et crinis flauos et membra decora iuuenta:

'nate dea, potes hoc sub casu ducere somnos,

nee quae te circum stent deinde pericula cernis,

demens, nee Zephyros audis spirare secundos?

ilia dolos dirumque nefas in pectore uersat

certa mori, uariosque irarum concitat aestus.

non fugis hinc praeceps, dum praecipitare potestas?

iam mare turbari trabibus saeuasque uidebis,
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conlucere faces, iam feruere litora flammis,

si te his attigerit terris Aurora morantem.

heia age, rumpe moras. uarium et mutabile semper

femina.' sic fatus nocti se immiscuit atrae.

Aeneas on the high stern now was set

to leave; he tasted sleep; all things were ready.

And in his sleep a vision of the god

returned to him with that same countenance—

resembling Mercury in everything:

his voice and coloring and yellow hair

and all his handsome body, a young man's—

and seemed to bring a warning once again:

"You, goddess-born, how can you lie asleep

at such a crisis? Madman, can't you see

the threats around you, can't you hear the breath

of kind west winds? She conjures injuries

and awful crimes, she means to die, she stirs

the shifting surge of restless anger. Why

not flee this land headlong, while there is time?

You soon will see the waters churned by wreckage,

ferocious torches blaze, and beaches flame,

if morning finds you lingering on this coast.

Be on your way. Enough delays. An ever

uncertain and inconsistent thing is woman."

This said, he was at one with the black night.15

This passage stands in subtle but important contrast to the earlier 
vision. While the earlier waking experience was a warning, it 
alerted Aeneas not to any impending danger but rather chastised 
him for his forgetful and irresponsible behavior in staying at Carth­
age. The vision expressed the gods' displeasure with a hero who had 
put aside his fated duty in favor of Dido, Carthage, and the saner life 
of a mere man. In fact, the waking visitation of Mercury is the pre­
cise opposite of a warning of impending danger in that the re­
mainder of the Aeneid is a record of the tribulations which lie in the 
direction in which Mercury nudges the hero in this vision. 
The dream, however, is premonitory in the short fall, a warning 
of immediate danger. While it certainly looks forward to Aeneas' 
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future misson in Italy—he could not fulfill his destiny if he is cut 
down in Carthage—this dream-warning is considerably less far­
sighted than the vision, more rooted in the here and now. Beyond 
this, a medieval dream interpreter would have noticed crucial differ­
ences in Aeneas' state of mind just before the two experiences, dif­
ferences which serve to distinguish the literary vision or fictional 
apocalypse from the dream event.16 Before the first (which Vergil 
clearly intends for us to understand as a real visitation from Mer­
cury), Aeneas is blithely going about Dido's business without the 
brooding restlessness of the inactive hero. The vision is actually 
aimed at this very state of mind—rather than warning Aeneas 
against external dangers, it seeks to amend his own mind, a grave 
internal threat to his destiny. A medieval dream interpreter would 
have seen this fact as evidence that the vision was a true apparition, 
because it is obviously not the product of the hero's troubled 
conscience. 
The dream, however, is far more ambiguous, far more successful 
as a dramatic device. Unlike the earlier vision, the dream happens at 
a time of worry and foreboding—unable to sleep, Aeneas sits on the 
stern of his ship—and is preceded in the narrative by Dido's painful 
speech searching for a response to Aeneas' decision to leave. Thus, 
both Aeneas and the readers have reason to fear the worst and thus 
to suspect that this second visit of Mercury is an anxiety-dream. 
Further, Mercury is not explicitly identified in the dream (as he was 
in the vision); in the later passage the reference is to "similis 
dei . . . redeuntis" ("the god's image returned"), which implies, if 
only weakly, that this present image, so remarkable for its fidelity to 
the first, may in fact have the first as its origin. The verb phrase 
"uisa monere est" similarly weakens the credibility of the dream: 
although the phrase is not as ambivalent in Latin as its translation, 
"seemed to bring a warning," might suggest, the phrase nonetheless 
grounds the dream in the sleeping metaphorical sight of the hero. 
As with the other examples, then, the use of the dream in the Ae­
neid is at least potentially ambiguous, perhaps suggesting divine 
communication* perhaps serving as a window into the emotional 
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life of the character, and surely advancing the narrative by providing 
character motivation. 
As a final example of the dream as a narrative event, we may cite 
the following passage in the Confessions of St. Augustine, a writer 
not otherwise known for credulity in such matters. Late in Book 
Three, Augustine relates the dream of his mother Monica and, more 
important, his unsuccessful attempt to deflect its meaning away 
from himself: 
Vidit enim stantem se in quadam regula lignea, et advenientem ad te 
juvenem splendidum, hilarem atque arridentem sibi, cum ilia esset 
moerens et moerore confecta: qui cum causas quaesisset ab ea moestitiae 
suae quotidianarumque lacrymarum, docendi, ut assolet, non discendi 
gratia, atque ilia respondisset perditionem meam se plangere; jussisse 
ilium quo secura esset, atque admonuisse ut attenderet et videret, ubi 
esset ilia, ibi esset me. Quod ilia ubi attendit, vidit me juxta se in eadem 
regula stantem. 
She saw herself standing upon a certain wooden rule, and coming to­
wards her a young man, splendid, joyful, and smiling upon her, although 
she was grieved and crushed with grief. When he asked her the reasons 
for her sorrow and her daily tears—he asked, as is the custom, not for the 
sake of learning but of teaching—she replied that she lamented for my 
perdition. Then he bade her rest secure, and instructed her that she 
should attend and see that where she was, there was I also. And when she 
looked there she saw me standing on the same rule.17 
Augustine the author has absolutely no doubt about the divine au­
thority for this dream, though elsewhere in the same book of the 
Confessions—and the proximity is not accidental—he reserves his 
most caustic rhetoric for the superstitious beliefs of the Manichees, 
beliefs too absurd even for his unregenerate self (see chapter 3 
below for a quotation). 
Augustine's memory of his pathetic, defensive response to his 
mother's dream forms the coda of the story: 
Unde illud etiam, quod cum mihi narrasset ipsum visum, et ego ad id 
trahere conarer, ut ilia se potius non despararet futuram esse quod eram; 
continuo sine aliqua haesitatione, Non, inquite, non enim mihi dictum 
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est, Ubi tile, ibi ettu; sed, Ubi tu ibi, et tile. Confiteor tibi, Domine, recor­
dationem meam quantum recolo, quod saepe non tacui, amplius me isto 
per matrem vigilantem responso tuo, quod tarn vicina interpretationis 
falsitate turbata non est, et tarn cito vidi quod videndum fuit, quod ego 
certe, antequam dixisset, non videram; etiam turn commotum fuisse, 
quam ipso somnio, quo feminae piae gaudium tanto post futurum, ad 
consolationem tune praesentis sollicitudinis, tanto ante praedictum est. 
Whence too was this, that when she had narrated the vision to me and I 
attempted to distort it to mean rather that she should not despair of 
becoming what I already was, she immediately replied without any hesi­
tation: "No!" she said, "It was not said to me, 'Where he is, there also are 
you,' but 'Where you are, there also is he.' " I confess to you, Lord, that 
my memory of this, as best I can recall it, and I often spoke of it, is that I 
was more disturbed by your answer to me through my mother—for she 
was not disturbed by the likely-seeming falsity of my interpretation and 
quickly saw what was to be seen, which I certainly did not see before she 
spoke—than by the dream itself. By this dream the joy of that holy 
woman, to be fulfilled so long afterwards, was predicted much before­
hand so as to bring consolation in her present solicitude.18 
While Augustine is certain of the special nature of the dream, it is 
for him subsumed into the universal, immanent hand of the Father 
leading him ineluctably on the path he is fated to take. Always the 
logician and rhetorician, Augustine is more unnerved at being 
bested in disputation by his mother (coached from on high, to be 
sure) than by her eerie, premonitory dream. In short, for Augustine, 
Monica's dream is of a piece with the death of Alypius, the encoun­
ter with Faustus, and even with Tolle, lege: it is no less and no more 
than another of God's ubiquitous incursions into his errant life. 
These dreams as narrative events are an important literary con­
text for the medieval dream vision, one of the two categories be­
tween which the poetic form asserted itself. These dream events in 
third person narratives constitute proof that everyday dreams are 
sometimes significant, sometimes, remarkably, vehicles for enig­
matic messages from beyond. More importantly, however, these 
dream-events serve as powerful narrative catalysts: they suggest, 
inspire, and usually result in decisive, often heroic action, and there­
fore can be seen as a conventional method of depicting a character's 
motivation in the largely externalized literatures of the ancient 
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world. These dreams are thus the literary forebears of works such as 
Psychomachia, the Consolation of Philosophy, and Le Roman de la 
Rose, in which the action that the allegory represents is wholly an 
intellectual one, one depicted in an external psychological grammar 
that is, in all fairness, the forerunner of Freud's superego, ego, and 
id. We shall see that the dream vision used this fundamentally psy­
chological thrust of the narrative dream, still and always tantalized 
by the possibility that its origins may be more than psychological. 
The Apocalypse 
The second of the two literary contexts of the late medieval dream 
vision is apocalyptic writing, the traditional literary form which 
begins (in the Christian era) with the Book of Revelation and comes 
soon to include a remarkable body of early Christian reports of vi­
sions, ecstases, divine or angelic visitations, and deathbed ravish­
ments into Heaven.19 At first glance, these works might not seem 
separable from the dreams-as-narrative-events just discussed (and 
even less separable from the dream vision), but their differences 
from these other forms would have been obvious and crucial to me­
dieval readers. The most important difference, as I suggested ear­
lier, is the context of the vision, its circumstances. Aeneas' dream of 
Mercury, for example, comes at a high dramatic moment in Book 
Four of the Aeneid: on the evening before his departure from 
Carthage, Aeneas himself senses this tension, is at first unable to 
sleep, and then finally falls into an uncomfortable slumber on the 
stern of his ship. He dreams a classic anxiety dream, resurrecting the 
mental image of Mercury from his earlier vision and exteriorizing 
his fears about Dido's response to his departure. A medieval expert 
would have given this dream as much credence—and the same sort 
of credence—as a modern psychologist would: the dovetailing of day 
residue in an unquiet mind thoroughly impugns the dream as a di­
vinely originating premonition. 
The apocalypse, however, has a completely different context. If 
an apocalypse occurs in a larger work at all, this larger work is typi­
cally "factual," a history or chronicle or spiritual biography. The 
visionary is never depicted as distressed or anxious; in fact, he is 
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always represented as worthy, pure, and totally free from worldly 
cares. The psychic emptiness of the visionary is conventionally em­
phasized in mystical tracts such as The Cloud of Unknowing, and its 
history as a requirement for mystical experience is long and distin­
guished: only a vessel empty of earthly concerns can accept the in­
dwelling of the Divine Presence.20 And the emptiness must be a 
conscious emptiness, a simplicity of heart and an abstinence of 
mind: visionaries may occasionally be tranced or even on the point 
of death, but never asleep. 
The other difference between the dream-event and the apoca­
lypse is in content. The dream events in larger narratives are gener­
ally without striking or memorable content: their purpose is to ad­
vance their narratives and not to move the readers with their 
messages. Even Clytaemnestra's dream, however striking its imag­
ery may be, shares this merely personal relevance, for the image of 
the snake is, within Aeschylus' fiction, Clytaemnestra's and not ours, 
and the dream report is a projection of her guilt and dramatic situa­
tion, not the readers'. The apocalypse, however, succeeds only in­
sofar as its content is compelling and universal: the Apocalypse, for 
example, is comprehensible as a revelation merely by the applica­
tion of Semitic and Christian iconography without any need to re­
sort to the personality or circumstances of St. John. The Apocalypse 
is a framed narrative, of course, but it is one whose frame has no 
dramatic or formal relationship to the visionary report which it in­
troduces: the frame of an apocalypse serves only to authenticate the 
vision and to normalize the visionary, that is, to assure the readers 
that the vision did take place and that the visionary was sane, sober, 
and unencumbered by emotional or physical distress. The frame 
thus readily dispensed with, the vision takes over completely, with 
all its symbols, colors, and eschatological meanings supporting a 
universal ethical or theological truth. To put it simply, Clytaemnes­
tra's dream is finally about her guilt and Joseph's dream is about the 
imminent danger to the child Jesus, while John's vision has no per­
sonal context at all: it is from first to last an artifact transmitted by 
God to be experienced by all as universally applicable. 
The distinction can be seen by briefly examining two later works 
40 
DREAM AND APOCALYPSE 
in the apocalypse tradition, the Visio Sancti Pauli and the Visio 
Wettini of Walahfrid Strabo. The Visio Sancti Pauli is one of the 
earliest and most important of the large body of apochryphal vi­
sions. It was probably written in the second century and was alleged 
by its author to be the lost narrative of the experience to which St. 
Paul refers in 2 Corinthians: 
Si gloriari oportet (non expedite quidem) veniam autem ad visiones et 
revelationes Domini. Scio hominem in Christo ante annos quatuorde­
cim, sive in corpore nescio, sive extra corpus nescio, Deus scit, raptum 
huiusmodi usque ad tertium caelum. Et scio huiusmodi hominem sive in 
corpore, sive extra corpus nescio, Deus scit: quoniam raptus est in parad­
isum: et audivit arcana verba, quae non licet homini loqui. Pro huiusmodi 
gloriabor; pro me autem nihil gloriabor nisi in infirmitatibus meis. 
(2 Corinthians, 12:1-5) 
I must continue boasting—it serves no purpose—and turn now to vi­
sions and revelations of the Lord. I know a man in Christ who, some 
fourteen years ago—whether in the body or outside of the body I do not 
know; God knows—was rapt into the third heaven. And I know that this 
man—either in his body or outside of it (I do not know; God knows)— 
was taken up into Paradise itself and there heard secret words which 
men are not permitted to speak. About this I boast; about myself I boast 
of nothing save my infirmities. 
The document which purports to be the account of this vision, the 
Visio Sancti Pauli, generates from this scant Scriptural allusion a 
rich, dramatic first-person account of the Apostle's rapture. The 
frame prologue to the vision report, a masterful little story in itself, 
places Paul's visionary experience in sharp contrast to the everyday 
dreams of lesser men: 
Consule Theodosio Augusto minore et Cynegio, tune habitante quodam 
honorato Tharso, in domum que fuerat sancti Pauli, angelus per noctem 
apparens reuelauit ei dicens ut fundamenta domus dissolueret et quod 
inuenisset palam faceret; haec autem fantasmata esse putauit. 
In the consulship of Theodosius Augustus the Younger and of Cyne­
gius, a certain nobleman living in Tarsus, in the house which was that of 
Saint Paul, an angel at night appeared to him, saying that he should open 
the foundations of the house and should publish what he found, but he 
thought that these things were dreams?1 (my emphasis) 
41 
DREAM AND APOCALYPSE 
As the frame narrative continues, we learn that the homeowner 
refused to follow the instructions of the angel until the heavenly 
visitor had come a second, and then a third time: his feeling after 
three such messages was that these might be more than "fantas­
mata." Set beside Paul's meticulous insistence on having been rapt 
into Heaven, this sympathetic depiction of the homeowner's scepti­
cism about dreams in somnio amounts to a convenient index to the 
different perceptions of dream and vision in the early Christian era. 
The dream was suspect and unreliable: no one could expect the poor 
homeowner to tear his house down on the authority of a mere 
dream. Only after three such messages—recall the cumulative effect 
of the repeated dreams in Herodotus—does the homeowner, still 
with misgivings, dig up his foundation. 
The apocalyptic vision is different, special. Paul does not report 
that he was asleep when he had it, and his Apostolic authority and 
reputation for no-nonsense bluntness make the Visio instantly au­
thoritative and precious (or at least this was the intention of the 
author). The reference to dreams in the frame prologue is thus a 
rhetorical strategy designed to place the subsequent vision in a con­
text which will remind readers of the received distinctions between 
the worthless dream and the divine revelation. 
This formula for revelation-writing, based ultimately on the Book 
of Revelation itself and locally on the Visio Sancti Pauli and its con­
temporaries, became the ironclad convention for a millennium of 
Christian ecstasis writers. Literally scores of visions, ecstatic ac­
counts, and at least one "visionary novel" {The Pastor of Hermes) 
were written in the first centuries of the Christian era, and all of 
these emphasize the implicit ground rules of the Visio Sancti Pauli: 
that visions are not dreams and that the context, introduction, and 
"environment" of a vision must identify it as a qualitatively differ­
ent experience from that of the dream. Time after time in these 
apochryphal writings, the authors use the Pauline formulas "raptus 
in caelum" and even "sive in corpore, sive extra corpus." Along with 
this conscious adherence to the tradition, these writings, such as the 
visions of Sedrach, Our Lady, St. John, and many others, explicitly 
insist that they are records of waking visions and not of dreams, an 
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emphasis that continued throughout the long history of the apoca­
lypse genre. In the ninth century, for example, Walahfrid Strabo 
elaborately assures us that the visionary Brother Wetti is awake: 
Turn frater: "Non mensa placet, non pabula prosunt.

Cedo locum, compellor enim feritate doloris

Strata videre mea. Haec aliam portate sub umbram."

Tolluntur stramenta aliamque feruntur in aedem

Continguam cellae quam cenatum ante petivit.

Ergo ubi membra suo componit languida lecto, 
Conclusis oculis penitus dormire nequiebat. 
Spiritus ecce doli foribus processit apertis 
Clericus in specie, frontis latuere fenestrae, 
Ut nee signa quidem parvi videantur ocelli. 
Then brother Wetti said: "It upsets me to be at table; the food does me 
no good. I give up my place; a severe pain forces me to look to my bed; 
please carry this bed to another room." His bed was lifted up and taken to 
another room next to the cell to which he had come to take his meal. 
He had laid down his limbs on his couch, closed his eyes, but had not 
yet been able to fall into a deep sleep, when suddenly the spirit of guile 
came through the open doorway. He was dressed as a priest; the aper­
tures of his brow were shouded in darkness so that not so much as the 
gleam of an eye could be seen.22 
The quotation is significant because it represents a late but still "se­
rious" survival of the tradition, the conventions of which have been 
solidified into final guarantors of verity. Strabo, Hincmar, Bede, and 
the rest, out of touch with the original Christian impulse to apoca­
lypse, imitated the form conscious of dangers not appreciated or 
realized in the first centuries of the Christian era: what if this is just 
a silly dream, a phantasm? Of what value is it then? To protect the 
truth claims of these narratives, the writers typically included elabo­
rate disclaimers (such as Strabo's above), shrilly assuring readers 
that the visionary is not asleep—at the point of death, in ecstasy, 
semiconscious, even delirious from starvation, but not asleep. 
Another crucial convention in these writings is their absolute in­
sistence on third person narration. Even in 2 Corinthians, St. Paul 
adopts the form to describe his own experience: "Scio hominem in 
Christo" ("I know man in Christ"). In his introduction to the Visio 
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Wettini, David Traill theorizes that this third person narration be­
came conventional for a variety of reasons: to avoid the credibility 
problems in relying on the visionary as reporter as well, and to pro­
vide a voice external to the experience to assure readers that the 
visionary was a normative and trustworthy individual, one, for ex­
ample, who hadn't eaten that night and would thus have no pollu­
tants in his stomach. In short, the narrator was a moderator who 
could take pains to investigate and guarantee the validity of the vi­
sion (at least circumstantially), pains avoided with a vengeance by 
dream vision writers.23 
The later history of the apocalypse is outside the scope of this 
study, but it is relevant to show just how it diverged rhetorically and 
thematically from the medieval dream vision. In the eleventh cen­
tury, we find the Visio Episcopus Goliardis, which uses the conven­
tional motifs for playful, parodic purposes: 
A tauro torrida lampade Cynthii 
Fundente iacula ferventis radii, 
Umbrosas nemoris latebras adii, 
Explorans gratiam lenis Favonii. 
Aestivae medio diei tempore, 
Frondosa recubans Iovis sub arbore, 
Astantis video formam Pythagorae; 
Deus scit, nescio, utrum in corpore. 
Ipsam Pythagorae formam aspicio, 
Inscriptam artium schemate vario. 
An extra corpus sit haec revelatio, 
Ultrum in corpore, Deus scit, nescio. 
In May, when fall Apollo's rays 
Like bright hot spears in showers, 
I wander, sweetened by Zephyrus 
In secret woodland bowers. 
At noon, upon this summer's day 
In Jove's oak's shade, as I resting lay, 
I see Pythagorus' form stand there: 
God knows if in body—I cannot say. 
I see Pythagorus himself, 
Who wrote, of all the arts, the scheme, 
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But if this vision be out of body 
Or in, God knows, but I can't deem.24 
In this vision, the standard Pauline formula is put into a comic, even 
satiric context. This does not mean, of course, that the revelation 
form was bankrupt in the eleventh century; it does mean, when one 
notices how its conventions have become merged with the termi­
nology of classical antiquity, that if the form was not obsolescent by 
this time, it was at least dryly and predictably conventional.25 
A semisecular tradition of vision writing also exists in the later 
Middle Ages, a tradition dating back to the "Vision of Er." Though 
works in this lineage often swing close to the overtly religious apo­
calypse (and less often to the dream vision), their development is 
fairly independent. The major works in this Platonic visionary tra­
dition are Prudentius' Psychomachia, Martianus Capella's De Nup­
tiis Mercuriae et Philologiae, and, of course, The Consolation of Phi­
losophy. For a variety of reasons, these important poems lie outside 
the provenance of this book; though their influence on Guillaume de 
Lorris and Chaucer is unarguable, these allegorical visions do not 
have a direct formal relationship to the dream vision. 
First and most important, the manner of these poems is unilater­
ally and uncompromisingly discursive and their mode is either 
naively allegorical or dialogic, unlike religious apocalypses which 
often included typological or historical figures as figurative ele­
ments. Consequentially, the Platonic visions seem to care little 
about literal credibility: it hardly matters that readers do not believe 
the literal truth of the "Vision of Er" or The Consolation of Philo­
sophy, for the fruit of these texts is their doctrine and not the literal 
truth of their fabulous imagery. While it is appropriate that Boe­
thius have such a vision at this low point in his life, the Boethian 
doctrine dramatically realized by Lady Philosophy is easily detachable 
from the fictional frame. In contrast, the literal truth of the religious 
apocalypse was crucially important to its medieval readers, as evi­
denced by the ecclesiastical scrutiny given to visionaries whose writ­
ings were innocuous or even completely orthodox. The Platonic vi­
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sion frame was a disposable convention, while that of the Christian 
apocalypse was not. 
The later history of the Platonic revelation only serves to illus­
trate the conventionality of the form and its use for naive didactic 
allegory. The form experienced a major resurgence in the twelfth 
century in the luxuriant allegories of such as Alain de l'lsle and Ber­
nard Silvestris. Anticlaudianus, De Planctu Naturae, and the Cos­
mographia were roughly contemporary with the Visio Episcopus 
Goliardis just quoted, but these poems, despite their power and 
beauty, exploit the apocalypse frame for only the barest conven­
tional purposes. Thus, we must not confuse the profound doctrinal 
or philosophical influence of these works—for example, that of the 
Pleynt of Kynde on the Parlement ofFoules or on the Roman de la 
Rose—with literary influence: Guillaume de Lorris, Chaucer, and 
Jean de Meun were greatly indebted to the Chartrean Naturalists 
and to other Neo-Platonists for ideas about love, nature, and even 
about allegory, but the form they chose to express these ideas had, 
we shall see, very different origins. 
These two forms—the dream as narrative event and the apoc­
alypse—are the two literary poles between which the dream vision 
found its existence. Their carefully contrived essences and conven­
tions, which seem to be as old as literature itself, create a taxonomy, 
a structure that includes two and only two kinds of experience: one a 
dream in a story, a dream fraught with ambiguity and ambivalence 
like our own, the other a singular communication from God sent to 
humanity through the agency of a privileged individual. From the 
very beginning, the distinction between these two sorts of expe­
rience was carefully maintained by the perpetuation of formal con­
ventions which clearly identified a given work as either a dream or a 
revelation. Dreams (like Clytaemnestra's or Monica's or those in the 
Bible) were either ordinary, albeit curious, or somebody else's; apoc­
alypses (like St. John's or Wetti's) were, irrelevantly, somebody 
else's too, but their message was universal, hence impersonal, hence 
everybody's and nobody's. 
In the beginning and within purely literary circles, this taxonomy 
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—it is either somebody else's dream or everybody's revelation— 
developed accidentally and innocently: we shall see in the next chap­
ter that a remarkably similar, even parallel, scientific structure of 
exclusion, based on classical and medieval oneiromancy, developed 
alongside its literary analogue. This second taxonomy, one dividing 
dreams into revelatory dreams and your dreams, was far from acci­
dental: it was the serendipitous discovery of the conservative fathers 
of the Church, which they set in stone to protect the institutional 
Church from dangerous visionaries and their chaotic dreams. The 
ultimate effect of the twin taxonomies or classifications, one liter­
ary, the other scientific, was exclusion, the exclusion of the everyday 
somatic dream of the ordinary person which somehow spoke to uni­
versal concerns—in short, the relevant dream. 
By virtue of pressures more within the province of the psychia­
trist than that of the literary historian, the dream vision was born in 
the space between the dream event and the apocalypse, a space be­
tween wholly dramatic and wholly didactic purposes. At one ex­
treme, the dramatic, is the dream event. Its energy is completely 
focused on the story of which it is a part. In the case of the Magi or 
Aeneas, the dream is a source of character motivation, an internal 
event which advances the external events of the narrative (the re­
turn by another route, the departure from Carthage). As such, the 
dreams are quite pointless outside their contexts and have no didac­
tic value: we are not moved by them to flee to Egypt or to anticipate 
an armed attack (or even to muse on how inconstant a thing is 
woman). Their point and purpose are wholly psychological: they are 
evidence of their dreamers' reasons (inspired or otherwise) for do­
ing what they did. No one could live in St. Paul's house in Tarsus and 
not fancy that it might contain some relic, and the writer of the Visio 
Sancti Pauli understands this well; the homeowner's dream must 
play three times before he thinks anything of it and takes pick and 
shovel. Dreams as narrative events move texts. 
The revelation, however, is a text. The apocalypse is generally 
narrated by an objective third party whose function is to add credi­
bility to the report, and the visionary is invariably depicted as 
straightlaced, holy (and rather boring)—a person who doesn't have 
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nightmares, doesn't eat the wrong foods, and doesn't talk to imagi­
nary playmates. This person, often a saint, and one commonly on 
the point of a holy, peaceful death, is so trustworthy, so far above 
suspicion, that he generally disappears from his own text: after all, 
the vision has nothing special to do with him—there is ideally no 
"him" for the vision to have to do with—but a special communica­
tion to the world from God that merely uses this person as a me­
dium. Having thus neutralized the dramatic potential in the text and 
having established a special claim of divine communication, the vi­
sion writer is free to represent God's revealed truth without obstruc­
tion or impediment. 
The dream vision draws much from these two forms. From the 
dream event it takes drama and an abiding interest in the personal­
ity of the dreamer as the esthetic center of the work. Like the dreams 
of Clytaemnestra or of Pilate's wife, the dreams of Chaucer or of the 
"jueler" of Pearl are uniquely psychological events inextricably tied 
to the personalities of their dreamers. From the apocalypse the 
dream vision takes a fascinated, unblinking report of a remarkable 
inner occasion. The form of the dream vision, a lengthy dream re­
port framed by a brief prologue and epilogue, invites a sort of forget­
fulness on the part of its readers, invites them to treat the dream 
report as an important, even supernal message only accidentally 
enclosed within an "insignificant" dream. While the dream vision 
does not owe a direct debt to the Apocalypse and its tradition, it is 
impossible to imagine a medieval reader of Pearl or of Piers Plow­
man or even of the Hous of Fame failing to think of St. John and his 
glimpse of Heaven and allowing himself to consider this unlikely 
revelation as a vicarious affirmation of the revelatory powers of 
one's own dreams. 
But the dream vision did not simply establish itself between these 
two forms: it transcended them. Neither the narrative dream event 
nor the revelation can lay any special claim to irresistible rhetorical 
power. The dream event has little specifically rhetorical value at all, 
for it is simply one of a series of events in a story subject only to the 
limitations of realism and to the grammar of narrative causation. 
The revelation, while powerful, is hardly rhetorically so: ecstasis 
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writers generally make little attempt to enlist the readers' support 
or agreement beyond providing the explicit assurance that the text's 
import is revelatory. To do more than this would cheapen the divine 
message, freely given and embraceable in faith by those of faith. 
The dream vision, however, does have a strategy, a typical rhetor­
ical thrust. This strategy is the subject of chapter 4, but we may note 
here that the strategy inheres in the simple description of the form: 
the story of a man (dream event) and his dream (apocalypse). The 
form takes the didactic integrity and brilliance of the apocalypse and 
puts it in the head and in the "story" of a suspect, individual dreamer 
and, ultimately, draws its energy from its position or space between 
the two forms, a space within which readers can never be sure 
whether the words they read are God's or those of one who has 
dreams. 
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MEDIEVAL DREAM

AUTHORITIES

s every reader of medieval literature well knows, the Age 
of Freud was not the only great period of dream analysis 
in Western science. Another period of intense interest in 
dream lore or oneiromancy came in the late Middle Ages, an age that 
was heir to a tremendous body of classical oneiromancy beginning 
with Plato and Aristotle and including such figures as Artemidorus, 
Cicero, and Macrobius. The challenge for the Catholic Middle Ages 
was to make sense of this corpus of authoritative opinion passed on 
to them by the ancients; to consider, codify, and reconcile the cate­
gories of the classical psychologists and encyclopedists with the 
New Dispensation. Augustine, Aquinas, and scores of other Church 
fathers in fact succeeded in this hermeneutic task; they reconciled 
the overwhelmingly sceptical teachings of the Greek and Roman 
philosophers with the unavoidable evidence of Sacred Scripture, 
evidence that made absolute scepticism untenable. As we shall see, 
the seams between classical and patristic approaches to dreams are 
tidy, if not completely invisible, and the consensus of these writers is 
remarkably rational, sensible, and close to prevailing modern views 
on the subject of dreams. In fact, while modern dream writers can be 
neatly divided into two irreconcilable camps—the pathological and 
the revelatory—medieval authorities are much more open-minded. 
As evidence, perhaps, of the perceptual openness that Carolly 
Erickson describes in The Medieval Vision, medieval dream author­
ities were able to combine a healthy scepticism about dreams as 
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somatic experiences with a blithe acquiescence to the existence of 
dream experiences which were quite other than merely somatic.1 
It was not by accident that medieval Christian oneiromancers and 
patristic authorities treated the question of the interpretability of 
dreams with such care, for the matter of dream interpretation was a 
volatile one on practical levels for the Middle Ages. The early Chris­
tian era, the post-Apostolic centuries, inspired, as we have seen, an 
enormous number of devotional and eschatological ecstasis writers, 
and one might imagine that the trade in apochryphal visions, ec­
stases, raptures, and apocalypses was brisk in this age. We shall see 
that these writers of ersatz revelations had circumstantial Scriptural 
authority for their experiences—after all, God had spoken to others 
in dreams, so why not to them as well? Soon, however, the Church 
grew larger and more strictly institutionalized and, as evidence as 
early as the Epistles of Saint Paul testifies, the central authority of 
the Church was constantly plagued with strange divergences or 
dangerous positions held by far-flung outposts of the new religion 
and spawned, often, by somebody's vision, extracorporeal expe­
rience, or dreams. The evidence in the Patrologia Latina for the 
development of this conservative position on dreams and visions is 
spotty at best, but what we do have suggests that warnings to the 
credulous are virtually as old as the Church itself.2 At any rate, by the 
fourth century, Augustine can announce without bitterness (in De 
Genesi ad Litteram) that the age of miracles is past and that we are 
never on safe ground believing that our dreams are inspired. The 
necessity of this position at the managerial level is obvious and un­
remarkable; what is important about the Church's ultimate conser­
vatism on the dream question is that it allowed the Middle Ages to 
draw on, legitimize, and therefore perpetuate a strikingly uniform 
classical scepticism about dreams, a classical-patristic detente that 
codified dreams into a scientific taxonomy in the interstices of 
which the poetic form developed. 
Classical Scepticism 
As it seems everything else does, dream science begins with Plato.3 
Plato was extremely cautious about dreams, recognizing both the 
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danger inherent in the vivid, effective dream and the predictable 
rational objections to uncritical credulousness.4 He often alludes to 
Socrates' dreams, the most famous of which is his dream that his 
own execution would be delayed until the return of the ceremonial 
ship from Delos (Crito, section 43). Even this dream, however, like 
several others in the dialogues, receives little serious comment from 
either Plato or Socrates and seems principally intended as dramatic 
and sympathetic, the literary device of a literate philosopher. A 
more pointed discussion of dreams can be found in the Timaeus> a 
mystic psychological assertion that would prove the foundation for 
the Neo-Platonic apocalpyses of the twelfth century: 
No man, when in his wits, attains prophetic truth and inspiration; but 
when he receives the inspired word, either his intelligence is enthralled 
in sleep or he is demented by some distemper or possession. And he who 
would understand what he remembers to have been said, whether in a 
dream or when he was awake, by the prophetic and inspired nature, or 
would determine by reason the meaning of the apparitions which he has 
seen, and what indications they afford to this man or to that, of past, 
present or future good or evil, must first recover his wits. But, while he 
continues demented, he cannot judge of the visions which he sees or the 
words which he utters; the ancient saying is very true—that "only a man 
who has his wits can act or judge about himself and his own affairs," and 
for this reason it is customary to appoint interpreters to be judges of the 
true inspiration.5 
Even this statement, however, must be viewed with a certain cir­
cumspection. Plato is acknowledging the existence of a category and 
offering an explanation of its existence, but he carefully surrounds 
the acknowledgment of the revelatory dream with insistent re­
minders about the necessity of rational control and with cautions 
about the uncertainty of the visionary state. His persistent refer­
ences to dementia, the cautions implicit in the beginning of the quo­
tation, and the final suggestions concerning professional oneiro­
mancers radically delimit the possibilities opened by the statement, 
so much so that Socrates, in another mood, might say the same 
things only to conclude that, given the dangers and uncertainties, 
revelation through dreams is not worth the effort. 
Plato considers dreams again in the Republic, but this time the 
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thrust is thoroughly sceptical. Near the end of the treatise, Socrates 
describes the appetites of the Despotic Man, appetites which 
. . . bestir themselves in dreams, when the gentler part of the soul 
slumbers and the control of reason is withdrawn; then the wild beast in 
us, full-fed with meat or drink, becomes rampant and shakes off sleep to 
go in quest of what will gratify its own instincts.6 
The passage continues, describing the outrages the Despotic Man 
commits "in phantasy," but comes to acknowledge, in fairness, that 
It is otherwise with a man sound in body and mind, who, before he 
goes to sleep, awakens the reason within him to feed on high thoughts 
and questionings in collected meditation.7 
The paragraph concludes, however, with an unmistakable warning 
to even such pure men, a warning which, in fact, apologizes for the 
preceding digression on the rare revelatory dream: 
However, we have been carried away from our point, which is that in 
every one of us, even those who seem most respectable, there exist de­
sires, terrible in their untamed lawlessness, which reveal themselves in 
dreams.8 
This final position is remarkably close to the standard Christian 
teaching in the high Middle Ages: the revelatory dream is a real 
category, representing a phenomenon that exists in fact, but such 
dreams are exceedingly rare and the everyday dreams of mere mor­
tals ought never to be assumed to be communications from the gods. 
They are indices of a man's nature (and may therefore be precious or 
admirable if that nature is so), but only the very purest natures 
might hope to attain some transcendent truth through them. 
It is difficult to find another classical authority as open-minded 
about dreams as Plato. Aristotle, in two short tracts in the Parva 
Naturalia, is considerably less sanguine about even the possibility of 
the revelatory or miraculous dream and treats dreams as thoroughly 
physiological phenomena. The longer and more important of these 
two tracts, Peri enypnion (On Dreams), acknowledges with Plato 
that the dream operates in the absence of the senses and rational 
faculties but offers an uncompromising psychological explanation 
for its origin: 
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[In On the Soul] Imagination was agreed to be a movement produced by 
perception in a state of activity, and the dream seems to be some sort of 
mental picture (for we call a mental picture appearing in sleep a dream, 
either simply so or, at any rate, in some sense); it is clear that dreaming 
belongs to the sensitive faculty and is related to it in the same way as 
imagination.9 
With typical Aristotelean closure, the discussion concludes "from all 
this that a dream is one form of mental image, which occurs in 
sleep,"10 a position which Aristotle amplifies in On Prophecy in 
Sleep, a short and summary dismissal of its topic: 
Generally speaking, seeing that some of the lower animals also dream, 
dreams cannot be sent by God, nor is this the cause of their appearance, 
but they are miraculous, for human nature is miraculous, though it is not 
divine.11 
While this extreme position was not entirely acceptable to later 
classical authorities (and certainly not to Christian ones), the emi­
nence of Aristotle and the rational, clinical approach he took to the 
dream question exerted a profound conservative influence on later 
opinions. His emphasis on the physiological causes for dreams, 
taken with similar assertions in Plato's Republic, established a solid 
sceptical position which was passed on to Latin authorities such as 
Lucretius and Cicero. 
De Rerum Natura contains an extended discussion of sleep, treat­
ing the subject in a clinical manner reminiscent of Aristotle and 
taking the conventional position that it is a state of partial with­
drawal of the senses and the intellect: 
principio somnus fit ubi est distracta per artus 
vis animae partimque foras eiecta recessit 
et partim contrusa magis concessit in altum. 
dissoluuntur enim turn demum membra fluuntque. 
nam dubium non est, animai quin opera sit 
sensus hie in nobis, quern cum sopor impedit esse, 
turn nobis animam perturbatam esse putandumst 
eiectamque foras; non omnem; namque iaceret 
aeterno corpus perfusum frigore leti. 
First of all, sleep comes to pass when the strength of the soul is scattered 
about among the limbs, and in part has been cast out abroad and gone its 
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way, and in part has been pushed back and passed inward deeper within 
the body. For then indeed the limbs are loosened and droop. For there is 
no doubt that it is thanks to the soul that this sense exists in us; and when 
sleep hinders it from being, then we must suppose that the soul is dis­
turbed and cast out abroad; yet not all of it; for then the body would lie 
bathed in the eternal chill of death.12 
This notion of sleep as a demi-death, of which this is an early tes­
timony, is an important one for the apocalypse tradition as well as 
for that of the dream vision, but Lucretius makes in this passage no 
explicit case for revelation in sleep while strongly suggesting that 
the resting spirit is typically affected by external waking circum­
stances; for example, 
deinde cibum sequitur somnus, quia, quae facit aer,

haec eadem cibus, in venas dum diditur omnis,

efficit. et multo sopor ille gravissimus exstat

quern satur aut lassus capias, quia plurima turn se

corpora conturbant magno contusa labore.

fit ratione eadem coniectus partim animai

altior atque forus eiectus largior eius,

et divisior inter se ac distractior intust.

Again, when sleep follows after food, because food brings about just 
what air does, while it is being spread into all the veins, and the slumber 
which you take when full or weary, is much heavier because then more 
bodies than ever are disordered, bruised with the great effort. In the 
same manner the soul comes to be in part thrust deeper within; it is also 
more abundantly driven out abroad, and is more divided and torn 
asunder in itself within.13 
Lucretius takes up dreams in the next lines, a change of subject that 
suggests, even before he presents his thesis, that Lucretius views 
dreams as manifestations of a troubled spirit: 
Et quo quisque fere studio devinctus adhaeret 
aut quibus in rebus multum sumus ante morati 
atque in ea ratione fuit contenta magis mens, 
in somnis eadem plerumque videmur obire; 
causidici causas agere et componere leges, 
induperatores pugnare ac proelia obire, 
nautae contractum cum ventis degere duellum, 
nos agere hoc autem et naturam quaerere rerum 
semper et inventam patriis exponere chartis. 
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And for the most part to whatever pursuit each man clings and 
cleaves, or on whatever things we have before spent much time, so that 
the mind was more strained in the task than is its wont, in our sleep we 
seem mostly to traffic in the same things; lawyers think that they plead 
their cases and compose contracts, generals that they fight and engage in 
battles, sailors that they pass a life of conflict waged with the winds, and 
we that we pursue our task and seek for the nature of things at all times, 
and set it forth, when it is found, in writings in our country's tongue.14 
To emphasize this physiological explanation for dreams, Lucretius 
turns, in the final lines of the discussion, to the dreams of animals 
(as Aristotle did)—to sweating horses and panting dogs—and fi­
nally to the wet dream. The only allusion in De Rerum Natura to 
even the possibility of dream-visitations or of revelations in dreams 
occurs in a semidigression early in the same book (Book Four), as 
Lucretius introduces the notion of the mental image: 
Atque animi quoniam docui natura quid esset 
et quibus e rebus cum corpore compta vigeret 
quove modo distracta redirect in ordia prima, 
nunc agere incipiam tibi, quod vementer ad has res 
attinet, esse ea quae rerum simulacra vocamus; 
quae, quasi membranae summo de corpore rerum 
dereptae, volitant, ultroque citroque per auras, 
atque eadem nobis vigilantibus obvia mentis 
terrificant atque in somnis, cum saepe figuras 
contuimur miras simulacraque luce carentum, 
quae nos horrifice languentis saepe sopore 
excierunt, no forte animas Acherunte reamur 
effugere aut umbras inter vivos volitare 
neve aliquid nostri post mortem posse relinqui, 
cum corpus simul atque animi natura perempta 
in sua discessum dederint primordia quaeque. 
And since I have taught what was the nature of the mind, and whereof 
composed it grew in union with the body, and in what way rent asunder 
it passed back into its first-beginnings: now I will begin to tell you what 
exceedingly nearly concerns this theme, that there are what we call idols 
of things; which, like films stripped from the outermost body of things, 
fly forward and backward through the air; and they too when they meet 
us in waking hours afright our minds, yea, and in sleep too, when we 
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often gaze on wondrous shapes, and the idols of those who have lost the 
light of day, which in awful wise have often roused us, as we lay languid 
in sleep; lest by chance we should think that souls escape from Acheron, 
or that shades fly abroad among the living, or that something of us can be 
left after death, when body alike and the nature of mind have perished 
and parted asunder into their several first-beginnings.15 
Such a position forecloses the possibility of the dream from Heaven 
and places the dream phenomenon clearly in the realm of mental, 
imaginative activities with physical, mundane causes or stimuli. 
The crucial link between the seminal Greek authorities and the 
Middle Ages is Cicero, considered among medievals—recall Dante— 
to be the universal genius: philosopher, moralist, rhetorician. On 
the subject of dreams, their causes and their worth, Cicero is as clear­
headed and emphatic as Lucretius: despite his having been elected 
augur in 53 B. C, Cicero wrote (in De Divinatione) a blistering 
attack on the notion of revelation in dreams, lumping oneiro­
mancers together with magicians and other charlatans. The follow­
ing passage from De Divinatione recalls the pointed rejection of 
Aristotle: 
Hi cum sustinetur membris et corpore et sensibus, omni certiori cernunt, 
cogitant, sentiunt. Cum autem haec subtracta sunt desertusque animis 
languore corporis, turn agitatur ipse per sese. Itaque in eo etformae ver­
santur et actiones, et multa audiri, multa did vindentur. Haec scillicet in 
imbecillo remissaque animo multa omnibus modus confusa et variata 
versantur, maximeque 'reliquiae' rerum earum moventur de quibus vig­
ilantes aut cogitavimus aut egimus; 
When the soul is supported by the bodily members and by the five senses 
its powers of perception, thought, and apprehension are more trust­
worthy. But when these physical aids are removed and the body is inert 
in sleep, the soul then moves of itself. And so, in that state, visions flit 
about it, actions occur and it seems to hear and see many things. When 
the soul itself is weakened and relaxes many such sights and sounds, you 
may be sure, are seen and heard in all manner of confusion and diversity. 
Then especially do the 'remnants' of our waking thoughts and deeds 
move and stir within our soul.16 
Like all of the others, with the single exception of Aristotle, Cicero 
takes care elsewhere to allow that the gods do occasionally speak to 
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us in dreams, but by now the inclusion of this disclaimer seems little 
more than ceremonial. Indeed, there is remarkable unity among the 
great dream authorities of antiquity on this important question: the 
lore shows us undeniably that revelatory dreams do occur, but we are 
ill-advised to fancy that our own dreams might be such. 
It should be added that there is an equally insistent literature in 
support of the revelatory nature of dreams in Greek and Roman 
antiquity, but such oneiric speculation was by and large out of the 
mainstream of classical thought, at least as this was passed down to 
and understood by the Middle Ages. Divination and incubation were 
important elements in Greek and Roman religions, but a dispas­
sionate survey of the major intellectual figures of Greece and Rome 
(emphasizing those widely read in the Middle Ages) shows a deep-
seated scepticism about oneiromancy. Thus, authors such as Morton 
Kelsey are correct in claiming that there was great interest in dream 
interpretation in Greece and Rome, just as I would be correct in 
claiming that twentieth century Americans are fascinated with, say, 
flying saucers (and I could support my claim with a huge biblio­
graphy of our tabloid "chronicles"). In neither case, though, is the 
fascination "official," authoritative, or even representative of the 
leading minds of the periods. We are, thus, both more accurate and 
more responsible in concentrating on the classical authors, revered 
and trusted by medieval thinkers, however unrepresentative of their 
age and civilization they may be. 
The Encyclopedists 
Nearly contemporary with Cicero, another tradition in Western 
oneiromancy begins to surface. The Oneirocriticon of Artemidorus 
of Daldis (or, sometimes, of Ephesus; second century A. D.) is an 
important Greek dream manual, possibly showing some familiarity 
with Cicero but probably deriving from Posidonius and other East­
ern sources. A final determination of Artemidorus' sources, such as 
that conducted by Claes Blum, is unnecessary for our purposes, since 
his work seems to mark the introduction of this body to the West, 
and since the seminal discussion of dream analysis in Macrobius' 
Commentary on the Somnium Scipionis (fourth century) is trace­
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able with certainty no further back than to Artemidorus and to the 
mainstream Greek and Latin authorities just examined. 
At first glance, the Oneirocriticon seems a striking departure 
from the brief and summary discussions of dreams in Lucretius and 
Cicero; it is a complex, carefully organized, five-volume manual for 
the interpretation of dreams as portents of future events.17 None­
theless, the difference between Artemidorus and, say, Cicero, is one 
of degree and emphasis: while Artemidorus' principal interest is in 
the revelatory dream, he divides dreams, just as Cicero did, into 
categories and assigns values and levels of importance to each 
category. 
Accordingly, the first division of the Oneirocriticon is one be­
tween significant and insignificant dreams, called oneiros and en­
hypnion respectively. The precise distinction Artemidorus makes 
here is important: oneiri are significant in the waking world of the 
dreamer (that is, to present or future conditions) while enhypnioni 
lose their significance when the dreamer awakens (hence "enhyp­
nion" or "in sleep"). Oneiri are next subdivided into two classes: the 
"theorematic" oneiros, in which the communication or portent is 
direct, requiring no interpretation, and the "allegorical" oneiros, the 
true significance of which is veiled or coded. The bulk of the Oneiro­
criticon is, naturally enough, devoted to rules and examples of inter­
pretation of this last allegorical variety. 
Artemidorus' classification of dreams was his most important 
contribution to medieval dream lore. Though unaware of its source, 
nearly every medieval dream writer used Artemidorus' categories 
and even his terminology: following Macrobius, the standard term 
in medieval oneiromancy for a meaningless day residue dream is 
"insomnium" (translating Artemidorus' "enhypnion"), and Macro­
bius even repeats Artemidorus' quaint etymology for the term. 
Moreover, the division of significant dreams into theorematic and 
allegorical—or representational and figurative—neatly corresponds 
to the Macrobean distinction between the somnium and the visio 
(respectively), a formal or "generic" distinction which will prove 
crucial in the eventual "occupation" of this scientific taxonomy by 
the medieval dream vision. 
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Above all, however, like the others before him, Artemidorus 
counsels caution and scepticism in assessing the worth of specific 
dreams. Even in a treatise as enthusiastic as the Oneirocriticon on 
the subject of dream portents, Artemidorus offers careful and dis­
passionate advice to would-be oneiromancers, suggesting, for ex­
ample, that dream analysts consider such factors as the dreamer's 
homeland and personal habits (Books Four and Five). Thus, if we 
search for a credulous dream interpreter in the waning years of the 
classical era, we will not find him in Artemidorus, who was, with 
Cicero, the most important source of the seminal document for 
dream interpretation in the later Middle Ages, the Commentary on 
the Somnium Scipionis of Ambrosius Theodosius Macrobius. 
Macrobius' commentary on the "Dream of Scipio" is far and away 
the most influential theoretical treatment of dreams and dream in­
terpretation that the Middle Ages knew and, considering the work 
as a whole, this is a curious legacy. Macrobius never intended to 
write a treatise on dream interpretation, a subject which takes up 
only a few pages in the Commentary (and these by way of introduc­
tion), and yet it is for these pages that Macrobius is most revered. 
In fact, the Commentary on the Somnium Scipionis is an encyclo­
pedic gloss on the Ciceronian text, a compendium of all knowledge 
loosely structured as a running commentary on the ecstatic conclu­
sion of Cicero's Republic. Operating on the first principle that 
"there is nothing more complete than this work [the Somnium], 
which embraces the entire body of philosophy," Macrobius uses the 
topics of Scipio's dream as occasions for lengthy discussions of 
numerology, mathematics, physical science, astronomy and, natu­
rally enough, dream lore. Thus, early in the Commentary, Macrobius 
comes to terms with the form of the revelation and (essentially 
glossing the passage quoted earlier), offers his own rather eclectic 
taxonomy of dreams. According to Macrobius, 
omnium quae videre sibi dormientes videntur quinque sunt principales 
et diversitates et nomina. aut enim est o^etpos secundum Graecos quod 
Latini somnium vocant, aut est opa^ia quod visio recte appelatur, aut est 
Xprj/JLariofios quod oraculum nuncupatur, aut est evvnvtov quod in­
somnium dicitur, aut est <$>6LVTCIO\XOI. quod Cicero, quotiens opus hoc 
nomine fuit, visum vocavit. 
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All dreams may be classified under five main types: there is the enig­
matic dream, in Greek oneiros, in Latin somnium; second, there is the 
prophetic vision, in Greek horama, in Latin visio; third, there is the 
oracular dream, in Greek chrematismos, in Latin oraculum; fourth, there 
is the nightmare, in Greek enhypnion, in Latin insomnium; and last, the 
apparition, in Greek, phantasma, which Cicero, when he has occasion to 
use the word, calls "visum."18 
Macrobius next goes into some detail on each of the varieties, be­
ginning with the insignificant types: 
est enim evvnviov quotiens cura oppressi animi corporisve sive fortu­
nae, qualis vigilantem fatigaverat, talem se ingerit dormienti: animi, si 
amator deliciis suis aut f ruentem se videat aut carentem, si metuens quis 
imminentem sibi vel insidiis vel potestate personam aut incurrisse hanc 
ex imagine cogitationum suarum aut effugisse videatur: corporis, si 
temeto ingurgitatus aut distentus cibo vel abundantia praefocari se aes­
timet vel gravantibus exonerari, aut contra si esuriens cibum aut potum 
sitiens desiderare, quaerere, vel etiam invenisse videatur, fortunae cum 
se quis aestimat vel potentia vel magistratu aut augeri pro desiderio aut 
exui pro timore. 
Nightmares may be caused by physical or mental distress, or anxiety 
about the future; the patient experiences in dreams vexations similar to 
those that disturb him during the day. As examples of the mental variety, 
we might mention the dream of the lover who dreams of possessing his 
sweetheart or of losing her, or the man who fears the plots or might of 
an enemy and is confronted with him in his dream or seems to be fleeing 
him. The physical variety might be illustrated by one who has overin­
dulged in eating or drinking and dreams that he is either choking with 
food or unburdening himself, or by one who has been suffering from 
hunger or thirst and dreams that he is craving and searching for food or 
drink or has found it. Anxiety about the future would cause a man to 
dream that he is gaining a prominent position or that he is being de­
prived of it as he feared.19 
After making a similar disclaimer on the subject of the phantasma 
or visum, Macrobius concludes: 
his duobus modis ad nullam noscendi futuri opem receptis, tribus ceteris 
in ingenium divinationis instruimur. 
The two types just described are of no assistance in foretelling the future; 
but by means of the other three we are gifted with the powers of 
divination.20 
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Macrobius next turns to descriptions of these "tribus ceteris," the 
three significant varieties: 
et est oraculum quidem cum in somnis parens vel alia sancta gravisve 
persona seu sacerdos vel etiam deus aperte eventurum quid aut non 
eventurum, faciendum vitandumve denuntiat. visio est autem cum id 
quis videt quod eodem modo quo apparuerat eveniet. amicum peregre 
commorantem quern non cogitabat visus sibi est reversum videre, et 
procedenti obvius quern viderat venit in amplexus. depositum in quiete 
suscepit et matutinus ei precator occurit mandans pecuniae tutelam et 
fidae custodiae celanda committens. somnium proprie vocatur quod tegit 
figuris et velat ambagibus non nisi interpretatione intellegendam signi­
ficationem rei quae demonstratur, quod quale sit non a nobis exponden­
dum est, cum hoc unus quisque ex usu quid sit agnoscat. 
We call a dream oracular (oraculum) in which a parent, or a pious or 
revered man, or a priest, or even a god clearly reveals what will or will 
not transpire, and what action to take or to avoid. We call a dream a 
prophetic vision (visio) if it actually comes true. For example, a man 
dreams of the return of a friend who has been staying in a foreign land 
thoughts of whom never enter his mind. He goes out and presently 
meets this friend and embraces him. Or in his dream he agrees to accept 
a deposit, and early the next day a man runs anxiously to him, charging 
him with the safekeeping of his money and committing secrets to his 
trust. By an enigmatic dream (somnium) we mean one that conceals 
with strange shapes and veils with ambiguity the true meaning of the 
information being offered, and requires an interpretation for its under­
standing. We need not explain further the nature of this dream since 
everyone knows from experience what it is.21 [emphasis mine] 
Macrobius concludes this passage by referring to the five varieties of 
somnia outlined by Artemidorus—personal, alien, social, public, 
and universal—and offers brief commentaries on each. 
Such was the authoritative classification for dreams for over a 
millennium. Later writers might alter the Macrobean categories 
slightly, but except for such minor alterations and shifts in empha­
sis, the taxonomy stays intact through Freud and even Edgar Cayce. 
Macrobius clearly recognizes that the dream is often the fulfillment 
of a wish, the product of transmuted thoughts, experiences, and de­
sires, yet he simultaneously maintains that, at special times to spe­
cial people, the same dreams are vehicles for divine communication. 
The taxonomy, while seemingly very neat, raises more questions 
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than it answers: how, for example, are we to tell if a dream that fits 
the formal description of a visio (or oraculum or somnium), yet is 
possibly traceable to day residue (and hence is an insignificant in­
somnium), is worthy of interpretation? How, for example, should I 
interpret last night's dream that a distinguished colleague had 
praised this book? Formally, the dream is a visio since it seems to 
reveal the future directly and clearly ("apertly," Chaucer would say); 
at the same time, though, the dream is also manifestly the fulfill­
ment of its dreamer's wish and thus an insomnium. What are we to 
do with such commonplace dream experiences (and the even more 
common one of the s omnium-ins omnium, the enigmatic dream in­
terpreted to portend the fulfillment of a wish)? 
Macrobius does not answer this sort of question explicitly, but his 
implied answer, gleaned from the quotations just presented, would 
seem to be that the possibility that a dream might have originated in 
the waking concerns of the dreamer is, in and of itself, sufficient to 
raise questions about its authenticity. This at least would seem to be 
the medieval interpretation, not only because it is a point heavily 
emphasized by medieval dream writers, but also, paradoxically, be­
cause it helps account for the separate existence of the "apocalypse 
tradition" with formal constraints very different from those of the 
dream vision. The insistence on the waking state of the visionary, on 
his serenity, and especially on minutiae such as his fasting prior to 
the experience, when viewed in light of Macrobius' taxonomy, sug­
gests that the apocalypse conventions developed as means of pro­
tecting holy experience from "disqualification by causes" when 
judged according to standards such as Macrobius' 
Thus, Macrobius' categories are (or at least were interpreted by 
medievals to be) extremely conservative, all but precluding the pos­
sibility of a dream-revelation except under extraordinarily "sterile" 
and controlled circumstances. Otherwise, it would seem that, accord­
ing to Macrobius, we ought never to consider our dreams revelatory. 
Select Medieval Authorities 
With all of its inconsistencies and contradictions, the dream tax­
onomy which reached fruition in the Commentary on the Somnium 
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Scipionis suited the purposes of medieval dream writers perfectly, 
for it contained all of the elements required by their ancient theol­
ogy and their contemporary philosophical scepticism. In the Liber 
de Spiritu et Anima, for example, St. Augustine repeats Macrobius' 
fivefold classification almost verbatim: 
Omnium quae sibi videre videntur dormientes, quinque sunt genera; 
videlicet, oraculum, visio, somnium, insomnium, et phantasma. Oracu­
lum est, cum in somnis parens vel aliqua sancta gravisque persona, seu 
sacerdos, vel etiam Deus eventurum aliquid aperte vel non eventurum, 
faciendum vel devitandum denuntiat. Visio est, cum id quis videt quod 
eodem modo quo apparuerat, eveniet. Somnium est figuris tectum, et 
sine interpretatione intelligi non potest. Insomnium est, quando id quod 
fatigaverat vigilantem, ingerit se dormienti; sicut est cibi cura vel potus, 
vel aliqua studia, vel artes, vel infirmitates. Secundum namque studia 
quae quisque exercuit, somniat; et solitarum artium simulacra in prae­
sentia mentis impressa apparent in somnis. Juxta etiam infirmitatum 
diversitates diversa accidunt somnia. Etaim secundum morum et humo­
rum varietates variantur somnia. Alia namque vident sanguinei, alia 
cholerici, alia phlegmatici, alia melancholia. Illi vident rubea et varia; 
isti, nigra et alba. Phantasma est, quando qui vix dormire coepit, et adhuc 
se vigilare aestimat, aspicere videtur irruentes in se, vel passim vagantes 
formas discrepantes et varias, laetas vel turbulentas. 
Of those experiences which sleepers seem to have, there are five va­
rieties: oraculum, visio, somnium, insomnium, and phantasma. It is an 
oraculum when in sleep a parent or a holy and respectable person, a 
priest or even God Himself announces what shall or shall not come to 
pass, or what one should or should not do. It is a visio when that which is 
revealed happens in the very way it appeared in the dream. A somnium 
is made of images and cannot be understood without interpretation. It is 
an insomnium when that which oppressed the person awake returns to 
afflict him when asleep; for example, some disturbance from food or 
drink, or certain avocations or arts, or certain infirmities. It follows of an 
avocation when that in which one labors is what one dreams of; and 
images of those very arts impressed on the waking mind appear in sleep. 
Likewise, certain dreams result from various infirmities, and are also 
affected by various habits or bodily humors. Some dreams are sanguine, 
some choleric, some phlegmatic, some melancholic. Some see red and 
other colors, others only black and white. It is a phantasma when, barely 
asleep, one thinks himself still awake and seems to see fleet images or 
various flitting shapes, sometimes joyful, sometimes troubled.22 
I quote the passage at length both to show Augustine's great unac­
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knowledged debt to Macrobius and to his system and also to illus­
trate his conscious decision to emphasize the somatic dream (the 
insomnium) in this expanded version of his original. Leaving out 
Macrobius' charming case of the dream of the return of the long 
missed friend "quern non cogitabant" and his other examples of 
prophetic or premonitory dreams, Augustine chooses to expand on 
the insomnium, stressing the range of everyday preoccupations 
{studia et artes) which can bring on such dreams. Similar remarks 
can be found in the Confessions, only five chapters away from Au­
gustine's recollections of his mother's dream of the young man on 
the rule (discussed earlier, in chapter 1): 
Cibus in somnis simillimus est cibus vigilantium, quo tamen dormientes 
non aluntur; dormiunt enim: atilla nee similia erant nullo modo tibi, 
sicut mine mihi locuta es; quia ilia erant corporalia phantasmata, falsa 
corpora, quibus certiora sunt vera corpora ista quae videmus visu carneo, 
sive coelestia sive terrestria: cum pecudibus et volatilibus videmus haec; 
et certiora sunt, quam cum imaginamur ea. Et rursus certius imaginamur 
ea, quam ex eis suspicamur alia grandiora, et infinita quae omnio nulla 
sunt, qualibus ego tune pascebar inanibus; et non pascebar. 
Food in dreams is very much like the food of waking men, but sleepers 
are not fed by it: they merely sleep. But those fantasies [i.e., the teachings 
of the Manichees] were in nowise similar to you, as you have now told 
me, because they were corporeal fantasies, false bodies, and real bodies, 
whether in the heavens or on earth, are more certain than they. These 
things we behold in common with beasts of the field and birds of the air, 
and they are more certain than those which we conjure up in imagina­
tion. Again, there is more certainty when we fashion mental images of 
these real things than when by means of them we picture vaster or un­
limited bodies that do not exist at all. On such empty phantoms I was 
fed—and yet I was not fed.23 
Elsewhere in his writings, Augustine is equally careful to main­
tain what was rapidly becoming the orthodox viewpoint, acknowl­
edging the miraculous nature of the dreams recorded in Scripture 
while lambasting at every turn credulous beliefs in one's own 
dreams. In De Cum pro Mortibus, for example, Augustine discounts 
dream visitations from the dead, explaining that the images of loved 
ones produced in the dreamer's mind are purely phantasmal.24 
Thus, while Augustine can credit a divine source to Monica's 
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dream, he is careful in more analytical contexts to maintain a thor­
oughgoing scepticism about dreams. Even in his exegesis of the Paul­
ine ecstasis in Book 12 of De Genesi ad Utteram, Augustine care­
fully prefaces his remarks on the three levels of vision with a brief 
discussion of dreams and their relationship to the mind of the 
dreamer: 
Quis enim cum a somno evigilaverit, non continuo sentiat imaginaria 
fuisse quae videbat, quamvis cum ea videret dormiens, a vigilantium cor­
poralibus visis discernere non valebat? Quanquam mihi accidisse scio, et 
ob hob etiam aliis accidere potuisse vel posse non dubito, ut in somnis 
videns, in somnis me videre sentirem; illasque imagines, quae ipsam 
nostram consensionem ludificare consueverunt, non esse vera corpora, 
sed in somnis eas praesentari firmissime, etiam dormiens, tenerem 
atque sentirem. 
Does not everyone, when awake, still feel that the images he saw while 
asleep were real? Who is really able to distinguish between what he has 
seen asleep and waking, corporeal sights? I know these things have hap­
pened to me and I have no doubt that they have happened to others (and 
will continue to happen): when I dream certain sights, I also dream that I 
see them in fact. These images, with whose games we are all familiar, are 
not corporeal, but when I am asleep, they surely seem so to me, such that 
I can hold and feel them.25 
Even the word "somnium" occurs only rarely after this point in the 
De Genesi ad Utteram, as Augustine analyzes Paul's rapture into 
the third Heaven: the word consistently used for the experience, not 
surprisingly, is "visio," a term sanctified by the Visio Sancti Pauli 
and one which short-circuits Macrobius' categories. Even so, Augus­
tine interrupts himself again in the exegesis to detail the several 
varieties of revelatory experience in terms which subtly recall 
Macrobius: 
Ego visa ista omnia visis comparo somniantium. Sicut enim aliquando et 
haec falsa, aliquando autem vera sunt, aliquando perturbata, aliquando 
tranquilla; ipsa autem vera, aliquando futuris omnino similia, vel aperte 
dicta, aliquando obscuris significationibus et quasi figuratis locutionibus 
praenuntiata: sic etiam ilia omnia. 
I might compare these visions to those experienced in dreams. Some are 
false, some true; some unsettled, some serene. Some offer images of the 
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future, sometimes plainly announced, while at other times the prophe­
cies are given through enigmatic meanings or figurative pronounce­
ments.26 
Though here the decided emphasis is on revelatory or significant 
experiences (the visio suggested by "aperte," the somnium by "ob­
scuris," and the oraculum by "figuratis locutionibus"), Augustine 
still begins with the ubiquitous disclaimer, "aliquando . . . haec 
falsa." 
Writing not long after Augustine, Gregory the Great is consider­
ably less open-minded than even Augustine was, reflecting the 
growing official conservatism on the dream question, which Morton 
Kelsey calls "The Coming of Darkness." From the point of view of 
dream enthusiasts, the term is apt, for there seems to develop at this 
stage of patristic writings a concerted attempt on the part of the 
Church establishment to minimize (though not, of course, to elimi­
nate thoroughly) the possibility of the significant, revelatory dream: 
Aliquando namque somnia ventris plenitudine, vel inanitate, aliquando 
vero illusione, aliquando cogitatione simul et illusione, aliquando revela­
tione, aliquando autem cogitatione simul et revelatione generantur. 
Dreams are generated either by a full stomach or by an empty one, or by 
illusions, or by our thoughts combined with illusions, or by revelations, 
or by our thoughts combined with revelations.27 
This statement seems intentionally confused, featuring the sort of 
manic randomness we associate with the Prologue to Book One of 
the Hous of Fame: Gregory carefully includes "revelationes" among 
the possible causes for dreams, but he does so in a singularly un­
promising way, refusing even to give this worthy cause single status 
in his list. Still, however sceptical this statement may seem, it is only 
so by degree and, considering the insistence of Augustine on mun­
dane causes for dreams, a small degree at that. Given this attitude— 
acknowledgment of revelation in dreams but contrived pessimism 
about identifying such agency—it is not surprising that Gregory 
next repeats advice as old as Aristotle, Cicero, and Cato: 
Somnia etenim nisi plerumque ab occulto hoste per illusionem fierent, 
nequaquam hoc vir sapiens indicaret dicens: Multos errare fecerunt 
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somnia, et illusiones vanae (Eccli. 34: 7). Vel certe: Non augurabimini, 
nee observabitis somnia (Levit. 19: 26). Quibus profecto verbis, cujus 
sint detestationis ostenditur quae auguriis conjunguntur. 
If dreams did not frequently come from illusions of the Devil, the wise 
man surely would not have said, "For dreams have led many astray, and 
vain illusions as well" (Ecclesiasticus 34: 7), or "You shall not divine or 
observe dreams" (Leviticus 19: 26), words which anathemize those who 
dabble in auguries.28 
This attitude toward dreams became the standard one among the 
Church Fathers in the succeeding centuries of the Middle Ages, of 
whom I shall include only two examples before turning to Thomas 
Aquinas' mature Scholastic view. Writing in the ninth century 
Commentary on Ecclesiastes, Rhabanus Maurus includes a dismissal 
of dream credulity as memorable and shrill as can be found in the 
period: 
Vana spes, et mendacium viro insensato; et somnia extollunt impru­
dentes. Quasi qui apprehendit umbram, et persequitur ventum: sic et qui 
attendit as visa mendacia. Hoc secundum hoc visio somniorum; ante 
faciem hominis, similitudo alterius hominis. Ab immundo quis munda­
bitur? et a mendace quid verum dicitur? 
A vain hope and a lie to insensate men; dreams only coddle fools. Like 
those who attend to shadows and those who follow the very wind—such 
as these pay heed to lying visions. What can be learned from such visions 
in sleep?—before the face of man, but the image of man himself. And 
who can be cleansed by filth? And who can learn the truth from a liar?29 
Addressing his sister in the Liber de Modo Bene Vivendi, Bernard of 
Clairvaux uses some of the same imagery as Rhabanus did, equating 
dream credulity with folly, though doing so more positively and 
gently: 
Qui in somniis vel augurliis spem suam ponit, non confidit in Deo: et 
talis est qualis ille qui ventum sequitur, aut umbram apprehendere nit­
itur. Auguria mendacia, et somnia deceptoria, ultraque vana sunt. Non 
debemus credere somniis, ne forte decipiamur in illis. Spes nostra in Deo 
semper sit firma, et de somniis nulla nobis sit cura. 
He who puts his faith in dreams or divinations has none in God; he is 
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like one who follows the wind or who tries to grab at shadows. Lying 
divinations and deceptive dreams are equally vain. Let us not believe in 
dreams lest we be ensnared by them. Let our faith rest ever firm in God, 
and let us care nothing for dreams.30 
Thomas Aquinas and the Summa Theologicae might well serve 
as the watershed for this discussion, since the later Middle Ages saw 
the return of a substantial part of Aristotle's work largely through 
Thomas' Christianizing mirror, and since Thomas has no trouble 
discovering the total scepticism of "The Philosopher" on dreams. 
There is no extended discussion of dreams and oneiromancy them­
selves in the Summa (a fact I take to be significant in itself), but 
Thomas' fugitive statements on dreams and dream interpretation 
may be collected to give a clear picture of his (very negative) think­
ing. The best known passage in the Summa, la. Ill; 3, responsio, 
explains how "angeli revelant aliqua in somnis": 
Unde Aristoteles, assignans causam apparitionis somniorum, dicit quod, 
cum animaldormit, descendente plurimo sanguine adprincipium sensit­
ivum, simul descendunt motus, idest impressiones relictae ex sensibi­
lium motionibus, quae in spiritibus sensualibus conservatur, et movent 
principium sensitivum, ita quod fit quaedam apparitio, ac si tune princi­
pium sensitivum a rebus ipsis exterioribus mutaretur. Et tanta potest 
esse commotio spirituum et humorum, quod hujusmodi apparitiones 
etiam vigilantibus fiunt: sicut patet in phreneticis, et in aliis hujusmodi. 
Sicut igitur hoc fit per naturalem commotionem humorum; et quan­
doque etiam per voluntatem hominis, qui voluntarie imaginatur quod 
prius senserat; ita etiam hoc potest fieri virtute angeli boni vel mali, 
quandoque quidem cum alienatione a corporeis sensibus, quandoque au-
tem absque tali alienatione. 
Hence Aristotle says, in analysing the cause of dream images, that when 
an animal is sleeping most of the blood descends to its seat and sense 
movements accompany this. In other words, the impressions left from 
the objects of the senses are retained in the animal spirits and induce 
change in the seat of the senses. And thus a kind of image is produced as 
though the seat of the senses were at that moment being caused to 
change by external objects themselves. In fact, the disturbance of the 
spirits and humors may be so great that hallucinations of this sort may 
occur even in those who are awake as, for example, in the insane and the 
like. Therefore, just as this happens through a natural disturbance of the 
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humors, and sometimes through the will (as when a man deliberately 
imagines what he had previously experienced), so also this can occur 
through the power of good and bad angels, both at times when we are 
disconnected from our bodily senses and at other times when we are 
connected with them.31 
This is a crucial passage because it effectively collapses Macrobius' 
"distinction by causes" by sensibly claiming that God can use any­
thing, even human physiology, for His purposes; it does not, how­
ever, engender hopes that such divine intervention can be recog­
nized for what it is. 
Elsewhere (at 2a. 2ae; 95, 6), Thomas discourses briefly on the 
causes of dreams: internal (physiological or emotional imbalance) 
or external (evil spirits, good spirits, God), with only divine causa­
tion valorizing the dream. Thus, on the subject of prophecy, Thomas 
is technically open-minded but rhetorically stern: 
Sic ergo dicendum quod si quis utatur somniis ad praecognoscenda 
futura secundum quod somnia procedunt ex revelatione divina, vel ex 
causa naturali, intrinseca sive extrinseca, quantum se potest virtus talis 
causae extendere, non erit illicita divinatio. Si autem hujusmodi divinatio 
causetur ex revelatione daemonum cum quibus pacta habentur expressa, 
quia ad hoc invocantur, vel tacita, quia hujusmodi divinatio extenditur ad 
quod se non potest extendere, erit divinatio illicita et superstitiosa. 
To conclude, if anyone uses dreams to foretell the future when he 
knows that they come from a divine revelation, or, observing its limits, 
from some natural cause, internal or external, then this is not unlawful 
divination. But if the foretelling comes from the disclosure by demons 
with whom a pact has been made, whether express, by invoking them, or 
tacit, by seeking knowledge out of human reach, then this is superstitious 
and unlawful divination.32 
The subject of dreams comes up twice more in purely ethical con­
texts in the Summa, specifically on the degree of guilt incurred in 
wet dreams (at 2a. 2ae; 154-55 and again at 3a. 80; 7); in the second 
discussion, Thomas' psychological explanation for the wet dream 
allows monks so afflicted to take the Eucharist the next morning, 
provided their dreams were wholly the products of their unconscious 
minds. 
I conclude this survey of medieval scepticism on the dream ques­
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tion with three later authorities whose popularity and importance 
to medieval thought are hardly questionable: John of Salisbury, Boc­
caccio, and Bartholomeus Angelicus. It cannot be ascertained, of 
course, that Chaucer or the Pearl-poet or Langland knew their think­
ing on dreams, but nonetheless the Polycraticus, the De Casibus 
Virorum Illustrorum, and the De Proprietatibus Rerum were, in 
their respective fields, widely admired and revered books thoroughly 
in the mainstream of philosophical, historical, and medical learning. 
John of Salisbury takes up the dream question in Book Two of the 
Polycraticus, as an example of "Quia Deus signis suam praemunire 
dignatur creaturam" or of how God by signs deigns to forewarn His 
creatures, a proof of "divinae miserationis" ("divine pity"): 
Signa etenim interdum vera, interdum falsa sunt. Quis nescit somnio­
rum uarias esse significationes quas et usus approbat et maiorum con­
firmat auctoritas? In eis utique quoniam sompnis est, animales virtutes, 
scillicet sensus, qui dicuntur corporis et sunt animale quiescunt, sed natu­
rales intenduntur. 
At times signs are true; at times false. Who is ignorant of the various 
meanings of dreams which experience approves and the authority of our 
forefathers confirms? In dreams especially, since it is the sleeping state, 
the animal properties (that is to say the senses which are called corporeal 
but are in reality spiritual) are quiescent, but the natural properties are 
intensified.33 
The snippet of traditional psychology which concludes this passage, 
along with John's admission that certain dreams do have meaning, 
seems to promise a clear, practical discussion of the method of dif­
ferentiating and interpreting dreams. The rhetorical question, 
"Who is ignorant . . . " reminds us that John is aware of the exis­
tence of true revelations, and the rest of the passage seems a calm 
prelude to a final, clinical solution to the dream question. The pas­
sage seems to promise that psychology and theology, human nature 
and Biblical tradition can be brought together to solve this vexing 
problem. 
The promise is not fulfilled.34 What follows this chapter in the 
Polycraticus is nothing more than Macrobius' distinction between 
somnia and insomnia (which asserts that the two sorts of dream are 
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distinct but not practically differentiable; chapter 15) and a tentative 
analysis of interpretive principles which somewhat anticipates 
Freud's notions of transference and condensation (chapter 16). Fi­
nally in chapter 17, John's own voice intrudes on the growing but 
contradictory evidence to introduce a sunny, reasonable conclusion 
that completely dismantles the edifice of lore: 
Sed dum has coniectorum traditiones exequimur, uereor ne merita 
non tarn coniectoriam exequi, quas aut nulla aut inanis ars est, dormitare 
videamur. Quisquis enim somniorum sequitur uanitatem, paruum in 
lege Dei uigilans est, et dum fidei facit dispendium, perniciosissime 
dormit. Ueritas siquidem ab eo longe facta est, nee earn facilius potest 
apprehendere quam urionem expungere vel puncto curare carcineam qui 
caligantibus in meridei palpat. 
In describing the methods of the interpreters of dreams, I fear it may 
seem that I am not describing the art but am myself nodding, for it is no 
art at all or at best a meaningless one. For whoever involves himself in 
the deception of dreams is not sufficiently awake to the law of God, 
suffers a loss of faith, and drowses to his own ruin. Truth is indeed far 
removed from him, nor can he grasp it any more effectually than he who 
with blinded eyes gropes his way in broad daylight can lance a boil or 
treat a cancer.35 
Boccaccio's approach to dreams is like that of John of Salisbury, 
though his "solution" to the question is finally not as crashing as 
that of the Polycraticus. In Book Two of the De Casibus Virorum 
Illustrorum, Boccaccio introduces dreams in relation to his notions 
of the soul and of allegory: 
Etenim maximus quiddam diuinitatis occultam infixum mortalium ani­
mis est. Eoque agente curis sol ti ceu minus corporea depressi inde plura 
sopito corpore aut visione certissima aut tenui sub velamine audimus 
vidimusque. 
. . . there is a certain divine something implanted in the souls of men; 
when the body is asleep, this something is released by our thoughts and 
is less imprisoned by the solidity of the body. It is then that we hear and 
see the things that will take place either in actual visions or under the 
veil of allegory.36 
Like the first passage quoted from the Polycraticus, this introduc­
tion seems to augur well for an open, less totally sceptical considera­
tion of dreams, and, in the paragraphs that follow this one, Boccac­
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cio carefully reminds us of the well-attested dreams of figures such 
as Simonides, Calpurnia, Atterius, and Pharaoh. All comes, how­
ever, to an abrupt, rather open-ended conclusion: 
Nolim tamen ab hoc arbitretur quisquam etsi se de corpus sompno deti­
neatur immobile animam semper sua divinitate frui. Quum diuni mune­
ris illud sit quando contingit. Variis quippe et plurimus agentibus causis 
per ambages frequenter deducitur. Et ideo si quandoque visis fides inte­
gra adhibenda sit: nam tamen eisdem semper credendem est. Sicut in 
ceteris inter spernandum credendumque discretione preuia discernen­
dum est. Ut non negligamus quod ad salutem ostenditur: et conuerso 
innocuis non turbemur. 
Of course, no one must believe that every time he dreams there is a 
divine communication, or that each dream is a present from God. For 
many reasons a man's spirit is frequently led into confusing obscurities. 
Therefore, even if one puts complete faith in dreams, they cannot always 
be believed. As in everything, above all one should carefully weigh be­
tween rejecting a dream or believing in it. In that way we will not neglect 
anything that is for our benefit, nor, on the other hand, will we be dis­
turbed by something harmless.37 
This is certainly good and sound advice, the chief difficulty of which, 
we have seen, inheres in that very process, "discernere." 
Bartholomeus Anglicus, a central figure in the history of medicine 
in the Middle Ages who wrote about a hundred years after John of 
Salisbury, will conclude this brief anthology of medieval dream au­
thorities. Bartholomeus is predictably specific about the causes of 
dreams, citing Aristotle and Augustine's De Genesi ad Litteram 
(Book 12; see pages 65-66 above) in his eclectic, derivative discus­
sion. His formal pronouncements on dreams (in John of Trevisa's 
translation) have the same peremptory ring that sounded earlier in 
John of Salisbury, as well as his subterranean perplexity: 
Also somtyme sweuenes be]? trewe and somtyme fals, somtyme clere and 
playne and somtyme troubly. Sweuenes j?at be}? trewe buj? somtyme 
opun and playne and somtyme iwrappid in figuratif, mistik, and dim and 
derke tokenynges and bodinges, as it ferde in Pharaoes sweuene.38 
However, 
Somtyme Satanas his aungel desgisi)? hym as )?ey3 he were an angel of 
Ii3t and make)? siche images to begile and deceyue man to his purpos, 
whanne me trowi)? him in doinges }?at be)? opunlich goode . . .  . 
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Also diuers sweuenes come)? of diuers causes, somtyme of complex­
ioun, as he ]?at is sanguineus ha)? glad and likinge sweuenes, malancolius 
metij? of sorwe, colericus of fire and of firy )?inges, and flewmaticus of 
reyne and snowe, and of watres and of watery )?inges and of o]?ire such. 
And so eueriche man metij? sweuenes acordinge to his complexioun, 
witt, and age. So sei)? Constantius. And somtyme sweuenes come)? of 
appetite, affeccioun, and desire, as he ]?at is anhongred metij> of mete, 
and a dronken man J?at is a)?urst meti)? of drinke, . . . 39 
Thus, like Macrobius, Augustine, and all the others before him, Bar­
tholomeus admits that there may be some dreams, under rare cir­
cumstances, that come from God and may contain wisdom, but by 
now this gesture is no more than ceremonial. The admission is 
stated briefly and the theological justification—something like "di­
vine pity"—is surely included, but the bulk of the discussion is de­
voted to the everyday somatic dream, the worthless, sometimes be­
guiling and troubling dream from which Alcuin prays to be spared: 
Domini Jesu Christi, miserere mei et cohibe in me omnis iniquiae concu­
piscentiae motum; ut non me compellat corruptellarum turpitudines 
perpetrare, quae per imagines animales me usque ad carnis fluxum in 
somnis conantur seducere. 
O Lord Jesus Christ, have mercy on me and abide with me in all my 
various trials and to all my goals. Let me not be compelled to endure the 
disgraces of the corrupters who, through creatures of my mind, try to 
move me in sleep towards the dissolution of my very flesh.40 
One wonders what Pertelote might have said to Alcuin. 
Assessing the Evidence 
Several facts can be deduced from the foregoing, very fragmentary 
anthology of classical and medieval dream writers. The first fact is 
that medieval, and especially patristic writers were caught in a cur­
ious doctrinal-philosophical tangle. The weight of the classical evi­
dence (excluding an Arab-mystical tradition based on Artemidorus) 
was decidedly sceptical, probably itself a reaction to flourishing mys­
tery cults and popular credulity in Greece and Rome. The classical 
authorities were aware of the canonical dream visitations from the 
gods but were unwilling to accord these a central place in their dis­
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cussions, fearing that ignorant men would be led astray by credulous 
beliefs that Jove or Venus might visit them too in sleep. Thus, the 
great medieval authority on nearly everything, Cicero, is the source 
of the scepticism in Macrobius, to which the encyclopedist 
added a "Platonic" ambivalence for what we shall see were rhetori­
cal and not scientific reasons. 
This collision of philosophical common sense and mystical tradi­
tion among classical dream writers took its toll on their descendents 
in the Middle Ages and is half of the reason why the medieval au­
thorities sound so fey and discontinuous on the dream question. The 
discontinuity, the latent and inherent contradictions in the classical 
and medieval taxonomies, first becomes visible in Macrobius. Seek­
ing to elevate the Somnium Scipionis in the beginning of his com­
mentary, Macrobius sets out his five categories as we have seen only 
to do remarkable violence to them a page or so later: 
hoc ergo quod Scipio vidisse se rettulit et tria ilia quae sola probabilia 
sunt genera principalitatis amplectitur, et omnes ipsius somnii species 
attingit, est enim oraculum quia Paulus et Africanus uterque parens, 
sancti gravesque ambo nee alieni a sacerdotio, quid illi eventurum esset 
denuntiaverunt; est visio quia loca ipsa in quibus post corpus vel qualis 
futurus esset aspexit; est somnium quia rerum quae illi narratae sunt 
altitudo tecta profunditate prudentiae non potest nobis nisi scientia in­
terpretationis aperiri. 
The dream which Scipio reports that he saw embraces the three reli­
able types mentioned above, and also has to do with all five varieties of 
the enigmatic dream [after Artemidorus: personal, alien, and so on]. It is 
oracular since the two men who appeared before him and revealed his 
future, Aemilius Paulus and Scipio the Elder, were both his father, both 
pious and revered men, and were both affiliated with the priesthood. It is 
a prophetic dream since Scipio saw the regions of his abode after death 
and his future condition. It is an enigmatic dream because the truths 
revealed to him were couched in words that hid their profound meaning 
and could not be comprehended without skillful interpretation.41 
What are we to make of this or, more to the point, what might some 
poor journeyman oneiromancer of twelfth century France or En­
gland make of it? Macrobius seems impressed—and expects his 
readers to be impressed—that the Somnium Scipionis embraces all 
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"three reliable types mentioned above," but, far from adding literal 
dignity and credibility to the dream, this embrasure would cause a 
would-be dream interpreter no little unrest (as would, say, three 
alibis). More than this, Macrobius makes this odd proclamation on 
the significance(s?) of the Somnium Scipionis heedless of the ines­
capable contrary evidence in the text itself: 
hie mihi—credo equidem ex hoc quod eramus locuti; fit enim fere ut 
cogitationes sermonesque nostri pariant aliquid in somno tale, . . . 
Africanus se ostendit ea forma quae mihi ex imagine eius quam ex ipso 
erat notior; . . . 
And then—(I suppose it was a result of what we had been talking about; 
for it happens often that the things that we have been thinking and 
speaking of bring about something in our sleep . . .)—Africanus stood 
there before me, in figure familiar to me from his bust rather than from 
life . . . , 42 
Cicero himself seems to leave open the possibility that the Somnium 
Scipionis is really the "Insomnium Scipionis," a day residue dream. 
The long conversation with Masinissa before retiring, along with 
the telling remark that Africanus appeared not as in life but as his 
statue looked, strongly suggests something other than supernatural 
causation for Macrobius' locus classicus. 
Macrobius is predictably silent on this difficulty, refusing to allow 
it to obtrude on the dream's philosophic worth. The dream is 
worthy, as I suggested earlier, because it is inherently excellent, be­
cause it contains palpable truths, and because it is a great man's 
dream. To claim more of it than this is dangerous. 
Such a dream, in fact, beggars the categories, and violates the 
taxonomy by locating itself in the seam or gap in the five-part 
scheme: the revelatory types (visio, oraculum, and somnium), are 
characterized formally or "generically" according to their contents— 
they are either clear vision, dream conversation, or enigmatic 
vision—while the insignificant types (insomnium and visum) are 
identified externally or "symptomatically"—either as the effect of 
some physical or emotional imbalance or as occurring between wak­
ing and sleep. Macrobius' decision to judge the Somnium Scipionis 
formally rather than symptomatically (disregarding Scipio's own 
suggestion) and the contradictions attendant on that decision are 
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alarming evidence that, despite their neatness, Macrobius' cate­
gories simply do not wash. 
Augustine's ambivalence on dreams is surprisingly like that of 
Macrobius. Like his pagan counterpart, Augustine knew that 
dreams were, for the great majority of people, the merest imagina­
tive refuse, but, again like Macrobius, he was categorically prevented 
from discounting the dream altogether, for the evidence of occa­
sional dream-visitations (in Scripture at the very least) was incon­
trovertible. Thus, we find the strange contradictions of Book Three 
of the Confessions, in which Augustine first derides credulous belief 
in dreams and then fervently recounts that of his mother. The cate­
gories of Augustine, like the fivefold taxonomy of Macrobius, are 
almost secondary, created by the exigencies of doctrine and common 
sense rather than by a direct experiential or intellectual encounter 
with the phenomena. The multiplicity of causes for dreams in Au­
gustine—God, angels, demons, fumosity, and so on—hides an un­
derlying conservative need to retain the fundamentals of doctrine 
without opening the door to wild, illogical, and potentially danger­
ous credulity in dreams. Rhabanus Maurus and Gregory the Great 
may be allowed their purple prose on the dream question because, 
like Augustine in the De Genesi ad Litteram, their large task in 
these tracts (Moralia in Job and Commentary on Ecclesiastes) was 
the exegesis of a Biblical text in which dreams were shown to be 
revelatory. As if to counterweight the implied approval of the her­
meneutic text itself, both writers include excessive denials that 
other dreams, our dreams, can portend as these of the Old Testa­
ment did. 
This "doublethink" on the dream question became institutional­
ized in the later Middle Ages, as the three final examples, from 
different disciplines, indicate. With the right hand, John of Salisbury 
and Boccaccio can blithely introduce the dream as a vehicle of divine 
communication and can list the significant dreams canonized by 
doctrine and tradition, provided they take all (or nearly all) of the 
others away with the left. Bartholomeus Anglicus can do the same, 
with that wonderfully quirky turn of phrase surely borrowed from 
John of Salisbury: "Also somtyme sweuenes be]? trewe and som­
77

MEDIEVAL DREAM AUTHORITIES 
tymes fals." Such a locution could stand as the sum of medieval 
knowledge of the subject of dreams. In the West at least, there was 
no practical, usable prescriptive taxonomy of dreams: for all the 
theories and categories, rules and schemes, there are two and only 
two firm, though facetious precepts: 
I All significant dreams are significant. 
II All pathological dreams are pathological. 
Such "rules" inhered, once again, for reasons totally extrinsic to 
dream lore; they were the absolutely necessary precepts which al­
lowed oneiromancy to coexist with theology and science. When a 
dream was excellent, such as Scipio's or Monica's, ways were found 
to declare it so; when dreams were subversive or revolutionary (or 
so enigmatic that they could be so interpreted), their believers could 
be shown that, because their dreams are the fulfillment of their 
wishes or the "reliquiae" of their daily concerns, their dreams were 
merely somatic experiences. 
Having taken a look at the body of dream lore that was available 
to late medieval thinkers, we are now in a position to apply this lore 
to the dream vision. What my two Orwellian precepts amount to is a 
grand suppression—the suppression of the relevant dream. The ar­
gument runs like this: if dreams caused by emotional unrest or ob­
session are insignificant, then it follows that the dreams of persons 
admitting to such discomfitures are somatic, or at least one is safest 
in assuming so. To put it slightly more harshly, if a person's dream 
promises the fulfillment of a wish or the realization of fear—if the 
dreamer has any emotional investment in the content of the dream 
whatever—then the dream is meaningless. 
This premise is tacitly supported by the apocalypse literature sur­
veyed in chapter 2, where the vision-narrators took great pains to 
demonstrate that the visionaries were not asleep and, moreover, 
were level-headed holy men and women whose minds were as free 
from anxiety as their stomachs were free from pollutants. Strabo's 
elaborate introduction to the Visio Wettini is the summa for such 
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conventions: the narrative doggedly established that Brother Wetti 
was holy, at peace, awake, and fasting when he had his vision. Thus, 
his vision is credible qua vision because he was a fit vessel for Divine 
indwelling. Dream vision narrators, on the other hand, are conven­
tionally in turmoil. Piers Plowman begins with a restless soul on 
Malvern Hills: 
In a somer seson whan soft was the sonne

I shope me in shroudes as I a shepe were;

In habite as an heremite vnholy of workes

Went wyde in j?is world wondres to here.

Ac on a May morynge on Maluerne hulles

Me byfel a ferly, of fairy me thou3te:

I was wery forwandred and went me to reste

Vnder a brode banke bi a bornes side,

And as I lay and lened and loked in J?e wateres,

I slombred in a slepyng, it sweyued so merye.43

In Pearl, the narrator weeps and grieves, "fordolked of luf-daun­
gere": 
Bifore j?at spot my honde I spenned

For care ful colde }?at to me ca3t;

A deuely dele in my hert denned,

Pa3 resoun sette myseluen sa3t.

I playned my perle )?at \>er wa3t spenned

Wyth fyrce skylle3 J?at faste fa3t;

Pa3 kynde of Kryst me comfort kenned,

My wreched wylle in wo ay wra3te.44

Chaucer's narrators also suffer anxiety, the best of example being 
that of the narrator of the Book of the Duchess (the case of the Hous 
of Fame will be discussed a bit later): 
I have gret wonder, be this lyght, 
How that I lyve, for day ne nyght 
I may nat slepe wel nygh noght; 
I have so many an ydel thoght, 
Purely for defaute of slep, 
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That, by my trouthe, I take no kep 
Of nothing, how hyt cometh or gooth, 
Ne me nys nothyng leef not looth. 
(lines 1-8) 
This strikingly consistent feature of dream vision prologues is pow­
erful evidence that the dreams reported in poems are meant to be 
seen symptomatically as insomnia or everyday somatic dreams. 
Even given the careful arguments of Bloomfield, Koonce, Newman, 
and others—that some or all of these poems represent fictive som­
nia or visiones or oracula—it is difficult to overcome the simple fact 
of their dreamers' discomfiture in the light of passages like this 
from Macrobius: 
est enim evvnviov quotiens cura oppressi animi corporisve sive fortu­
nae, qualis vigilantem fatigaverat, talem se ingerit dormienti: animi, si 
amator deliciis suis aut fruentem se videat aut carentem, . . . 
Nightmares may be caused by mental or physical distress, or anxiety 
about the future: the patient experiences in dreams vexations similar to 
those that disturb him during the day. As examples of the mental variety, 
we might mention the dream of the lover who dreams of possessing his 
sweetheart or of losing her, . . , 45 
Thus, the dream vision is, considering symptoms or external indica­
tors, clearly an ins omnium, a somatic dream in which "the patient 
experiences vexations" traceable to the sketchy but always sufficient 
details which we know of the dreamer's life. The content of such 
dreams is never described by medieval oneiromancers—what pur­
pose would it serve?—but we may assume that Macrobean insomnia 
would be full of alien and enigmatic images or figmenta recogniz­
able and comprehensible only to the dreamer. 
And that is precisely the point, precisely the place where the 
dream vision breaks loose from the twin dream taxonomies we have 
been examining: the poems always record experiences that are 
never finally alien or incomprehensible: the Roman de la Rose and 
Pearl come to deal realistically with universal verities like love and 
the desire for life after death; Piers Plowman confronts the social, 
political, and religious corruption of fourteenth century England; the 
80 
MEDIEVAL DREAM AUTHORITIES 
Book of the Duchess speaks to all who mourn Blanche of Lancaster 
and all others who must someday mourn someone. In short, while 
the poems undeniably fit the external description of the insignifi­
cant insomnium, they fit with equal ease the internal or formal fea­
tures of the visio, the oraculum, and especially the s omnium: intrin­
sically and spiritually, the dream vision is a revelation, for, like the 
Somnium Scipionis, its content is worthy, its truth universal. 
This means that the late medieval dream vision is a consciously 
constructed anomaly which deconstructs the literary and scientific 
dream taxonomies by occupying the impossible space between the 
pathological and the divine, the somatic and the significant. It draws 
its unique energy and vitality from this deconstruction for, if it were 
merely a fictive revelation (not somatic), it would then be simply a 
fictive pronouncement of truth; and if it were merely a somatic 
dream (not significant), then it would be self-admittedly irrelevant. 
Thus it is both and neither: the dream vision is the impossible rec­
ord of one whose life and whose dreams are just like ours, whose 
dream in the course of its narration becomes ours, a self-conscious 
fiction that announces and celebrates its fictionality, thereby attain­
ing a higher "rhetorical" truth. 
The examination of these new contradictions, of truth in fiction 
and of the rectitude of the mind's own images, is the subject of the 
next chapter. We conclude this discussion and preview that next, 
however, by recalling Rhabanus Maurus: "Who can be cleansed by 
filth? And who can learn the truth from a liar?" Who indeed? 
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he relationship between the dream vision and its literary 
and scientific contexts is fairly clear: the poems filled par­
allel gaps in the two taxonomies with vicarious experiences 
the taxonomies denied to readers and dreamers. In literature, there 
were psychological dreams and revelatory dreams, but neither of 
these totally satisfied the real human need for a psychologically sig­
nificant (or "realistic") experience—an everyday dream—that was 
also prescient. Readers could encounter tales of wondrous dream 
visitations to the men and women of the past, special, magical mo­
ments when, for a time, the chasm separating this world from the 
next narrowed a bit for the privileged individual. Such moments, 
which Artemidorus identified as "personal revelations," were 
wonderful and tantalizing, but they happened only to Joseph or to 
Aeneas or to the Magi. These dreams brought their dreamers crucial 
messages and demonstrated these persons' favor with God and spe­
cial role in a divine plan. The dreams could come at any time, in fact 
did come when the dreamer least expected them, and never came 
when the dreamer was troubled or anxious or undecided about a 
course of action. 
Elsewhere, readers could read apocalypses (or what Artemidorus 
called "universal revelations"). Unlike the personal revelations of 
others, these revelations were as much the readers' as the visionary's: 
the message belonged to all equally, and the visionary was only the 
medium of communication. These revelations showed readers the 
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Platonic World of Forms, the Christian afterlife—visions of Hell, 
Purgatory, and Heaven and visions of the end of the world—but 
they never trafficked in more mundane signs and wonders such as 
announcements of the return of a friend from a foreign land or hints 
on when to plant the crops. 
The medieval science of dreams offered even less comfort and 
satisfaction. While the dream writers seemed to provide a mecha­
nism for determining the worth of dreams, their systems did little 
more in fact than to deny their readers the very dreams they most 
needed and wanted: the vtsw, oraculum, and somnium came only to 
those whose minds were free of perturbation, while those beset with 
worry and anxiety were, ipso facto, denied the dreams that would 
ease their malaise. Thus, while science denied the "relevant dream" 
in fact, literature teased readers by denying them even its vicarious 
satisfaction, telling them again and again, "Io non Enea, io non 
Paolo sono." 
It was into this environment, and actually because of it, that the 
dream vision was born. On the simplest of affective levels, the po­
etic account of the revelant insomnium provided the vicarious expe­
rience missing from the two classifications; further, in filling the 
gaps in the taxonomies, the dream vision called the taxonomies 
themselves into question. 
But gaps are not origins, and overworked metaphorics is not the 
medium of literary analysis. Someone had to perceive these gaps or 
inconsistencies in the literary and scientific discussions of dreams 
and then fill them with a carefully constructed poetic artifact, an 
artifact that, like modern science fiction, draws its energy from its 
subtle mix of the known and the unknowable, the demonstrable and 
the imaginable. More specifically, a rhetoric, a form, a psychology, 
and a metaphysics were needed to focus and loose the affective 
energy latent in the classifications and in the human response to 
their suppression. These topics—three developments that com­
bined to make the dream vision theoretically possible—are the mat­
ter of the following pages: first, the figmental rhetoric of Augustine 
and Macrobius (along with its appreciation by later writers); second, 
the liberation of the dream frame from its doctrinal and eschatologi­
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cal subject matter by Guillaume de Lords; and third, the contingent, 
democratic iconography inherent in the nominalism of the early 
fourteenth century. 
A Rhetoric and a Form: Augustine and Macrobius 
There is increasing evidence that hermeneutics in the Middle 
Ages begins with Augustine, begins in his appreciation of the subtle 
and sophisticated matrix of reader, text, and subject. This apprecia­
tion, gleaned from the Confessions and the De Doctrina Christiana, 
allows us to see Augustine anticipating the "modern" notion of a 
text's existence as residing in a reader's appreciation of it, a notion 
far from the traditional sense of medieval hermeneutics as textual 
alchemy. This is not the place to develop an Augustinian theory of 
reading: some remarks are necessary here, however, to illustrate the 
ways in which the semiotic theories of Augustine and Macrobius 
combined to form the basis for the rhetoric of the dream vision. 
For Augustine, reading was not a form of communication; it was a 
means of verification, a celebration of the reader's possession of the 
truth.1 Like every other human activity for Augustine, reading was 
subject to the test of uti versus frui, use versus enjoyment; much 
unlike other human activities, reading radicalizes the use-enjoyment 
distinction in remarkable ways. In Book One of the Confessions, for 
example, Augustine seems to be making the distinction between 
"reading" (verb, intransitive) and "reading something" (verb, tran­
sitive), a distinction with which Hamlet would tease Polonius: 
Quid autem erat causae cur graecas litteras oderam quibus puerulus im­
buebar, ne nunc quidem mihi satis exploratum est. Adamaveram enim 
latinas, non quas primi magistri, sed quas docent qui grammatici vocan­
tur. Nam illas primas ubi legere et scribere et numerare discitur, non 
minus onerosas poenalesque habebam, quam omnes graecas. Uncle ta­
men et hoc nisi de peccato et vanitate vitae, quia caro eram, et spiritus 
ambulans et non revertens? (Psal. 77, 39) Nam utique meliores, quia 
certiores erant primae illae litterae, quibus fiebar in me, et factum est, at 
habeo illud ut et legam si quid scriptum invenio, et scribam ipse si quid 
volo, quam illae quibus tenere cogebar Aeneae nescio cujus errores, obli­
tus errorum meorum, et plorare Didonem mortuam, quia se occidit ob 
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amorem, cum interea meipsum in his a te morientem, Deus vita mea, 
siccis oculis ferrem miserrimus. 
Why I detested the Greek language when I was taught it as a little boy I 
have not yet fully discovered. I liked Latin very much, not the parts given 
by our first teachers but what the men called grammarians teach us. The 
first stages of our education, when we learned reading, writing, and 
arithmetic, I considered no less a burden and punishment than all the 
Greek courses. Since I was but "flesh, and a wind that goes and does not 
return," where could this come from except from sin and vanity of life? 
Better indeed, because more certain, were those first studies by which 
there was formed and is formed in me what I still possess, the ability to 
read what I find written down and to write what I want to, than the later 
studies wherein I was required to learn by heart I know not how many of 
Aeneas' wanderings, although forgetful of my own, and to weep over 
Dido's death, because she killed herself for love, while all the while amid 
such things, dying to you, O God my life, I most wretchedly bore myself 
about with dry eyes.2 
This is a standard an often-quoted passage in the Confessions, re­
counting Augustine's sense of shame at falling victim to the seduc­
tive wiles of classical literature. It is followed by another well-known 
passage enlarging on the danger of "tears for Dido" as a symptom of 
moral depravity, but I quote it here not for this emphasis but instead 
to focus on Augustine's elliptical praise for grammar, for reading as 
a skill. The passage places this humble skill—and it is clearly this 
limited sense of the grammatici that Augustine has in mind—in 
moral opposition to reading some specific text as a source of plea­
sure or instruction: rhetoric or logic come to mind as rubrics. To be 
sure, Augustine here is speaking of pagan literature, but the extenu­
ated pleasure he describes here is a pleasure to be found in any and 
all texts. For, after dunning himself for weeping, Augustine returns 
to the subject of literacy: 
Sed nunc in anima mea clamet, Deus meus, et veritas tua dicat mihi: 
Non est ita, non est ita; melior est prorsus doctrina ilia prior. Nam ecce 
paratior sum oblivisci errores Aeneae, atque omnia ejusmodi, quam scri­
bere et legere. At enim vela pendent liminibus grammaticarum schola­
rum: sed non ilia magis honorem secreti, quam tegumentum erroris sig­
nificant. Non clament adversus me, quos jam non timeo, dum confiteor 
tibi quae vult anima mea, Deus meus, et acquiesco in reprehensione mal­
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arum viarum mearum, ut diligam bonas vias tuas. Non clament adver­
sum me venditores grammaticae vel emptores: quia si proponam eis, 
interrogans ultrum verum sit quod Aeneam aliquando Carthaginem ve­
nisse Poeta dicit; indoctiores se nescire respondebunt, doctiores autem 
etiam negabunt, verum esse. At si quaeram quibus litteris scribatur Ae­
neae nomen, omnes mihi, qui haec didicerunt, verum respondebunt; se­
cundum id pactum et placitum, quo inter se homines ista signa firma-
runt. Item, si quaeram quid horum majore vitae hujus incommodo 
quisque obliviscatur, legere et scribere, an poetica ilia figmenta; quis non 
videat quid responsurus sit, qui non est penitus oblitus sui? Peccabam 
ergo puer cum ilia inania istis utilioribus amore praeponebam, vel potius 
ista oderam, illi amabam. Jamvero unum et unum duo, duo et duo quat­
uor, odiosa cantio mihi erat; et dulcissimum spectaculum vanitatis equus 
ligneus plenus armatis, et Trojae incendium, atque ipsius umbra 
Creusae. 
Now let my God cry out in my soul, and let your truth say to me, "It is 
not so. It is not so." Far better is that earlier teaching. See how I am 
readier to forget the wanderings of Aeneas and all such tales than to read 
and write. True it is that the curtains hang before the doors of the gram­
mar schools, but they do not symbolize some honored mystery but rather 
a cloak for error \tegumentum erroris]. Let not men whom I no longer 
fear inveigh against me when I confess to you, my God, what my soul 
desires, and when I acquiesce in a condemnation of my evil ways, so that I 
may love your ways, which are good. Let not these buyers and sellers of 
literature inveigh against me if I put this question to them: "Did Aeneas 
ever come to Carthage, as the poet says?" For if I do, the more unlearned 
will answer that they do not know; the more learned will even deny that 
it is true. But if I ask them with what letters the name Aeneas is spelled, 
all who have learned this much will give the right answer in accordance 
with that agreement and convention by which men have established 
these characters among themselves. Again, if I should ask which of these 
would be forgotten with greater inconvenience to our life, to read and 
write or those poetic fables, who does not discern the answer of every 
man who has not completely lost his mind? Therefore, as a boy I sinned 
when I preferred these inane tales to more useful studies, or rather when 
I hated the one and loved the other. But then, "One and one are two, and 
two and two are four" was for me a hateful chant, while the wooden 
horse full of armed men, the burning of Troy, and Creusa's ghost were 
most sweet but empty spectacles.3 
The basic distinction which this passage makes, the distinction be­
tween reading and writing as useful and practical skills and the study 
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of myth and literature as dangerous vanities, is a familiar one in 
Augustine, a man who has little use for the Latin classics and a man 
who has come to painful terms with his own classical rhetorical 
training and expertise. What is interesting about the passage, then, 
is not the negative side, not the rejection of the vanities of literature, 
but Augustine's odd, sincere praise of the simpler, more rudimen­
tary arts of the grammatici.4 At first glance, this looks like a simple 
anachronism: "grammar" in the Middle Ages referred to a much 
wider field of study than it does today, making it seem, perhaps, that 
Augustine is praising grammar and dispraising rhetoric. But this is 
not what Augustine is doing: he is contrasting simple literacy with 
the youthful study of classical myth and heroic poetry (though both 
would have been "grammatical," at least in later medieval curricula). 
In effect, what Augustine is saying here is that the skill of reading 
(uti) is good, but that reading a text, getting lost in its details and 
(especially) sympathizing or identifying with a text's characters is 
not: whenever Augustine recalls himself doing the latter, for exam­
ple, weeping for Dido while witnessing dry-eyed his own spiritual 
suicide, he blanches in shame and confesses his guilt. The gram­
matic arts, especially spelling, are more valuable to Augustine be­
cause, although he perceives their obvious conventionality, they are 
coextensive with all speakers of Latin; the others, being stories, 
open themselves to debate, opinion, and fantasy. Augustine, there­
fore, seems to be suggesting here that words and meanings are 
equally worthless at a divine vantage point (although orthography 
is more stable than hermeneutics) and that the only worth that in­
heres in the act of reading is the invisible inner worth of a soul 
moving imperceptibly to God. 
The distinction between intransitive and transitive reading (be­
tween "reading" and "reading something") appears again in Augus­
tine, in the De Doctrina Christiana, but this time the worthless chaff 
is not a disreputable pagan poem but, it would appear, Sacred Scrip­
ture itself: 
Sic lapidum, sic herbarum, vel quaecumque tenentur radicibus. Nam et 
carbunculi notitia, quod lucet in tenebris, multa illuminat etiam obscura 
librorum, ubicumque propter similitudinem ponitur; et ignorantia ber­
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ylli vel adamantis claudit plerumque intelligentiae fores. Nee aliam ob 
causam facile est intelligere pacem perpetuam significari oleae ramus­
culo, quern rediens ad arcam columba pertulit (Genesis 8,11), nisi quia 
novimus et olei lenem contactum non facile alieno humore corrumpi, et 
arborem ipsam frondere perenniter. Multi autem propter ignorantiam 
hyssopi, dum nesciunt quam vim habeat, vel ad purgandum pulmonem, 
vel, ut dicitur, ad saxa radicibus penetranda, cum sit herba brevis atque 
humilis, omnino invenire non possunt quare sit dictum, Asperges me 
hyssopo, et mundabor. (Psalm 50, 9) 
The same thing is true of stones, or of herbs or of other things that take 
root. For a knowledge of the carbuncle which shines in the darkness also 
illuminates many obscure places in books where it is used for similitudes, 
and an ignorance of beryl or of diamonds frequently closes the doors of 
understanding. In the same way it is not easy to grasp that the twig of 
olive which the dove brought when it returned to the ark signifies per­
petual peace unless we know that the soft surface of oil is not readily 
corrupted by an alien liquid and that the olive tree is perennially in leaf. 
Moreover, there are many who because of an ignorance of hyssop— 
being unaware either of its power to purify the lungs or, as it is said, to 
penetrate its roots to the rocks in spite of the fact that it is a small and 
humble plant—are not able at all to understand why it is said, "Thou 
shalt sprinkle me with hyssop, and I shall be cleansed."5 
The "knowledge of the carbuncle" or of anything else is, it seems, 
useless in and of itself; indeed, the passage suggests that "knowl­
edge" or "notitia" can include myths, superstition, folklore or any 
real or imaginary lore surrounding anything. This "knowledge," 
which we might be tempted to call "context," understood aright by 
those with the faith to apply it correctly to the ubiquitous theme of 
the love of God, becomes a verification of that love abroad in the 
world. It becomes part of God's "grammar" of the world, a grammar 
expounded by scores of patristic exegetes. The text of the world, of 
Scripture, and of all things, is useful (uti) only for those who wish to 
hear once more God's message of love; it is properly enjoyed (Jrui) 
only as a celebration of this same repeated message. Recalling the 
issue of Aeneas' possible landfall at Carthage, we can see that the 
knowledge of the carbuncle separates the ignorant from the learned, 
but this distinction is finally meaningless, for the ignorant may read 
with the same faith as the learned have and therefore find the same 
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truth verified. Such minutiae are, for Augustine, at best, various in­
teguments hiding-revealing the one and only truth; at worst, they 
are dangerous, seductive byroads which can lead vain and unwarned 
readers from their wonted destination. To put it simply, then, for 
Augustine, intransitive reading is what we do while we are listening 
to the Father, listening to "my God cry aloud in my soul," and the 
written, palpable words of the text, finally, need have nothing to do 
with that internal cry, although they may, if we are not careful, 
render that cry inaudible. 
Like so much of the De Doctrina Christiana, this sounds impossi­
bly theoretical, but elsewhere Augustine provides an example of this 
special, pure, "intransitive" reading. In Book Six, Chapter Three of 
the Confessions, Augustine describes his friend Ambrose in a mem­
orable passage: 
Cum quibus quando non erat, quod per exiguum temporis erat, aut cor­
pus reficiebat necessariis sustenaculis, aut lectione animum. Sed cum 
legebat, oculi ducebantur per paginas, et cor intellectum rimabatur, vox 
autem et lingua quiescebant. 
When he was not with them [Milanese who sought his spiritual direc­
tion], and this was but a little while, he either refreshed his body with 
needed food or his mind [animum] with reading. When he read, his eyes 
moved down the pages and his heart sought out their meaning, while his 
voice and tongue remained silent.6 
This is more than the first recorded instance of silent reading in 
Western letters; it is, for Augustine, a profound theological, psycho­
logical, and ethical insight. Notice that Ambrose is not reading for 
meaning or studying—Augustine does not even mention what it is 
that he is reading—he is, we are told, refreshing his mind as one 
refreshes his body with food, is reading for enjoyment. His eyes, 
silently travelling across the page, do not themselves perceive the 
sense, Augustine says, and neither does his mind: it is his heart 
which seeks the sense. In effect, Ambrose is meditating: he is, as 
Richard of St. Victor and the author of The Cloud of Unknowing 
advise, distracting or occupying his mind while opening his heart 
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and soul to meaning, a meaning that does not necessarily inhere in 
the text. By reading silently, Ambrose avoids the seductive melodies 
of classical rhetoric (on which Augustine was an expert) by refusing 
to perform the text audibly, by reading (intransitive) and attending 
only to the silent cry of God audible in his soul. 
The most striking example of Augustinian intransitive reading is 
his own experience, the sorites Vergiliana he performed in Alypius' 
garden at his conversion: 
Et ecce audio vocem de vicina domo cum cantu dicentis et crebro repeten­
tis, quasi pueri an puellae, nescio: Tolle, lege; tolle, lege. 
And lo, I heard from a nearby house, a voice like that of a boy or girl, I 
know not which, chanting and repeating over and over, "Take up and 
read. Take up and read."7 
The rationalist Augustine assumes the chant to be part of a chil­
dren's game but, with a moment's thought, can remember no game 
of which this particular phrase was a part, so 
Repressoque impetu lacrymarum, surrexi, nihi aliud interpretans, nisi 
divinitus mihi juberi ut aperirem codicem, et legerem quod primum ca­
put invenissem. 
I checked the flow of my tears and got up, for I interpreted this solely as a 
command given to me by God to open the book and read the first chapter 
I should come upon.8 
At this point the narration breaks off as Augustine recounts his 
memory of the story of St. Anthony's belief that the words of the 
Gospel he heard one day were a miraculous admonition addressed 
specifically to him. This short digression, like the momentary 
thought of the child's game, is an example of Augustine's sense of 
hermeneutic knowledge, the "knowledge of the carbuncle" or here, 
of children's games or of hagiography. This knowledge adds noth­
ing whatever to the experience; it serves simply to verify rationally 
the epiphany that is taking place. And the memory of Anthony does 
indeed verify and valorize Augustine's own experience, for he re­
members that 
. . . tali oraculo confestim ad te esse conversum. Itaque concitus redii ad 
eum locum ubi sedebat Alypius: ibi enim posueram condicem Apostoli, 
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cum inde surrexeram. Arripui, aperui, et legi in silentio capitulum, quod 
primum conjecti sunt oculi mei: Non in comessationibus et ebrietatibus, 
non in cubilibus et impudicitiis, non in contentione et aemulatione; sed 
induite Dominumjesum Christum, et carnis providentiam nefeceritis in 
concupiscentiis (Rom., 13: 13~4). Nee ultra volui legere; nee opus erat. 
. .  . by such a portent he was immediately converted to you. 
So I hurried back to the spot where Alypius was sitting, for I had put 
there the volume of the apostle when I had got up and left him. I 
snatched it up, opened it, and read in silence the chapter on which my 
eyes first fell: "Not in rioting and drunkenness, not in chambering or 
impurities, not in strife and envying; but put you on the Lord Jesus 
Christ, and make not provision for the flesh and its concupiscences." No 
further wished I to read, nor was there need to do so.9 [my emphasis] 
The rest, of course, is history. What we need to see in this passage is 
the precise part that the words of Scripture play in Augustine's con­
version. Augustine knew Romans 13: 13-4 well; the words were not 
new to him. What was special about the experience was that the 
words were miraculously directed to him and him alone; Augustine 
intuits that, like St. Anthony, "admonitus fuerit, tanquam sibi di­
ceretur quod legebatur" ("he had been admonished . .  . as if the 
words read were addressed to him").10 Taken together with the de­
scription of Ambrose above, this passage seems to claim that (as the 
mystics suggest), to read Scripture is to open the heart to the real 
word of God by opening the eyes to His orthographic words. We fail 
to do this experience justice if we call it merely "identification" or, 
worse, "taking the words to heart," for what Augustine is describing 
here is a relationship of reader to text far more radical than identifi­
cation: "appropriation" might be a term strong enough. For Augus­
tine does not see himself as simply being "like" the original recip­
ients of Paul's letter, and it is not simply that he marvels at God's 
timeliness in showing him these old but relevant words at this exact 
moment in his spiritual development: in a miraculous sense, Augus­
tine is the recipient of the divine message, is drawn to see that he is 
part of a special and well-defined community of individuals that is 
the object of God's discourse through St. Paul. 
As Augustine himself observes earlier in the Confessions, the 
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psychic appropriation that happens in intransitive reading is not 
"rhetorical" or even rational in nature. Before his conversion, 
Itaque institui animum intendere in Scripturas sanctas ut viderem 
quales essent. Et ecce video rem non compertam superbis, neque nuda-
tam pueris; sed incessu humilem, successu excelsam et velatam myste­
riis: et non eram ego talis ut intrare in earn possem, aut inclinare cervi­
cem ad ejus gressus. Non enim sicut modo loquor, ita sensi cum attendi 
ad illam Scripturam sed visa est mihi indigna quam Tullianae dignitate 
compararem. Tumor enim meus refugiebat modum ejus; et acies mea 
non penetrabat interiora ejus. Vernum tamen ilia erat quae cresceret 
cum parvulis; sed eqo dedignabar esse parvulis, et turgidus fastu mihi 
grandis videbar. 
I accordingly decided to turn my mind to the Holy Scriptures and to 
see what they were like. And behold, I see something within them that 
was neither revealed to the proud nor made plain to children, that was 
lowly on one's entrance but lofty on further advance, and that was veiled 
over in mysteries. None such as I was at that time could enter into it, nor 
could I bend my neck for its passageways. When I first turned to that 
scripture, I did not feel towards it as I am speaking now, but it seemed to 
me unworthy of comparison with the nobility of Cicero's writings. My 
swelling pride turned away from its humble style, and my sharp gaze did 
not penetrate into its inner meaning. But in truth it was of its nature that 
its meaning would increase together with your little ones, whereas I 
distained to be a little child and, puffed up with pride, I considered myself 
to be a great fellow.11 
It is important to notice here that Augustine is not saying that, in his 
younger, worldly days, he did not appreciate Scripture rhetorically, 
though now he does: the tenses and references do not permit this 
reading. When Augustine describes Scripture as "incessu humilem, 
successu excelsam et velatam mysteriis" ("humble on entrance, lofty 
on advance and veiled with mysteries"), he is describing it as he 
presently appreciates it. The point of the quotation is that the tex­
tual experience of Scripture, in contrast to what we would call the 
rhetorical experience of Cicero or other Latin classics, did not appeal 
to the young, prideful, and unregenerate Augustine. He says that the 
experience of Scripture was (on recollection) a humbling one: notice 
that the text did not repel him but rather his unfitness for it kept 
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him from it: "Tumor enim meus refugiebat modum e jus. . . ."The 
careful phrasing means that the younger Augustine's failure to ap­
preciate Scripture was one of will, not of intellect or effort. The 
experience is thus ethical rather than rhetorical, since the impedi­
ment was not the humble text but the prideful reader. Without the 
humility to give faith precedence over reason and without the faith 
to see what he knows God has written, Augustine saw only the unin­
teresting and inferior rhetorical chaff, "incessu humilem." Later on, 
the text and its homely style have not changed at all: Augustine has 
changed and now can see the message "neither revealed to the proud 
nor made plain to children" but visible only with eyes of faith; "suc­
cessu excelsam" in this sense suggests not merely "advance" or pro­
gress but, once more, "appropriation" or "embrace."12 
This appropriation or "embrace" of Scripture (or of other special 
texts like the dream vision) is an embrace anterior to receiving or 
failing to receive a meaning from the text: for Augustine, reading 
Scripture is a perception of communion with its divine Author and 
not primarily one of communication. Such an intuition or expe­
rience of communion precedes any hermeneutic engagement with 
the text and is always distinct from appreciation or interpretation; 
the experience of the text is either one or the other. On the one 
hand, if the reading experience is intransitive and pride does not 
repel the reader, the reader will achieve this almost sacramental 
communion with the Author of the text. On the other hand, if the 
reading experience is transitive and pride and the text as object ob­
struct the communion of reader and Author, then the best the reader 
can hope for is interpretation and appreciation. 
Thus humility, repulsion, and plainness are not the "defense 
mechanisms" of the sacred text whose purpose is to protect it from 
the gaze of the unworthy; these emotional responses are integral 
parts of the reading experience. The factual education of the Chris­
tian rhetor as laid down in the De Doctrina Christiana does nothing 
to diminish the humbling sacramental experience of lectio divina, 
but neither does it enhance this contemplative, intransitive reading; 
the "knowledge of the carbuncle" can only illumine the surface, the 
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text, and not the Author. At best, such trivia as the properties of 
beryl or olive oil that Augustine discusses can only verify and cele­
brate the true message of the text, a meaning discovered in an open­
ness of the mind and a willingness of the heart such as Ambrose's 
unforced receptiveness, his eyes travelling cross the page, his tongue 
silent, his heart seeking the sense. 
Such a rhetorical orientation is very difficult to find among the 
rhetoricians of the late classical period and equally rare among the 
early Fathers of the Church: this participatory sense of the text does 
not fully re-emerge in Christian thought until the mystical writers 
of the twelfth century and after. In fact, there is only one other 
writer who develops a parallel sense of the "special text," a text that 
does not merely impart information but acts as a means for estab­
lishing a communion of spirits, a text that is a celebration of truths 
already acknowledged, a text for intransitive reading. 
The writer is Macrobius. The Commentary on the Somnium Sci­
pionis shares all of the notions developed from Augustine. Like 
Creation, the Somnium still bears the marks of its author, and the 
communion of the reader with Scipio is finally more important than 
the encyclopedic information encoded in the text. As Scripture is for 
Augustine, the Somnium Scipionis for Macrobius is a transcendent 
work that contains "the whole body of philosophy," the sum of all 
knowledge. 
Macrobius demonstrates the scriptural nature of his text, its fit­
ness for intransitive reading, by an admittedly artificial expansion of 
Cicero's narrative. From the smallest details in his original, Macro­
bius extrapolates entire sciences or bodies of knowledge which he 
perceives to lie latent in the Somnium. Like Scripture for Augustine, 
however, the Somnium for Macrobius is not a textbook from which 
the sciences can be extracted; on the contrary, the reader must ap­
proach the Somnium with prior encyclopedic knowledge to find all 
of philosophy verified in Scipio's mystic vision. Again like Scrip­
ture for Augustine, the Somnium for Macrobius is a celebration of 
the truth and of that community of believers who apprehend the 
truth in the text "successu excelsam et velatam mysteriis." The phi­
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losopher reading the Somnium and identifying with the "rapt" Sci­
pio finds the truths he already affirms—both scientific truths and 
ethical verities—embodied in the visionary experience of the Ro­
man hero. 
But Scipio's dream was a fake and Macrobius knew it. He ac­
knowledges this fact quite early in the Commentary in considering 
the rhetorical choices open to Cicero: 
hanc fabulam Cicero licet ab indoctis quasi ipse veri conscius doleat irri­
sam, exemplum tamen stolidae reprehensionis vitans excitari narratu­
rum quam reviviscere maluit. 
Cicero, as if assured of the truth of this tale [Plato's "Vision of Er"], 
deplored the ridicule it received at the hands of ignorant critics and yet, 
fearful of the unwarranted censure that was heaped upon Plato, pre­
ferred to have his account given by a man aroused from sleep rather than 
by one returned from the dead.13 
One might assume that such an admission might have a less than 
salutary effect on Cicero's (and Macrobius') credibility, but such is 
not the case. Macrobius' response to the problem is to develop a 
sophisticated sense of truth-in-fiction, a heuristic in which trans­
cendent truths may be—or may only be—expressed in self­
consciously fabulous figures or analogies.14 In the next chapter of the 
Commentary, Macrobius introduces this notion: 
nee omnibus fabulis philosophia repugnat, nee omnibus adquiescit; et ut 
facile secerni possit quae ex his a se abdicet ac velut profana ab ipso 
vestibulo sacrae disputationis excludat, quae vero etiam saepe ac libenter 
admittat, divisionum gradibus explicandum est. 
Philosophy does not discountenance all stories nor does it accept all, and 
in order to distinguish what it rejects as unfit to enter its sacred precincts 
and what it frequently and gladly admits, the points of division must 
needs be clarified.15 
This process of differentiation, involving distinctions between tall 
tales and so-called fabulous narratives, with subdivisions upon sub­
divisions, is a thorny one best represented graphically: 
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VARIETIES OF FICTION 
(after Macrobius, Commentary on the Somniun t Scipionis, I, ii) 
— Fict ions 
Fabula 
^ Narratio Fabulosa 
wholly fictitious-—' 
"solid founda tion of truth" 
base " " 
see nly 
According to Macrobius, only the rightmost, bottommost category, 
the "seemly narratio fabulosa," is fit to serve as a vehicle for philo­
sophic exposition because only such a story is 
sacrarum rerum notio sub pio figmentorum velamine honestis et tecta 
rebus et vestita nominibus enuntiatur: . . . 
a decent and dignified conception of holy truths, with respectable events 
and characters, . . . presented beneath a modest veil of allegory.16 
The next sentence makes the defense of the Somnium Scipionis 
complete by applying the distinction between unseemly fable and 
seemly fabulous narrative to the present text and to its Platonic 
forebear: 
cum igitur nullam disputationi pariat iniuriam vel Er index vel somnians 
Africanus, sed rerum sacrarum enuntiatio integra sui dignitate his sit 
tecta nominibus, accusator tandem edoctus a fabulis fabulosa secernere 
conquiescat. 
Therefore, since the treatises of Plato and Cicero suffer no harm from 
Er's testimony or Scipio's dream, and the treatment of sacred subjects is 
accomplished without loss of dignity by using their names, let our critic 
at last hold his peace, taught to differentiate between the fable and the 
fabulous narrative.17 
Macrobius next excludes certain subjects which are too lofty for 
even such decorous tales and then, in a crucial passage, develops an 
affective rhetoric for the narratio fabulosa: 
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de dis autem (ut dixi) ceteris et de anima non frustra se nee ut oblectent 
ad fabulosa convertunt, sed quia sciunt inimicam esse naturae apertam 
nudam que expositionem sui, quae sicut vulgaribus hominum sensibus 
intellectum sui vario rerum tegmine operimentoque subtraxit, ita a pru­
dentibus arcana sua voluit per fabulosa tractari. sic ipsa mysteria figura­
rum cuniculis operiuntur ne vel haec adeptis nudam rerum talium natura 
se praebeat, sed summatibus tantum viris sapienta interprete veri arcani 
consciis, contend sint reliqui ad venerationem figuris defendentibus a 
vilitate secretum. 
But in treating of the other gods and the Soul, as I have said, philos­
ophers make use of fabulous narratives; not without a purpose, however, 
nor merely to entertain, but because they realize that a frank, open expo­
sition of herself is distasteful to Nature, who, just as she has withheld an 
understanding of herself from the uncouth senses of men by enveloping 
herself in variegated garments, has also desired to have her secrets 
handled by more prudent individuals through fabulous narratives. Ac­
cordingly, her sacred rites are veiled in mysterious representations so 
that she may not have to show herself even to initiates. Only eminent 
men of superior intelligence gain a revelation of her truths; the others 
must satisfy their desire for worship with a ritual drama which prevents 
her secrets from becoming common.18 
Thus, the narratio fabulosa is elitist, though not absolutely so. As 
Augustine says in the De Doctrina Christiana, the initiate must be 
an encyclopedic philosopher to decode the fiction; one must possess 
all knowledge to understand, if this only is the goal. The person of 
simple faith, however, may embrace and revere the truths without 
understanding, just as Macrobius' "reliqui" ("others") may witness 
the ritual drama and worship at a distance. Ultimately, such people 
are probably better off than the "eminent men of superior intelli­
gence" because total understanding—a perfect transitive reading— 
is an impossibility; both Macrobius and Augustine see their texts as 
unfathomably rich and teach that the initiate's devotion is sublime 
not in mere comprehension but "in the embrace." 
Macrobius and Augustine differ on the issue of whether the initi­
ates should espouse or pronounce the truths they discover. Augus­
tine's position was, of course, "evangelical," that all doctrine should 
be universally promulgated, though he seemed to believe that all 
could never comprehend all. The De Doctrina Christiana pre­
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supposes that a careful and seemly exposition of the truths of Scrip­
ture is possible, though no expert could ever be so universally 
knowledgeable as to understand all of Scripture's integumenta, let 
alone tell all to the unlearned but faithful populace. 
Macrobius' view was markedly different. The very purpose of fic­
tion for Macrobius is to insulate truths from ignorance and sacrilege, 
so it follows that the unworthy should not be made privy to the 
truth, but should instead worship its fictional representation. This 
strange notion of worship in lieu of understanding has a curious 
later history among Christian writers, as Peter Dronke has shown 
in an edition of a Commentary on Macrobius' Commentary by Guil­
laume de Conches (twelfth century). Going far beyond Macrobius, 
Guillaume (understandably) perceives the pagan gods themselves 
as fictions perpetuated to insure the proper behavior in the masses, 
a control actually endangered by a revelation of the truth: 
Ratio est, quare nuda et aperta expositio est inimica nature deorum: 
scilicet ut soli sapientes sciant secreta deorum, per interpretationem in­
tegumentorum. Rustici vero et insipientes ignorent, sed tantum credant, 
quia si modo sciret rusticus, quod Ceres non est aliud quam terre natura-
lis potentia crescendi in segetes et eas multiplicandi, item quod Bacus 
non est aliud quam terre naturalis potencia crescendi in vineas, non ti-
more Bachi vel Cereris—quos deos esse reputant—retardarent se ab ali­
qua inhonesta accione. 
There is a reason why naked and open exposition is repugnant to the 
nature of the gods: namely that only the wise should know the secrets of 
the gods, (arrived at) through the interpretation of integumenta. As for 
churls and foolish men, let them not know but only believe. For if a churl 
were but to know that Ceres is nothing other than the earth's natural 
power of growing into crops and multiplying them, or again that Bac­
chus is nothing other than the earth's natural power of growing into 
vines, then fear of Bacchus or Ceres—whom they think to be gods— 
would no longer keep them back from any dishonorable action in their 
way of life.19 
The fictions channel and regulate the actions and beliefs both of the 
wise who understand and also of the ignorant who do not. Com­
menting on the Macrobean phrase, "figurarum cuniculus" ("laby­
rinth of images," quoted earlier), Guillaume meditates: 
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Cuniculus est via subterranea, per quam homo latenter incedit ab uno 
locum ad alium, et inde etiam quoddam animal cuniculus appellatur, quia 
scilicet habitat in cavernis terre, qui et cirogrillus dicitur. Hie autem cuni­
culos vocat integumenta, quia quemadmodum in cuniculis latent huius­
modi animalia, ita et in integumentis veritas quasi obscure continetur. 
A cuniculus is a subterranean passage by which a man walks under 
cover from one place to another; so too an animal, a rabbit, is called 
cuniculus, because it dwells in the burrows underground. But here it is 
integumenta that are called 'labyrinths of imagery'—for as rabbits take 
cover in such labyrinths, so truth is enclosed, in darkness as it were, in 
integumenta.20 
This grand image brings together many variegated strands and con­
cepts. The figurarum cuniculus is the dark, arbitrary passageway run 
by trusting believers in the truth, a track "humble at entrance but 
sublime in embrace." This integument or covering is a human crea­
tion, worthless in itself but priceless for the truth to which it leads 
its trusting runners. To perceive the integument itself, to under­
stand it, is unnecessary to perceive the truth, and the darkness 
makes this irrelevant investigation all the more difficult. If one has 
only faith, the humble and submissive runner will be led, albeit 
blindly, through the maze of the labyrinth. If one has only knowl­
edge, this prideful non-runner will stand and strain to see the con­
struction of the labyrinth, unwilling to submit to its narrow trails, 
unwilling to be led to the truth. If one has both faith and knowledge, 
then this privileged runner will occasionlly glimpse the light that 
would blind in excess, even as he runs the cuniculus.21 
It would be inaccurate to call these ideas drawn from Augustine 
and Macrobius a "rhetoric," and even less accurate to call them the 
rhetoric of the dream vision. It is fair, though, to see in them a 
movement, a thrust in two thinkers important for the Middle Ages 
that extenuates or even calls into question the traditional sense of 
hermeneutics. To sum up the ideas, Augustine and Macrobius both 
radicalize the traditional "fruit and chaff" analogy to the extent that 
the chaff is at best irrelevant and fabricated and at worst seductive 
and misleading. This position may seem a bit extreme in the case of 
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Augustine, but the De Doctrina Christiana contains several pas­
sages where Augustine seems to be consciously manufacturing fruit 
out of the most ridiculous chaff; for example: 
Et tamen nescio quomodo suavius intueor sanctos, cum eos quasi dentes 
Ecclesiae video praedicere ab erroribus homines, a que in ejus corpus, 
emollita duritia, quasi demorsos mansosque transferre. 
Nevertheless, in a strange way, I contemplate the saints more pleasantly 
when I envisage them as the teeth of the Church cutting men off from 
their errors and transferring them to her body after their hardness has 
been softened as if by being eaten and chewed.22 
Augustine {nescio quomodo) enjoys this, and it is important to 
understand just why he does. There is, of course, no legitimate rela­
tionship between teeth and the saints according to any human per­
spective: the point of the comparison is that the creative intellectual 
exercise of (literally) making the comparison is an act of faith which 
valorizes both the perceptor and the specific detail of the physical 
world perceived. The exercise would not work, in fact, if a pre­
existing logical or iconographic relationship were available: that 
would not only ruin the fun but would also eliminate the faith-
communion between the perceptor and the Author, ruin the exercise 
of seeking the meaning with the heart as opposed to ascertaining it 
with the intellect. 
Elsewhere, Augustine can be heard to announce, in effect, that 
there is nothing inherently holy in the lexical words of Holy Scrip­
ture or even in the word "God" (compare "Yahweh");23 the words 
are merely a necessary but contingent system of grunts kindly toler­
ated by a bemused deity: 
Et tamen Deus, cum de illo nihil digne dici possit, admisit humanae vocis 
obsequium, et verbis nostris in laude sua gaudere nos voluit. Nam inde 
est et quod dicitur Deus. Non enim revera in strepitu istarum duarum 
syllabarum ipse cognoscitur; sed tamen omnes latinae linguae scios, cum 
aures eorum sonus iste tetigerit, movet ad cogitandam excellentissimam 
quamdam immortalemque naturam. 
For God, although nothing worthy may be spoken of Him, has accepted 
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the tribute of the human voice and wished us to take joy in praising Him 
with our words. In this way He is called Deus. Although He is not recog­
nized in the noise of these two syllables, all those who know the Latin 
language, when this sound reaches their ears, are moved to think of a 
certain most excellent immortal nature.24 
In both writers, then, as this quotation from Augustine indicates, 
the bond between tenor and vehicle is neither inherent, intellectual, 
nor rational: both rhetorics operate only in faith. Without faith, 
Augustine's Christian rhetoric falls apart, as does Macrobius' Stoic-
Platonic rhetoric: scoffers at the systems—pagans for Augustine, 
Epicureans for Macrobius—who are unwilling to suspend disbelief 
and enter humbly into the humble fiction, are forever shut off from 
the truth. Only the wise may learn all or nearly all there is to know of 
the veil, but all of faith can perceive the fitness and seemliness of the 
integumentum or narratio fabulosa, believe in the goodness of its 
craftsman (Craftsman), worship the unseen truths, and travel 
across the labyrinthine page, their tongues silent, towards ultimate 
communion with the craftsman in the truth. 
We thus have a system that requires a surface or integument that 
must of necessity be self-consciously and self-evidently fictional or 
worthless, an artifact created by an individual artificer and designed 
to embody the truth for the wise and to act as a pathway to that same 
truth for the less-than-wise. Thus, this fiction is humble and even 
ridiculous at entrance but sublime in its embrace by faithful readers, 
a rabbit-run the twists and turns of which are pointless in 
themselves—though possibly amusing—and valuable only in that 
they lead finally to an identity or communion with the architect of 
the cuniculus. The end point of the work, this communion or iden­
tity, demonstrates to readers that they are part of an elect, a special 
community which hears the word of the Apostle and intuits it to be 
addressed specifically to them. 
This in turn begins to describe a form. The surface of this form is 
an inherently worthless projection of an individual human psyche, 
fit and seemly, perhaps, but revelatory only of the condition of that 
psyche. While this surface is humble, its contents are sublime, at 
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least for readers whose souls are potentially congruent with that of 
the fabricator of the labyrinth; for those readers who can transcend 
the form and embrace the contents—"incessu humilem, successu 
excelsam et velatam mysteriis" ("humble on entrance, lofty on ad­
vance and veiled with mysteries")—the dark labyrinth allows them 
to see clearly insomnium. 
Freedom in Parody: The Roman de la Rose 
The Somnium Scipionis was the first dream vision. It was a first-
person account of a dream which suggested (but by and large failed 
to develop) a complex relationship between dream and dreamer. Its 
exegesis by Macrobius in the fourth century foregrounded the latent 
ambiguities in the nature of the dream and also, by a strange coinci­
dence, associated Cicero's strange, enigmatic text with a body of pro­
topsychological dream lore that was to become the standard discus­
sion of the topic for a thousand years or more. In the context of an 
Augustinian rhetoric, the Somnium Scipionis and its Commentary— 
the precious allegorical vision of the great auctor Cicero and its bril­
liant expansion by the polymath Macrobius—was obviously assured 
a special place in late medieval learning. The twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries were years of dogged search for the literary treasures of 
the past and, even later, men such as Petrarch and Poggio would 
embark on veritable expeditions in search of lost fragments of 
Cicero and other Latin authors, but the Commentary on the Som­
nium Scipionis was already their prized possession. Cicero's de re 
publica had not yet been discovered (nor had Plato's Republic, of 
course), but the Somnium Scipionis was already theirs, thanks to the 
man who explored (and often invented) its profundity, Macrobius. 
Thus, Cicero, Macrobius, and a thoroughly congruent Augustinian 
perspective on the integumenta of the dream-text: this was a textual 
nexus ripe for exploitation by poets. 
Exploitation came remarkably late in the Middle Ages. In fair­
ness, there were many dream-frame poems before the Roman de la 
Rose—the allegorical spectacles of the Chartrean Naturalists, for 
example—but these works were in the apocalypse tradition and 
thus lacked one or more of the distinguishing marks of the dream 
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vision. The Chartrean Naturalists and Dante wrote visions (some­
times waking, sometimes sleeping) which imitated John's vision on 
Mount Patmos or fed on a separate folkloric tradition of descents 
into the underworld or raptures into Heaven, while other dream 
poets before Guillaume de Lorris wrote visions on what should 
properly be called Boethian models, delicious love-debates presided 
over by an allegorical figure of authority, the descendant of Lady 
Philosophy. None of these poets fully exploited the arresting ambi­
valence of Cicero's Somnium; none captured the unique epistemo­
logical crux of truth-in-fiction; none troubled themselves to present 
a distressed, unfit visionary whose vision transcends his unfitness. 
None, that is, until Guillaume de Lorris. The Roman de la Rose 
must stand as the first work in a millennium which brings together 
the disparate rhetorical motifs of Cicero, Macrobius, and Augustine 
in a framework that captures the ambivalence of the opening of the 
Somnium Scipionis. The claim that the dream is a revelation; the 
broad hints that it cannot be so; the grounding of the dream-
experience in an individual psyche in turmoil or distress; the ulti­
mate, intuitively obvious import of the dream to an elite who have 
the faith to embrace the work: all is present, for the first time, in the 
Roman. 
To illustrate, we need do little more than quote: 
Aucunes genz dient qu'en songes 
n'a sa fables non et men^onges; 
mes Ten puet tex songes songier 
qui ne sont mie men^ongier, 
ainz sont apre bien aparent, . . . 
Many men sayn that in sweveninges 
Ther nys but fables and lesynges; 
But men may some swevenes sen 
Whiche hardely that false ne ben, 
But afterward ben apparaunt.25 
This deft touch takes the reader immediately into the heart of the 
dream question and speaks directly to the inconsistency between the 
rational voice of authority (what "men sayn") and the psychological 
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needs and realistic experience of real people (what "men may . . . 
sen"). While this statement serves at its surface to decide the issue in 
favor of the prescient dream, the semantic structure of the sentence 
foregrounds and highlights the medieval ambiguity about dreams 
rather than smoothing it over. Thus, such an opening should hardly 
be read as a simple assertion that the sceptical "clerkys" are wrong; 
if anything, its acknowledgment of what "men sayn" reminds us of 
the Wife of Bath's Prologue, in which the persona's obsession with 
authority is as evident as her opposition to it. 
The rhetorical complexity increases in the next few lines, as, in 
seemingly trying to strengthen his case for his own dream as a reve­
lation, Guillaume introduces a decidedly recalcitrant authority: 
si en puis bien traire a garant

un auctor qui ot non Macrobes,

qui ne tint pas songes a lobes,

an^ois escrit l'avision

qui avint au roi Scypion.

Qui c'onques cuit ne qui que die

qu'il est folor et musardie

de croire que songes aviegne,

qui se voudra, por fol m'en tiegne,

quar endroit moi ai ge fiance

que songes est senefiance

des biens as genz et des anuiz,

que li plusor songent de nuiz

maintes choses covertement

que Ten voit puis apertement.

This may I drawe to warraunt

An authour that hight Macrobes,

That halt nat dremes false ne lees,

But undoth us the avysioun

That whilom mette kyng Cipioun.

And whoso saith or weneth it be

A jape, or elles nycete,

To wene that dremes after falle,

Let whoso lyste a fol me calle.

For this trowe I, and say for me,
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That dremes signifiaunce be 
Of good and harm to many wightes, 
That dremen in her slep a-nyghtes 
Ful many thynges covertly, 
That fallen after al openly.26 
These lines are typically read as an appeal to the authority of Macro­
bius but, given the sense of Macrobius and of his work that we have 
developed in the last two chapters, it is hard to read these lines of 
Guillaume de Lords in that way. Guillaume cites the authority of 
Macrobius on only two matters here, and the validity of the citations 
needs some scrutiny. First, Guillaume correctly attributes to Macro­
bius the teaching that all dreams are not necessarily false or lying 
and, second, credits him (as all modern classicists do) with recording 
and preserving the "avisioun" of Scipio. Both of these acknowledg­
ments are technically righteous but, as we have seen, they are also 
severely circumscribed and undercut by Macrobius himself, in ways 
Guillaume and his readers must have perceived. First, though in­
deed he says that all dreams are not false, he does not say by any 
means that all are true. In fact, Macrobius' favorite example of the 
worthless somatic dream, the lover's dream of the possession of the 
beloved, matches the one we are about to hear all too closely, and 
Guillaume's claim that the i?ox^-dream came true can hardly stand 
against the explicit disqualification in the very commentary that 
Guillaume cites. Second, Guillaume's gratitude to Macrobius for re­
cording the Somnium Scipionis is complicated, we have seen, by 
broad hints that the Somnium itself is a somatic dream (or, worse, a 
narratio fabulosa, as Macrobius admits). The question then arises, 
why does Guillaume de Lorris introduce Macrobius here only to do 
such obvious, intentional violence to his teachings and, effectively, 
to turn him on his encyclopedic head? 
The answer to this question can be found in the next lines of 
Guillaume's Prologue: 
El vintieme an de mon aage,

el point qu'Amors prent le paage

des jones genz, couchier m'aloie
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une nuit, si con je souloie,

et me dormoie mout forment,

et vi un songe en mon dormant

qui mout fu biaus et mout me plot;

mes en ce songe onques riens n'ot

qui tretor avenu ne soit

si con li songes recensoit.

Within my twenty yer of age, 
Whan that Love taketh his cariage 
Of yonge folk, I wente soone 
To bedde, as I was wont to done, 
And faste I slepte; and in slepyng 
Me mette such a swevenyng 
That lyked me wonders wel. 
But in that sweven is never a del 
That it nys afterward befalle, 
Ryght as this drem wol tel us alle.27 
These lines maintain the precarious balance established in the 
preceding ones, a balance between somatic and divine explanations 
for the dream. Again, Guillaume makes the express claim that the 
events depicted in the dream subsequently came true, but he also 
alludes unmistakably to naturalistic explanations, noting that, after 
all, he has this dream at that time when "Amors prent le paage de 
jones genz" ("Love exacts his price from young folk"). Such a situa­
tion should remind us of exactly the same contradiction in the Som­
nium Scipionis, in which Scipio offers what seems to be evidence of 
a somatic dream, evidence which Macrobius ignores. Officially, 
then, this present dream is as indeterminate as that of Scipio, one 
(this time consciously) suspended between contraries and satisfying 
the popular need for the relevant dream. 
The similarity between Amant's and Scipio's dreams does not end 
here, for the operation of the God of Love is not simply a localized 
metaphor confined to the prologue: the figure, of course, becomes a 
fully-realized personification in the dream. This change in the status 
of "Amors"—from a conventionalized personification of love lan­
guor to a principal allegorical antagonist—deepens and changes the 
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ambiguity of the situation. While the metaphor of love "exacting his 
price" means one thing at the simple level of personification, it 
means something radically different if the poem itself is evidence of 
that exacted price: suddenly, perhaps, this dreamer is not simply in 
love languor but is actually the recipient of a special revelation, ob­
sessed with divine madness, prophetic frenzy. In short, the deepen­
ing complexity of the Roman reveals the same mutual valorizing 
process that operated in the Somnium Scipionir. the dream is valo­
rized by the dreamer's great devotion to the deity, while it is clear 
that such a holy and seemly revelation would only come to a pious 
follower of Cupid. 
Such a reading is the only explanation for the "mes" at line 28: 
"mes en ce songe ongues riens n'ot qui tretot avenu" ("but in this 
dream there is nothing that did not later happen"). The concessive 
suggests that, under these circumstances, we would not normally 
assume that the dream would be prescient; after all, this dreamer is 
one of the "jones genz" debilitated by Love. The statement thus 
maintains the delicate balance between what "men sayn" and what 
"men sen" at the beginning of the poem and actually capitalizes on 
the status of the poet-dreamer as courtly lover. As a lover in fact, he 
is disqualified as a dreamer of visiones or oracula or somnia; as a 
lover in the mythos of courtly love, he is obviously a worthy con­
templative whose temporary ariditas (analogous to the mystic's) 
should cause him to hope for an ultimate revelation. Such a ma­
neuver is a stroke of genius for the courtly love poet Guillaume, who 
playfully transforms love languor from an obstacle to revelation to a 
manifestation of the new erotic "piety" that authorizes revelation. 
The next lines of the Prologue complete the strategic parallel 
with the Somnium Scipionis, going so far as to imply that Guillaume 
understood the Marcrobean sense of truth-in-fiction: 
Or veil eel songe rimeer 
por vos cuers plus feire agueer, 
qu'Amors le me prie et comande. 
Et se nule ne nus demande 
comant je veil que li romanz 
soit apelez que je comanz, 
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ce est li Romanz de la Rose, 
ou Tart d'Amors est tote enclose. 
Now this drem wol I ryme aright 
To make your hertes gaye and lyght, 
For Love it prayeth, and also 
Commaundeth me that it be so. 
And if there any aske me, 
Whether that it be he or she, 
How this book, the which is here, 
Shal hatte, that I rede you here: 
It is the Romance of the Rose, 
In which at the art of love I close.28 
Fundamentally, the poem is a divinely sanctioned entertainment: 
Love commanded that it be so for the enjoyment and instruction of 
the god's devotees, just as God's book of the world may be legiti­
mately enjoyed by his followers and just as the Somnium Scipionis 
can be reverenced by Macrobius' fellow philosophers. Such an inten­
tion de-emphasizes the status of Guilluame's personal revelation 
and brings the poem into line with the special collapse of uti-frui in 
intransitive reading. The content of the dream—its "factual 
basis"—is secondary to the truths of the theology of Amors that are 
contained in its integument. All may read and enjoy the story, and, 
additionally, the wise will find therein that 'Tart d'Amors est tote 
enclose," that the entire body of philosophy can be found in the text, 
a claim that directly echoes the Somnium Scipionis. 
Thus, in remarkable parallels with Macrobius, Guillaume claims 
that his dream is true, not (importantly) in its events but in its 
sentence, its hidden, scriptural, intransitive truth. While Guillaume 
certainly claims that his dream is a personal revelation, the force of 
its principal truth claim is that it is a "ritual drama" produced to 
lighten the hearts of the followers of Love and, in so doing, to verify 
and celebrate the truths they already hold in common. The "reli­
gious" reader of the Roman will be brought by it into that special 
communion with Amant and will, in embracing the dream, per­
ceive that he too is Amant, is one with the dreamer in his devotion 
to the God of Love. 
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The Roman de la Rose is thus the watershed text of the dream 
vision tradition, the singular blasphemous parody that cribbed the 
rhetorical strategies of Macrobius and Augustine and brought them 
into the service of secular, popular literature. The ambiguous status 
of the dream, grounded in the consciousness of the dreamer but 
ultimately seeming universal in its application, the recognition of 
truth-in-fiction—all of the motifs recognized by Macrobius are here. 
A Psychology and a Metaphysics: Nominalism 
The Roman de la Rose is very nearly the whole story of the origin 
of the late medieval dream vision: only one problem remains. Guil­
laume's persona is still, however metaphorically or blasphemously, 
an initiate, a saint of the new erotic religion, and it is only in his 
status as an initiate that his dream can be valorized. In other words, 
the Roman was possible only because courtly love was a mock reli­
gion and the "higher truths" buried in its labyrinths are parodic 
religious truths. To normalize this experience, to allow the dreamer 
to be truly an everyman and not a man privileged with raptus Deo, a 
revolution was needed, a revolution in metaphysics, epistemology, 
and psychology. Such a revolution would provide a new sense of the 
value of the figmenta of the human mind and would free these im­
ages from the constraining requirement that they adhere to an eter­
nal, universal, and unchanging world of forms. Such a revolution 
would make the dream vision truly a dream, not a revelation of the 
higher world but one thoroughly of the inner, individualized world 
of the dreamer, a world that could only be shared by those who first 
share in the thoughts, obsessions, and ultimate righteousness of the 
dreamer. 
The revolution is nominalism. Fundamentally, nominalists and 
conceptualists attacked the ancient Platonic notion that there physi­
cally exists a "world of forms," a realm consisting of universal, ab­
stract, incorporeal quiddities on which all phenomenal existence is 
based. The original concept is probably traceable to the cave meta­
phor of Plato's Republic but, once Christianized, the notion of "ex­
tramental universals" became a central tenet of natural philosophy. 
It was, in fact, on initially theological grounds that Ockham first 
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questioned the extramental existence of universals; if incorruptible 
and eternal universals exist, Ockham reasoned, then they could not 
have been created by God. Further, if universals exist, then their 
very existence constrains God's omnipotence, since He would be 
able to act on them only in accordance with their universal nature. 
His first formulation of this position echoes the figmental rhetoric 
of Macrobius and Augustine: 
Et dico, quod universale non est aliquid reale habens esse subiectivum, 
nee in anima nee extra animam, sed tantum habet esse obiectivum in 
anima, et est quoddam fictum habens esse tale in esse obiectivo, quale 
habet res extra in esse subiectivo. 
I maintain that a universal is not something real that exists in a subject 
[of inherence], either inside or outside the mind, but that it has being 
only as a thought-object in the mind. It is a kind of mental picture which 
as a thought-object has a being similar to that which the thing outside 
the mind has in its real existence.29 
This is not the place to assess the impact of this teaching on medie­
val philosophy;30 what is relevant to this present discussion is the 
curious effect that such a teaching has on the rhetorical nexus per­
ceptible in Macrobius and Augustine, one which sees surfaces as 
vehicles of truth but worthless in and of themselves. In the Platonic 
system, the status of phenomena is ambivalent: on the one hand, 
they are but the shadows of noumena, which at best only imperfectly 
represent them to creatures; on the other hand, phenomenal reality 
is visible and corporeal, making it hard to remember that these 
things are the shadows and the invisible entities are the truer reality. 
The same ambivalence surrounds the "phenomena" of the Roman 
de la Rose: the literal or phenomenal level of the poem, however 
unaccountable it may appear, serves as the vehicle for a divine reve­
lation and so is insulated from challenge or scrutiny. In other words, 
the reader of the Roman can never declare unilaterally that any 
given detail of the vision—say, Amant's basting his sleeves at line 
100—is totally grounded in the dreamer's own experience because 
the detail might well be an integument, a vehicle for a hidden alle­
gorical tenor whose meaning has been denied to the reader. As a 
110

ORIGINS 
reading experience, the Roman can never fully engage a reader be­
cause, given Guillaume's claim that the dream is a prescient 
revelation—a somnium—any given detail or event may operate in a 
context or at a level unavailable to the reader. 
Dualism and its universals exert a pressure on Macrobius and 
Augustine as well. Despite their rhetorical approaches to their texts, 
neither exegete is permitted to question the literal truth of the text 
under analysis. Macrobius especially must balance a sense of the 
Somnium Scipionis as ritual drama with the contradictory claim that 
it is also literally, naively prescient as well; that, as a revelation, the 
Somnium actually shows a picture of the Platonic cosmos while, as a 
fabulous narrative, it simultaneously embraces the "entire body of 
philosophy." Augustine sidesteps this issue by Christianizing the 
Platonic scheme and claiming that divine artifacts can simultane­
ously be things and signs (subject to both use and enjoyment, to both 
intransitive and transitive reading). Effectively, then, in a Platonic 
framework, the allegorist is always a type of the Creator; his allegor­
ical text is inescapably sacramental, containing representations that 
are never merely the figments of his own mind. 
Ockham's psychology and metaphysics changed this. Without de­
limiting God's omnipotence or omniscience in any way, Ockham 
simply claims that human intelligence does not regularly partake of 
that omniscience. Revelations and prophecies certainly take place 
but, says Ockham, the normal intellectual process of abstraction is 
not the result of divine indwelling or of a share in the mind of God. 
Universals exist, but not outside of the individual mind: they are 
created by repeated predication (that is, "candiditas" is that quality 
shared by vanilla ice cream, bond paper, cumulus clouds, etc.). For 
Ockham, the mental images of which our graphic or oral signs are 
expressions are grounded in our own minds, not in another realm, 
and thus are subject to judgments about their validity or righteous­
ness: 
Figmenta habent esse in anima, et non subiectivum, quia tune essent 
verae res, et ita chimaera et hircocervus et huiusmodi essent verae 
res; . . . 
. . . fictions have being in the mind, but they do not exist independently 
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[subiectivum], because in that case they would be real things and so a 
chimera and a goat-stag and so on would be real things.31 
In his later writings, Ockham abandoned metaphorical formula­
tions of this doctrine, including the notions of "fictum" or "figmen­
tum," for one more firmly rooted in sign theory. This later formula­
tion identified universals as the basic building blocks of thought, the 
nomines or names with which the mind forms propositions: 
. . . ipsae intellectiones ahimae vocantur passiones animae, et suppo­
nunt ex natura sua pro ipsis rebus extra vel pro aliis rebus in anima, sicut 
voces supponunt pro rebus ex institutione . . . 
The mind's own intellectual acts are called states of mind. By their nature 
they stand for the actual things outside the mind or for other things in 
the mind, just as the spoken words stand for them by convention . . )2 
Thus, Plato's world of forms exists, but only in Plato's mind, only as 
the products of his individual process of abstraction, and only as the 
inventory of images with which he constructs propositions and syl­
logisms. They are unique and personal: as each person's experience 
of phenomenal reality is different from that of every other person, 
so each individual's stock of intellectiones will be different from 
everyone else's, as different as different languages or as similar as 
different pronunciations of "Aeneas." 
Thus, the new nominalist orientation was inward, though some­
thing short of solipsistic: clearly, worldj of forms still exist and are 
still communal if not actually universal, and "psychological" univer­
sals like caninitas and candiditas are probably no less righteous and 
accurate categories of experience than oral or written names repre­
sent. They are based on accrued experience, judgment, wisdom, 
learning, and understanding and, though no two corresponding 
senses of, say, "virtus," will be exactly synonymous, the senses of 
"virtus" developed by most good people will be at least recognizably 
similar. Like spoken languages but anterior to them, this interior 
language of universals is a useful and necessary vehicle for thought 
and communication: useful because conventional, necessary because 
everything that is not God is contingent, making knowledge of God 
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impossible and knowledge of everything else experiential and ap­
proximate at best. 
Such a rethinking of epistemological and metaphysical problems 
in the late Middle Ages could not fail to have its effect on literature, 
especially on allegorical and naively iconic literature. By decapitat­
ing a Platonic metaphysics, nominalism turned literature away from 
a vaguely Neo-Platonic sense of fantasy and allegory as realizations 
of the world of forms or windows onto a higher realm. Thus, a 
nominalist allegory, or more generally a nominalist poem, uses im­
agery not only to communicate (what might be) ultimate realities 
but also to examine and explore the mind of the image-maker, the 
poet. A poem such as the Book of the Duchess, for example, uses 
nominalism to have it both ways: the poem can simultaneously 
mourn Blanche and foreground the intellectual and creative poverty 
of the narrator and the audience: 
The ficta (or figmenta) of the brain fail to correspond exactly with the 
phenomena. It becomes important, then, that man's schemes be inter­
rupted, reassessed, even broken, as they were in the Book of the Duchess, 
so that man, as dreamer, can be rendered naked to start afresh.33 
Such an observation accounts nicely for the inherent silliness of the 
obtuse narrator of this stark and serious poem. In this perspective, 
the Book of the Duchess becomes a study in perspective itself, in the 
contingency of language and in the danger of interpreting pheno­
mena by way of pre-existing generalizations in the interpreter's 
mind or available to it through books. "Man, as dreamer" becomes 
the subject of the poem equally with the events dreamed because, 
just as speech reflects the speaker's thoughts, nominalist universals— 
realized as dream images—reflect the thinker's soul. 
In a more general rhetorical sense, this change in focus from 
noumenal reality to psychological realities (and the uncertain 
"communal" reality built from them) served to make nominalism 
an uncanny backdrop for the medieval dream vision. Recalling Aug­
ustine and Macrobius, we should ask what would be the end point of 
a labyrinth of images that is not merely figmental but which is also 
the semiotic signature of its architect? In other words, what is em­
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braced by the reader who overcomes the initial humility of another's 
dream and actually comprehends its alien images? The answer is 
something short of ultimate knowledge or revelation, but something 
which was, for the logician Ockham, the only human achievement 
that could transcend the contingency of the phenomenal world. The 
end point of the dream vision is the communion of two minds, 
whose ficta are astonishingly identical; it is the intuition that the 
words (or the dream) are not someone else's or anyone's but—"tolle, 
lege"—mysteriously, specially the reader's coequally with the 
dreamer. Ockham, of course, saw this communion as possible only 
in logic, the cold-blooded, abstract system of propositions leading to 
intellectual or notional assent, but the dream vision extended the 
possibilities: to read another's dream is to find oneself thinking that 
person's thoughts, but to embrace that dream, to comprehend or see 
the justice of its ficta or figmenta—this is to become one with that 
dreamer. 
Thus, just as the rhetorical goal of reading Scripture is to become 
one with God in spirit—and not necessarily in mind—the rhetorical 
goal of reading a dream vision is to become one with the dreamer. 
The reader actually has shared in the distress, the distraction, and 
the vision of the dreamer, actually "comes to the place where he is 
already," as Augustine would say. Such a revelation is certainly less 
sublime than the one experienced on Mount Patmos but, for the 
fourteenth century, it was also a more credible and engaging one, 
one to which a subtle but powerful rhetoric would be brought to 
bear. 
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STRUCTURE

Jm\ fter considering the contexts of the dream vision and its 
M^ V proximate origins in medieval rhetoric and philosophy, it 
\^_ is finally possible to examine how the poems operate. This 
examination will be divided into two stages: a formal description of 
the structure of the dream vision using traditional models and term­
inology and an affective analysis of this structure. The purpose of 
this two-stage discussion is to illustrate what I have already sug­
gested about the twofold content of the poems: the poem about a 
dreamer and a dream, the fabric of the figmenta of a troubled dream­
er, is simultaneously about the ideas for which those figmenta stand 
and the mind which created the figmenta. 
The Shape of the Poem 
Like any other poem, the dream vision begins by announcing it­
self to be a certain kind of experience: it does this by introducing a 
certain sort of persona or speaking voice and determining a specific 
relationship between that persona and the reader. The text is in the 
hands of or proceeds from the muse of a specific individual, and all 
of the words have this person as their ultimate source. Thus, the 
lyric persona is both the reporter of the narrative (or complex of 
emotions) and also the text's ultimate (and probably only) subject. 
This much is true of all lyric poetry by definition, and the dream 
vision is a species of the lyric mode. All lyrics are finally about their 
singers and their subjects—their external topics and the internal 
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responses of the lyric poets to these topics—in ways that frequently 
make subject and object indistinguishable. The situation in the 
dream vision, however, complicates even this subtle, often murky 
configuration because here neither the event nor the reporter are 
stable, sharply determined entities. The event is ambiguous, of 
course, because it is a dream and one that is not, in all likelihood, a 
communication from beyond. Indeed, the "events" reported in 
dream visions are probably not events at all but, as Augustine and 
others might have said, are gratuitous, random representations of 
thoughts and memories given imaginary life in the figmenta of the 
dreamer's brain. 
The other element of the lyric mode, the persona, is also espe­
cially troublesome and indeterminate in the case of the dream vi­
sion.1 We have noted already that the dreamer is regularly depicted 
as troubled, depressed, and alienated from the comforts of society: 
he may be suffering from love languor or be in mourning or he may, 
like "Long Will" or the dreamer who dreams of the Palace of Fame, 
be suffering from a deeper, more pervasive anguish or depression. 
In any case, he is the sort of person who has dreams, the sort of 
sensibility we might expect in a lyric poet but one in whose hands we 
might not feel terribly secure. 
It could reasonably be objected at this point that the anxious or 
distracted persona is a feature of all lyric poetry and not unique to 
the dream vision—after all, why do lyric poets write if they are not 
moved to do so by some desire to express the overwhelming emo­
tions they feel? The difference, that between the conventional lyric 
persona and the poet-dreamer, is one of fictive intention: the lyric 
persona, moved by some emotion to write a poem, goes ahead and 
writes a poem about that emotion and about the events that engen­
dered it, while the poet-dreamer never sets out consciously to ex­
pose his feelings. The elliptical descriptions of dreamers at the be­
ginning of dream visions never include explicit statements about 
just what is troubling this poor wretch—Geffrey refuses to discuss 
the question rather brusquely in the Book of the Duchess (the "phi­
sicien but oon" passage, lines 30-43). It is thus impossible to begin a 
116 
STRUCTURE 
dream vision without a sense of intrusion, as when the person sit­
ting next to us on the bus begins to tell us his life story (and we have 
the window seat); on beginning the poem, the readers discover that 
all before them promises to be a projection of the troubled mind 
introduced at the poem's beginning. 
These two ambiguities about both halves of the lyric structure— 
the fantastic event and the unreliable reporter—create radical lyric 
expectations in the reader; however indirectly, the dream report 
promises to be an expression of emotion like any other lyric except 
that here the central sentiment is not one about which the poet is 
being honest and forthright. Such expectations prepare the reader 
for strange, enigmatic details within the dream reports: 
En icelui tens deliteus,

que toute rien d'amer s'esfroie,

songai une nuit que j'estoi.

Lors m'iere avis en mon dormant

qu'il iere matin durement;

de mon lit tantost me leve,

chaucai moi et mes mains lave

lors tres une aguille d'argent

d'un aguillier mignot et gent,

si prins l'aguille a enfiler.

Hors de vile oi talant d'aler

por oir des oisiaus les sons,

qui chantent desus les buissons

en icele saison novele.

And in this sesoun delytous,

Whan love affraieth alle thing,

Me thought a-nyght, in my sleping,

Right in my bed, ful redily,

That it was by the morowe erly,

And up I roos, and gan me clothe.

Anoon I wisshe myn handis bothe;

A sylvre nedle forth y drough

Out of an aguler queynt ynough,

And gan this nedle threde anon;

For out of toun me list to gon
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The song of briddes forto here, 
That in thise buskes syngen clere.2 
What does this mean? The passage seems to violate the rules of 
logic, sequence, and narrative succession. The very first image of the 
dream, the wonderfully wrought picture of Amant rising and bast­
ing his sleeves with the silver needle, shows by its prominent posi­
tion in the narrative that it is a crucial motif but offers readers abso­
lutely no clue as to what that motif or image might mean. 
Explanations for the detail abound in editions of the poem, but none 
fully accounts for the extraordinary vividness and power of this 
striking, truly dreamlike image. To say that this intense picture of 
Amant basting his sleeves in advance of his meeting with le Dieu 
d'Amors captures the real experience of dreaming is fine and true, 
but such an appreciation does not begin to account for its power and 
enigma. 
The meaning of the passage, of course, is secondary to this rhetor­
ical power: if the basting of the sleeves has any meaning at all, this 
meaning is obviously suppressed to allow the image to remain a 
radically lyric enigma. Guillaume shows us his dream-self basting 
his sleeves with the silver needle as the birds sing to underscore the 
total conflation of text and persona here and to reinforce the sense 
of enigma and intrusion already felt by readers at the opening of the 
poem. In this radical lyric situation at the beginning of the dream 
report, the image is tauntingly enigmatic for readers who are not 
privy to the dreamer's secret distress; the image calls forth a reac­
tion of hushed, respectful ignorance like that of the rustici watching 
a Macrobean "ritual drama." Like parallel opening enigmas in many 
other dream visions—the whelp {Book of Duchess), the "huyl" 
(Pearl), the "shroudes" (Piers Plowman), and the daisy (Legend of 
Good Women)—this image shouts its meaningfulness but remains 
silent on its meaning. It is an image, sure enough, but one presented 
to demonstrate to readers that the ritual drama of this text is, so far, 
beyond the ken of the uninitiated. 
This relationship can be neatly expressed in terms of Viktor 
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Shklovsky's concepts of "story" and "plot," a pair of terms he first 
used to analyze Tristram Shandy} By "story," Shklovsky means the 
real chronological and external events that are the subject of a narra­
tion; by "plot" he means the verbal or stylistic character, pace, and 
progress of the narrative. Applying the terms to the rhetorical situa­
tion at the beginning of the dream vision, with its enigmatic but 
hypnotic images, we could say that story and plot are indistinguish­
able, for it is clear from the prologue of the poems that the efficient 
subject of the poem is to be the dreamer, which makes the dream, 
the representation of the dreamer's inner life, the "story." At the 
same time, however, the character and development of the text— 
the "plot"—are equally reflections or representations of that same 
subject. Thus, as we might expect in a lyric, the dream vision begins 
by asserting its expressiveness, though it soon demonstrates the 
practical inexpressibility of its story; the poem effectively declares 
that the narrative it is to tell is really no narrative at all but the 
ins omnium of one who has refused to name the vexation that caused 
it. This means, therefore, that both the text and its content are 
equally the personal products of the distressed dreamer—that story 
is indistinguishable from plot—and that both are insulated from the 
readers' comprehension by their fundamental lack of communion 
with the dreamer. In other words, basting the sleeves must mean 
something to Guillaume de Lorris (the origin of the dream of 
Amant), but this meaning is unavailable to all who do not share in 
Guillaume's unidentified distress. 
Perhaps the best example of this initial conflation, of dream and 
dreamer, of story and plot, occurs early in the Book of the Duchess: 
I was go walked fro my tree, 
And as I wente, ther cam be mee 
A whelp, that fauned me as I stood, 
That hadde yfolowed, and koude no good. 
Hyt com and crepte to me as lowe 
Ryght as hyt hadde me yknowe, 
Helde doun hys hed and joyned hys eres, 
And leyde al smothe doun hys heres. 
I wolde have kaught hyt, and anoon 
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Hyt fledde, and was fro me goon; 
And I hym folwed, and hyt forth wente 
Doun by a floury grene wente 
Ful thikke of gras, ful softe and swete. 
(lines 387-99) 
There are few more traditionally lyric moments in all of Chaucer. 
The whelp is all but pure symbol, a little unit of passionate lyric 
expression that is allusive without reference, all vehicle and no ten­
or. In the hands of the courtly lover-persona of the Book of the 
Duchess, the whelp is little more than sentimental window 
dressing, an occasional emblem of love and fidelity to warm the 
questionable heart of Madame Eglantine. The whelp surfaces and 
disappears without a trace in the space of only thirteen lines, leaving 
behind the sense that it has no place in a rational allegorical or 
narrative structure. Yet, in this radical lyric opening of the dream 
vision, where all is quite palpably the mindscape of the distressed 
dreamer, the errant image seems perfectly congruent. Were such an 
"event" to happen, say, in Spenser, we would demand a meaning 
(and sooner or later would get one); here, we hardly even wonder, 
for this is not a narrative and the voice is not that of a rational, 
meticulous allegorist: this is the fevered lyric expression of poor, 
love-languishing Geffrey, in which text is teller, story is plot. 
As the dream report continues, however, this identity of story and 
plot, this conflation of dream and dreamer, begins to break down in 
a process we might call "narrative normalization." At a distance 
from the dream prologue (where the lyric sense of the poem is the 
strongest), two subtle changes occur which begin to shift the dream 
report out of its lyric mode: the splitting of the dreamer and the 
foregrounding of the iconography of the text. 
The first of these changes, the splitting of the dreamer, is less a 
change than a manifestation of a state of affairs that has obtained 
from the beginning of the poem. At the start of the dream report, 
the reader tacitly accepts the identity of the poem's persona with the 
"I" of the dream report. A passage from the Roman de la Rose 
should illustrate: 
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Et li dex d'Amors m'a seii 
endementieres aguetant 
con li vanieres qui atant 
que la beste en bon leu se meite 
por lessier aler la saeste. 
And thus while I wente in my play, 
The God of Love me folowed ay, 
Right as an hunter can abyde 
The beest, tyl he seeth his tyde 
To shoten at good mes to the der, 
Whan that hym nedeth go no ner.4 
Because of the fundamentally lyric situation at early stages such as 
this in the Roman, there is no particular reason to make nice distinc­
tions between the character in the dream and the narrator of the 
poem: in this case, since this is manifestly a poem about Guillaume's 
experiences in love, it is entirely reasonable that he should portray 
himself as being stalked by //' Dieu d'Amors. Nonetheless, it is 
Amant the dreamer-character that sees the God of Love stalking 
him as his prey; it is Guillaume the dreamer-narrator that supplies 
the detail. 
Such a point may seem tedious and over-subtle, but the fact is that 
the "two Amants," the dreamer-character and the dreamer-narrator, 
become thoroughly distinct—split—in the very next lines of the 
poem, as the omniscient narrator records a mistake made by his 
fallible alter-ego in the dream: 
Dedenz une piere de mabre 
ot Nature par grant mestrise 
soz le pin la fontaine asise; 
si ot desus la pierre escrites 
el bort amont letres petites, 
qui disoient, ilec desus 
estoit morz li biau Narcisus. 
And springyng in a marble ston 
Had Nature set, the sothe to telle, 
Under that pyn-tree a welle. 
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And on the border, al withoute, 
Was written in the ston aboute, 
Letters smal, that sayden thus, 
"Here starf the fayre Narcisus."5 
The one-line inscription on the well diverts the text into a new, di­
dactic mode. For the next seventy-odd lines, the physical narrative is 
deferred as Guillaume rehearses the story of Narcissus from Meta­
morphoses. The rehearsal is brisk, accurate, and entertaining, but 
the digression distracts the reader's mind (and certainly Amant's) 
from the physical object to its mythological history as interpreted by 
this new, detached persona. The interpretation of the legend (and, 
thus, of the well), is made explicit in the final lines of the digression: 
Dames, cest essample aprenez, 
qui vers vos amis mesprenez; 
car se vos les lessiez morir, 
Dex le vos savra bien merir. 
Ladyes, I preye ensample takith, 
Ye that ageyns youre love mistakith; 
For if her deth be yow to wite, 
God can ful well youre while quyte.6 
The warning is racy and urbane—to the point of a possible pun on 
"full well" in the translation—and the meaning it imposes on the 
image is not applicable to any but "proude-hertid" loved ones such 
as Amant's.7 Specifically, the interpolated gloss fails to suggest that 
the well represents any danger to Amant: 
Quant li escrit m'ot fet savoir 
que ce estoit trestot por voir 
la fontaine au bel Narcisus, 
je me suis trez un poi ensus, 
que dedenz n'ousai esgarder, 
ainz coman^ai a coarder, 
que de Narcisus me sovint 
cui malement en mesavint. 
Mes me pensai que a seu'r, 
sanz peor de mauves eur, 
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a la fontaine aler pooie;

por folie m'en esloignoie.

Whanne that this lettre, of which I telle, 
Hadde taught me that it was the welle 
Of Narcisus in his beaute, 
I gan anoon withdrawe me, 
Whanne it fel in my remembraunce 
That hym bitidde such myschaunce, 
But at the laste thanne thought I, 
That scatheles, full sykerly, 
I myght unto the welle goo. 
Wherof shulde I abasshen soo?8 
This carefully wrought passage allows Guillaume to have it both 
ways. The first six lines (1543-48) tease the reader with a cautious, 
sensible reaction to the well of Narcissus. The dreamer-character 
has not noticed (recall) that the God of Love has been stalking him 
all this while, but the readers and the dreamer-narrator have noted 
this. Readers, I suspect, know "full well" that the well represents a 
danger to Amant, and these first few lines of the passage allow read­
ers to savor the danger. Lines 1549-52, however, show that the 
dreamer-character does not realize the danger and, following the 
cue of the rehearsal of the Narcissus legend and its sanguine sen­
tence, Amant approaches the well, looks in, and falls under the spell 
of the lady's eyes, represented by the crystal stones. 
Thus, the dreamer-character has made a mistake. He has misin­
terpreted the meaning of the well, with the help of the "glossator," 
whose redaction of Metamorphoses suggested that it represented no 
danger. On the rhetorical level, story has diverged from plot, first, 
since images have been introduced into the vision that the dreamer-
character has misinterpreted and second, since this misinterpreta­
tion is immediately manifest to the readers. The two dreamer-
figures have been split—into an omniscient dreamer-narrator and a 
naive dreamer-character, one who knows what the well holds in 
store and one who cannot predict this. 
This splitting "normalizes" the text by freeing the readers from 
the exclusive perspective of the dreamer-character's consciousness. 
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More than this, by giving readers a perspective on the action that is 
superior to or at least different from that of the dreamer-character, 
this splitting also frees the text from the lyric mode, in which the 
meaning of an image is never totally independent of the lyric "I." 
Instead, the splitting of the dreamer seems to place the readers in a 
classic narrative structure in which no character is favored and in 
which the readers and the narrator are the final arbiters of the se­
quence of events and their meaning. 
It is difficult to find this peculiar arrangement anywhere in litera­
ture outside of dream-poetry, in which the mistakes of the dreamer-
character (a pseudo-eyewitness) are quite common and conven­
tional. A list of such "authorial" miscues might begin with the 
jeweler's misapprehension of the status of his pearl {Pearl), Drede's 
misplaced trust of his shipmates (The Bouge of Court), and Gef­
frey's fabled obtuseness towards the Black Knight (the Book of the 
Duchess). 
The second movement towards "narrative normalization" is the 
foregrounding of iconography. This typically occurs simultaneously 
with the splitting of the dreamer, but it is a sufficiently important 
feature to warrant notice on its own. The foregrounding is, put 
simply, the readers' growing intuition that the events and images, 
the details and the situations of the dream narrative are symbolic 
and that their symbolism is comprehensible to the readers without 
the intervention of the dreamer-narrator.9 This sense, in effect a 
sense of the divergence of story and plot, is a sort of confidence or 
familiarity with the scenes and images of the dream, which, just per­
haps, may not be inscrutable, enigmatic functions of the psyche of 
the dreamer. In the extreme, this foregrounding happens when the 
dreamer-character shows himself incapable of interpreting his own 
dream or becomes himself an object of interpretation ("Amant," 
"Drede," and so on, as personifications as well as personae). Even 
when this does not happen—even when the dreamer-character has 
not been separated from the dreamer-narrator—the conventional 
or self-evident imagery of the dream report still comes to militate 
against the radical lyric expectations of the beginning of the poem, 
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still suggests that there is something of this insomnium that is com­
prehensible to the readers. A case in point is the fair field of folk in 
Piers Plowman: 
Thanne gan I to meten a merueilouse sweuene, 
That I was in a wildernesse, wist I neuer where. 
As I bihelde into }?e est, an hiegh to \>e sonne, 
I seigh a toure on a toft trielich ymaked; 
A depe dale binethe, a dongeon J?ereinne 
With depe dyches and derke and dredful of sight. 
A faire felde ful of folk fonde I there bytwene, 
Of alle maner of men, pe mene and \>e riche, 
Worchyng and wandryng as ]?e worlde asketh. 
Somme putten hem to )?e plow, pleyed ful selde, . . . 10 
There is nothing in this panoramic image to suggest that it is a 
dream image, nothing peculiar or personal about it, nothing to sug­
gest that its thrust is different from that of the social panoramas of 
the morality plays from which it is derived. The effect of such a 
passage (and of a great deal of the Visio) is to orient the reader in a 
familiar allegorical framework and then, in time, to call that famil­
iarity into question. Such a familiar orientation invites readers to 
forget that this is a somatic dream, to embrace the righteousness of 
the text as a figurative narrative and not as the dream-projection of 
Long Will. 
A final case, in which splitting and foregrounding occur together, 
is that of Pearl. Early in the dream report, the narrator catches sight 
of the Pearl maiden on the verge of Heaven and proceeds directly to 
ask her all the wrong questions: 
'O perle', quod I,'in perle3 py3t,

Art }?ou my perle )?at I haf playned,

Regretted by myn one on ny3te?

Much longeyng haf I for j?e layned,

Sy|?en into gresse j?ou me agly3te.

Pensyf, payred, I am forpayned,

And J?ou in a lyf of lykyng Iy3te,

In Paradys erde, of stryf vnstrayned.
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What wyrde hat3 hyder my iuel vayned, 
And don me in J?ys del and gret daunger? 
Fro we in twynne wern towen and twayned, 
I haf ben a joyle3 jueler.11 
Unlike the readers, who have already guessed that this is to be an 
apocalyptic revelation, the narrator does not appreciate or even un­
derstand the privilege that has been accorded him and, ignoring the 
possibilities for beatific eschatological knowledge to be learned 
from the Pearl maiden, begins immediately to chastise her for leav­
ing him back on earth to mourn her passing. As in the next few 
stanzas the dreamer-character attempts to elicit an invitation to 
cross the river into Heaven and to stay there with her forever, both 
the splitting and the foregrounding become more obvious. Pearl 
even reaches the point where readers begin to wish that this super­
nal vision might have been granted to one with more foresight and 
less self-interest, one who, if offered intelligence about the next 
world, would not play courtly lover and complain of his lady's 
"daungere." 
So the second stage or phase of the dream vision is a sort of narra­
tive normalization in which various forces work together to sub­
merge the essential lyric mode of the dream report and to encourage 
narrative expectations (to the extent that, in Pearl and the Book of 
the Duchess, the dreamer is often perceived to be impeding the 
progress of the epiphany). The dream vision typically remains in 
this stage nearly until its conclusion. For evidence of this we need 
only turn to secondary sources, to critical books and articles on spe­
cific poems, which attest eloquently to the fact that the body of the 
dream report is, or seems to be, interpretable independent of the 
dream frame. The Piers Plowman Visto might serve as an example 
here, for it is taken in large measure from antifraternal and Wyclif­
fite sources and so seems to have a life of its own apart from the 
dreaming mind of Long Will, a "life" so vivid that many a commen­
tator on Piers Plowman all but forgets that the poem is a dream 
report. The Book of the Duchess is an even clearer case: narrative 
normalization virtually turns this poem against its own dreamer­
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persona, the man who cannot see what the dream makes so patently 
obvious—that the Black Knight has lost his lady Blanche through 
death. In this case, as in that of Pearl, critics of the poem have actu­
ally become impatient with the dreamer, calling him boorish, insen­
sitive, cruel, or at least obtuse. This long-standing view of Chaucer's 
character "Geffrey"—a perfectly accurate character description—is 
the mark of Chaucer's success in normalizing the lyric experience of 
the Book of the Duchess, for it shows that readers feel perfectly 
competent to judge the actions and reactions of the dreamer in what 
is, remember, his dream. 
This second phase typically ends with the conclusion of the dream 
report (if not of the poem), at which a third and final stage is 
reached. The end of the dream vision always includes a reminder— 
sometimes explicit, sometimes tacit—that this was, after all and all 
expectations to the contrary, this one fellow's dream. The poems 
frequently employ a "reawakening device" which serves nicely to 
remind readers that the narrative (or seeming narrative) they have 
read is and has always been a dream. The best known such device is 
to be found at the conclusion of the Book of the Duchess: 
Ryght thus me mette, as I yow telle, 
That in the castell ther was a belle, 
As hyt hadde smyten houres twelve.— 
Therwyth I awook myselve 
And fond me lyinge in my bed; . . . 
(lines 1321-25) 
The bell reminds the reader quite neatly that both of the dreamer 
figures—the dreamer-character who hears the bell and the dreamer-
narrator who awakens, "Ryght thus me mette," to nocturnal 
"houres twelve"—are the same person, at least in some important 
ways. They are both clearly the same Geffrey who suffers the eight 
years' sickness, both the same disappointed courtly lover. The de­
vice, and thus the third stage, reassert the identity of the two 
dreamer-figures and with it the identity of story and plot. In effect, 
the third stage restores the integrity of the dream vision: it is not 
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and never was a narrative with an eyewitness, but from first to last it 
has been a lyric experience. 
A similar device concludes Pearl's dream report: 
I )?O3t J?at no]?yng my3t me dere 
To fech me bur and take me hake, 
And to start in ]>e strem schulde non me stere, 
To swymme ]?e remnaunt, ]?a3 I \>er swalte. 
(lines 1157-60) 
He jumps into the river, begins to swim, and, it seems, the very 
futile exertion of the attempt awakens him: 
For, ry3t as I sparred vnto )?e bone, 
{3 at brathjTe out of my drem me brayde. 
J3en wakned I in j?at erber wlonk; 
My hede vpon ]?at hylle \vat3 layde 
t>er as my perle to grounde strayd. 
I raxled, and fel in gret affray, 
And, sykyng, to myself I sayd, 
'Now al be to J?at Prynce3 paye'. 
(line 1169-76) 
The physical exertion of the dreamer-character in trying to cross the 
river—tossing and turning, as it were—awakens him and discovers 
him to be the same man with the same enigmatic longing, though 
now less enigmatic, now identifiable with the orthodox Christian's 
longing for communion with the "Prince." At the same time, read­
ers are made to see that the dreamer-character's futile exertion is 
analogous to their own futile attempts to put Heaven in earthbound 
terms, an intellectual thrashing about in a foreign medium that is 
equally exhausting and equally doomed to fail. 
The conclusion of the dream vision (the third phase) thus marks 
the reunion of the dreamer-character and the dreamer-narrator and 
with this reunion the reassertion of the lyric mode in place of the 
symbolic pseudonarrative which the readers have been following: 
the conclusion of the poem shows that the experience is and always 
was located in the mind of a dreamer whose secret longing, distress, 
or distraction has caused his dream. In other words, story and plot 
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have once more come together as well, since, at the conclusion of the 
dream report, the story (the seeming narrative of events in the 
dream report) has been exposed as no "sequence of [external and 
reported] events" at all but a sequence of internal psychic events— 
the plot, in Shklovsky's terminology—which took place only in the 
mind of the dreamer. 
This structure may be represented graphically thus: 
Stage Mode Events in the Text Reader Role Formalist 
Description 
1. prologue lyric introduction of the simple lyric per- story=plot 
dream as a symp­ ception: diagnosis 
tom of distress 
2. early in narrative the dreamer- illusory narrative story diverges 
the dream character makes perception or from plot 
report a mistake; imagery pseudonarrative; 
becomes self­ "narrative 
evident to the normalization" 
readers 
3. end of the lyric reassertion of the complex lyric per- true or redefined 
dream dream report as a ception; com­ story=plot 
report (or symptom munion with the 
epilogue) dreamer 
This table suggests the typical movement of the dream vision, one 
definable within fairly traditional bounds. The principal movement 
is one from an initial lyric perception at the beginning of the poem 
where the dream is introduced as an insomnium, through a second, 
finally illusory stage in which the dream report takes on the features 
of a narrative free from any special relationship with the psyche of 
the dreamer, to a final reassertion of the lyric identity of the whole 
experience. In effect, this movement is a strategy of misdirection: a 
lyric experience masquerades for a time as a narrative one only to 
reveal at its conclusion that it is not and never was a narrative in any 
traditional sense. Allegory often behaves this way, but seldom does 
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allegory retreat at its conclusion from the tacit admission or intu­
itive truth that it represents a universal experience. The dream vi­
sion, in its conventional epilogue-reminder that it is a dream, always 
effects this retreat, always therefore undercutting and devaluing its 
body. The reasons for this three-part movement, this attempt to 
mask and then to reassert the lyric integrity of the poem, can now be 
considered. 
The Poem and the Readers 
We have been able to describe, in the terms of traditional literary 
criticism, "what happens in a dream vision": put simply, the poems' 
essentially lyric identity becomes submerged in what seems to be a 
typical figurative or allegorical narrative. The dream reports are 
usually long and paratactic enough to allow and even encourage 
readers to forget that the poems are the reports of dreams, or, more 
accurately, to encourage readers to try to make sense of the narrative 
of "events" independent of the dream nature of those events. The 
illusion of eyewitness narrative is lifted at and by the poems' conclu­
sion, as the readers are reminded—either explicitly or tacitly—that 
the dream images are and always have been the interior imaginative 
events of the still-troubled dreamer. 
But this is not all and, in fairness, there are those who would claim 
that this sort of formal description is nothing at all, is itself illusory. 
Proponents of affective stylistics, for example, can claim that there 
is no "in a text" because there is no text, because, finally, a text is 
nothing other than a reader's experience of it. We have seen that 
there existed a medieval version of this position, found chiefly in 
Augustine's De Doctrina Christiana, and that this "affective" rhe­
torical stance is at the heart of the appeal of the dream vision. A 
glance at Augustine shows that this theory differs from modern 
ones only in Augustine's avowal of a level of communication or 
communion anterior to human language, a meaning to be sought 
with the heart, not expressed in words. 
This notion of a text somehow communicating at a level beneath 
its graphic words is strengthened by the impact of nominalism and 
its effect on medieval ideas of abstraction. While Ockham was no 
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existentialist or agnostic, his critique of the Platonic notion of ex­
tramental universals does represent a movement away from the text 
as naively didactic—of books as analogues to the Book of the World. 
The movement is towards a text that is interactive and experiential: 
the ficta or figmenta of the brain record or show the character of the 
maker, even more credibly than these images represent their phe­
nomenal originals. To use an example which Ockham might have 
considered, when we read five or six Commentaries on the Sen­
tences of Peter Lombard—a required exercise for masters of philos­
ophy at Oxford in Ockham's day—do we learn more about Peter 
Lombard or more about the five or six commentators? The answer 
is the paradox of pluralism: in reading one or two such commentar­
ies, we see most clearly the characters of the writers, and can trust 
our sense of the makers' signatures more than we can trust their 
individual sense of the Sentences. Afer several commentaries, how­
ever, we can begin to see what the diverse individual minds of the 
various commentators perceived together and can begin to make 
judgments when the commentators differed—in short, we can 
begin to learn something of Peter Lombard. Thus, to read is to expe­
rience both subject and object, to see both the maker and, through 
the maker's eyes (and nomines), the object of the discourse. Writing 
can only be trusted as this complex of representations. 
The dream vision can be called "affective" in this broad, 
Augustinian-nominalist sense. The form operates as a giant trope 
or scheme which initially taunts readers by its artifice and irrele­
vance to their experience—for what, after all, could be less relevant 
than another person's insomnium? Properly "alienated" from sym­
pathy with the experience, readers discover in the dream report that 
the images and events it records are not quite so alien (foreground­
ing of iconography) and that the perspective of the pseudo-
eyewitness is not always correct in its interpretation or construction 
of the events (splitting of the dreamer). Finally, at the conclusion of 
the poem, readers are reminded that this is a dream and thereby that 
they are in a peculiar communion with the dreamer insofar as they 
share that person's insomnium, share that person's ficta or 
figmenta. 
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The best example of initial, radically lyric alienation in the dream 
vision is the infamous crux at the beginning of the Book of the 
Duchess: 
But men myght axe me why soo 
I may not sleepe, and what me is. 
But natheles, who aske this 
Leseth his asking trewely. 
Myselven can not telle why 
The sothe; but trewly, as I gesse, 
I holde hit be a sicknesse 
That I have suffred this eight yeer, 
And yet me boote is never the ner; 
For there is phisicien but oon 
That may me hele; but that is don. 
Passe we over untill eft; 
That wil not be mot nede be left; . . . 
(lines 30-42) 
Arguments on the passage's courtly reticence notwithstanding, the 
inarguable effect of this passage on the reader is one of total and 
unequivocal alienation. Men might ask "what me is" and, in a pri­
vate lyric designed to illuminate this very point, the question would 
be entirely proper, but its answer here is not forthcoming. Instead of 
an explanation, the reader is given a teasing reference to a myste­
rious "phisicien," the identity of whom could be the now-absent 
Blanche, Jesus Christ, the comfort of death which comes when it 
will, or perhaps Joan of Kent or some other lady to whom young 
Geoffrey Chaucer paid the respects of the courtly lover. 
But enough, Chaucer says: "That wil not be mot nede be left." By 
these lines, the reader is decisively shut off from the experience that 
forms the basis of the dream that follows. Pearl's "huyl," Long 
Will's disguise, and even the blather of lore that begins the Hous of 
Fame achieve the same effect. Alienated from the persona of the 
poem and able to look forward to nothing other than this myste­
rious figure's day residue dream, the reader is forced effectively into 
a "diagnostic" relationship with the text; knowing Macrobius and 
the rest, this reader may only hope to be able to uncover the 
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dreamer's distress by examining the imagery and structure of the 
dream, thereby affirming the lyric expressiveness of the artifact. By 
reading the dream as a symptom, the reader can hope to discover the 
lyric thrust of the poem and see the dream as an objective or somatic 
correlative of the dreamer's unnamed and unshared distress. 
This alienated diagnostic kind of reading, a "simple lyric percep­
tion" of the text as the expression of a powerful authorial emotion, 
continues as long as the dream report remains solely the proprietary 
creature of the dreamer. The tacit reduplication of the dreamer into 
two figures, the dreamer-narrator and the dreamer-character, does 
nothing to eliminate or reduce the alienation of the reader as long as 
these two dreamer-figures, between them, seem to be invested with 
reportial and interpretive omniscience, that is, as long as story does 
not diverge from plot. If the poems were to continue in this mode, 
they would be little more than weird, random collections of images 
that, at best, might satisfy only this diagnostic urge in readers, little 
medieval detective stories with the glandular appeal of, say, Brown­
ing's "Porphyria's Lover." They would be experiences like Perte­
lote's of Chaunticleer's dream in the Nun's Priest's Tale, empty so­
matic experiences referable only to the pathology of the dreamer. 
But the medieval dream vision does not typically end this way— 
no more than does the Nun's Priest's Tale end with Pertelote's 
sense of Chaunticleer's dream. The splitting of the dreamer and the 
foregrounding of imagery or inconography, in the service of "narra­
tive normalization," crucially though subtly change the reader's ex­
perience of the dream report. Considering the effect of the first 
change, when the dreamer-character makes a mistake or otherwise 
is shown to be differentiable from the dreamer-narrator, the read­
er's perception of the text changes from that of the pre-emptive 
lyric experience of the dreamer to one in which the reader's palpable 
representative in the text (the dreamer-character as erstwhile eye­
witness) is capable of error. This demoting of the dreamer-character 
from pseudo-narrator to fallible "hero" does not require a blatant or 
critical error such as that of Amant; a subtle, barely perceptible na­
ivete or failure of insight such as displayed by Long Will or Geffrey 
in the Hous of Fame is sufficient to split the dreamer-character off 
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from the narrator and to establish the former as normative narra­
tive protagonist of the dream report. 
This splitting of the dreamer into one who writes the poem and 
another who lives in the dream world serves to complicate the ini­
tial lyric expectations. The change makes it clear that the poem is 
other than the report of a personal internal experience of a single 
integral consciousness: Geffrey in the House of Fame seems shaken 
by the discrepancy of Vergilian and Ovidian views of Dido; the 
Pe<zr/-narrator seems surprised that he cannot cross the river of 
mortality and visit the Pearl maiden; another Geffrey wonders what 
the Black Knight is doing in his love vision. Such events in dream 
narratives seduce their readers away from diagnostic reticence and 
deference to the controlling consciousness of the dream-experience 
and awaken a confidence in their own ability to understand the 
dream for themselves. In formalist terms, this phenomenon is the 
divergence of story from plot, of the narrative of events (presum­
ably objective, like the chronology of Tristram Shandy's life) from 
plot, the authorial imprint on the narrative (highly subjective, like 
Tristram's digressive rehearsal of his life story). In the dream vision 
as in Tristram Shandy, this divergence effectively releases the 
reader to examine and investigate the narrative, to separate it (it 
would seem) from the obtrusive shape given it by the narrator and 
to discover, for example, that Tristram was illegitimate or that this 
Black Knight is John of Gaunt or that the Pearl maiden's enigmatic 
statements about the Heavenly hierarchy mean this or that. 
Simultaneous with this splitting is the foregrounding of imagery 
or iconography. This feature, the introduction of scenes or images or 
exchanges which are either conventional or are naively interpret­
able without reference to the somatic framework, completes the 
process of narrative normalization. No longer able to rely on the 
dreamer-character's internal commentary to interpret the text, the 
reader suddenly discovers that this lost crutch is no longer necessary 
and begins to recognize, even in the unlikely venue of another per­
son's insomnium, images and scenes which make sense and ulti­
mately begin to describe or suggest a theme. Estates satire, conven­
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tional hints of raptures into Heaven, or even the recognizable figure 
of the melancholy John of Gaunt begin to appear, making this in­
somnium the impossible relevant dream, something more, perhaps, 
than the anxious somatic experience of a distressed individual. 
As the dream report continues in this normalized narrative mode, 
the readers become increasingly confident in their own interpretive 
abilities and even begin to feel superior to the dreamer-character as 
analysts of the poem, an urge to competition easily found in the 
criticism of the Book of the Duchess or Pearl, for example. This is 
not a dream but a poem, the reader feels; an understandable poem, a 
poem about universal or at least communal problems or emotions or 
concerns. Elizabeth Kirk makes the point nicely: 
The self-contained dream-world, that artifact accessible and intelligible 
only in terms of the greater reality beyond on which it is dependent, has 
turned out to be "real life"; it is human society in all its concreteness, 
human existence susceptible of the pattern and significance characteris­
tic of art or of religious and philosophical systems but with the pattern 
suspended until we have been immersed in the reality.12 
The salvation of baptized infants, the sorrow of England over the 
death of the Duchess Blanche, the inequities of a society polluted by 
Lady Meed—the more central such issues become in the dream re­
port, the less relevant the dream frame seems to become and the 
more universal or apocalyptic becomes the status of the text. This is 
no mere insomnium, those few might say who even consciously re­
member that it was so introduced. 
But it is an insomnium, always was and always will be, and the 
reawakening of the dreamer, that same fallible, mysterious fellow, 
demonstrates this and thus explodes the illusion of narrative. Of 
course the dreamer-character is not an eyewitness; of course this 
figure is a character in the "story," but the other "I" of the dream 
report, the other consciousness that has lurked in the background all 
this while—the dreamer-narrator—is a witness, a privileged inter­
preter, and the ultimate lyric subject-object of the poem. This ines­
capable fact, obscured from readers since the opening frame, returns 
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to the foreground at the end of the poem and demands a giant ad­
justment, a major rethinking of the significance of the experience of 
the dream report. 
This rethinking is usually not painless. The reappearance of the 
dreamer-narrator at the conclusion of the dream vision reasserts 
more than the fundamental lyric nature of the whole poem, for this 
figure appears ipso facto unchanged by his experience. He could not 
be changed, of course, because—lyric mode—he has written this 
poem after the fact: he is the "reawakened dreamer" in the pro­
logue, after all. The fact that we tend to forget this, forget that the 
Geffrey who bemoans the chaotic state of oneiromantic learning or 
the Geffrey who suffers an "eight years' sickness" is the same Gef­
frey throughout the poem, is a testament to the power of the form's 
narrative normalization. The experience should change the dream­
er, we think: what experience? which dreamer? 
This perception is true even for poems like Pearl, the prologue of 
which describes the state of mind of the dreamer before his dream. 
The conclusion of Pearl (or of Piers Plowman or of the Bouge of 
Court or of the Legend of Good Women) does not show readers a 
rehabilitated dreamer but only one whose problem or distress has 
been redefined by the experience of the dream.13 Specifically, the 
P£<2f/-narrator is still longing for his "perle," though this image 
seems now to refer to his own place in Heaven and not to the earthly 
"Pearl maiden" which he has "lost"; the Book of the Duchess-
narrator still has, we assume, his eight years' sickness, though now it 
is put into a larger perspective and compared with more realistic 
sorrows and losses; Long Will is still an outcast in society, though 
now, perhaps, he begins to understand that alienation is the only 
possible relationship a right-minded person can have to a society 
that is itself so distant from the City of God. 
So the reappearance of the dreamer-narrator does not suggest 
that his dream has been recuperative of anything more than his 
perception, his perspective. The real import of this re-emergence, 
this reassertion of the lyric mode, is for the community of readers, 
who are suddenly required to accept the impossible contradiction: 
they have been seduced into experiencing another man's insom­
136 
STRUCTURE 
nium, and the experience has changed from an odd diagnostic and 
alienated one at its inception to one which they have understood, 
comprehended, or "embraced," as Augustine would have said. In 
short, the readers have discovered themselves enrolled in the expe­
rience, and this enrollment, this communion, entails enrollment in 
the "dreamer's distress" as well: in order to have embraced the in­
somnium, the readers must necessarily have shared—unwittingly at 
first—in the emotional knot, the distraction, the perturbation that 
produced the dream experience. In one sense, the dream vision is 
nothing more than the impossible insomnium that truly speaks to 
human needs and concerns; in a more important sense, it is the me­
dieval poet's special vehicle for generating a recognition of commu­
nion in the truth.14 The dream vision is the wonderful, impossible 
insomnium of all those who feel, of all those who speak the special 
language, all those who dream the dream, creatures who may have 
failed to comprehend but who have run together the cuniculus fi­
gurarum and have completed a journey as humble as a meaningless 
dream in the reading but as sublime as their common human spirit 
in the embrace. 
A second chart might summarize: 
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CHAPTER FIVE

APPLICATIONS: THREE

DECONSTRUCTIVE

DREAM VISIONS

0% Z3 oes form prescribe content? Does the shape of a poem or 
argument determine or even affect the theme or point or 
concept being presented or argued? Do novels, lyrics, 
epics, and other literary forms tend towards certain themes to the 
exclusion of others? Or are form and content completely separate, 
the former simply the vehicle by which the latter is expressed? Spe­
cifically, does the peculiarly interpersonal strategy of the dream vi­
sion, which devalues the discursive component of its dream report 
for the purpose of establishing a special sort of psychic communion 
between reader and dreamer, necessarily cause the poetic form to 
gravitate toward certain themes and away from others? 
The answer to this is a qualified yes, at least for the dream vision. 
Medieval dream visions tend to be about the same things and con­
sider the same topics, provided we maintain a loose, relatively ab­
stract sense of words like "theme" and "topic." Poems as different in 
their announced subjects as the Roman de la Rose, the Dream of the 
Rood, the Hous of Fame, the Book of the Duchess, and Pearl all 
treat, in the last analysis, questions of epistemology, of perspective, 
of ways of knowing, and of the relationship between words and the 
truth these words seek to express. Deferring the Book of the Duch­
ess, Pearl, and the Hous of Fame for later in this chapter, consider 
for a moment the other poems in this list and note their common 
interest in knowing, in language, and in the verities language at­
tempts to express. The Roman de la Rose, especially as conceived by 
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Jean de Meun, is a thoroughly epistemological poem whose ultimate 
concern is with the cosmic implications of human life, a satire on 
learning that slowly chips away at the medieval edifice of lore. The 
poem concludes, in the address of Genius, that the fundamental and 
natural generative urges, which seemed so foolish when all that was 
at stake was Amant and his rose, are the basis of human existence, 
are truer and more real than all the contingent verbiage that sur­
rounds them. The graven message on the Well of Narcissus, taken 
at face value without any attempt to twist or gloss or determine it, is 
the final message graven on the reader at the conclusion of the Ro­
man: "here starf the faire Narcisus." 
The Dream of the Rood is more obviously an exercise in perspec­
tive. The narrator of this dream vision, a person "stained with sins, 
wounded with stains," encounters the Rood, a physical object that, 
historically, is more reprehensible than he but which has been trans­
formed by the Redemptive Act into an object of veneration, a 
golden, jewel-bedecked "beacen" or sign of hope. The encounter, it 
seems, teaches the dreamer that, although he is morally flawed and 
unworthy, God's redemption operates on an unearthly and irra­
tional level, transforming these very flaws into signs of divine love 
and forgiveness. Piers Plowman shows a remarkably similar 
movement, presenting in the Visio what seems to be the villainous 
figure of Lady Meed, expelling her, and finally discovering that, 
without her, humanity is denied access to the holy "meed" of salva­
tion. The words of the pardon that appears in the climactic scene of 
the Visio constitute the chief impediment to an understanding of 
meed in bono and, in a strangely liberating act, Piers tears up the 
pardon and frees the folk from the limitations inherent in human 
formulations of divine verities.1 
This similarity of theme in dream visions is not accidental but 
inherent, a function of the poems' common form. We have seen that 
the dream vision as a rhetorical nexus was born of late medieval 
scepticism, a scepticism that questioned dream lore, the relationship 
between truth and its semantic representations, and ultimately the 
ancient and pervasive Platonic dualism of the Scholastic period. It is 
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only logical and reasonable to assume that the same philosophical 
impulses that quickened the form might also find their way into the 
poems as contents. 
These impulses did find their way into the poems. The three 
dream visions discussed in the next few pages all share a profound 
distrust of language and its ability to represent phenomenal reality 
(to say nothing of the other world), and an equal distrust of the 
knowability of that reality. In positing and then denying the possi­
bility of supernal knowledge, the Book of the Duchess, Pearl, and 
the Hous of Fame each offer for purposes of examination a "dis­
course," test out the discourse in a dream setting, then finally awak­
en their readers to critique the possibility of using words to access 
the realities that have lain behind them. The Book of the Duchess is 
a creative exercise in the "discourse of sentiment," which discovers 
that the relationship between emotions and their verbal expres­
sions is artificial, ambivalent, and contingent; Pearl's dialogue sub­
sumes its many topics into a grand demonstration of the "discourse 
of eschatology," showing at its conclusion that (if nothing else) the 
realm of Heaven is beyond representation in earthbound terms; the 
Hous of Fame, in its Proem and three books, considers the dis­
courses of science, history, rhetoric, and philosophy and shows that 
all are finally equally contingent, equally functions of humankind 
and of the here and now. 
It is in this spirit that I call the discussion that follows "decon­
structive." While deconstruction as a clearly recognizable anti-
rhetoric is a product of eighteenth and nineteenth century thinking, 
deconstruction as a basic social impulse has existed and must exist in 
every culture insofar as and as soon as that culture is articulated. Far 
from being a tool of literary criticism, another new way to get at a 
text, deconstruction is the necessary obverse of any culture-as­
system, the ubiquitous urge to untangle, untie, unravel, and demy­
thologize any intellectual system that comes to be replaced by its 
semantic formulations, any system whose primitive communal 
sense becomes—literally—"lost in transmission." Thus, we should 
not be surprised to find deconstruction in places other than in Der­
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rida or Rousseau or Nietzsche or Levi-Strauss; it ought positively to 
be expected in the fourteenth century, in the obsolescence of old 
ways of knowing but before the bright reasonableness of new ones. 
Thus, if our sense of content is broad enough to include such no­
tions as "thrust," "purpose," "movement," or, perhaps best, "pro­
gram," then the dream vision, born in the gaps of medieval taxono­
mies and realized in a rhetoric that is based on the contingent and 
even illusory relationship of words and things, does prescribe its 
content. This can happen because (to risk circularity) the content 
prescribed is, finally, that contents are functions of form: dream 
visions are about the obstructive nature of language and its troub­
lous relationship to the world. Thus, what we might otherwise be 
tempted to call the topics of the poems—Blanche's death, the loss of 
the "perle," the search for tidings—become in this case constitutive 
vehicles analogous to words and sentences. Just as Augustine's dis­
cussion of hyssop or Marcrobius' of the stars show that they are not 
really talking about either plants or stars—even as symbols—but 
instead are presenting a discourse to celebrate the communion of 
souls predisposed to communion, the dream vision uses its literal 
contents as morphemes in the expression of its higher "content" or 
"program." In other words, the dream vision is about aboutness; it 
explores the problematics of reference; it begins as an ins omnium, 
an experience by definition lyrical rather than discursive, then mas­
querades for a time as discourse, and then finally undercuts this dis­
course while affirming the emotions or dispositions or perceptions 
that generated it. It is an ins omnium-tev elation, a somatic event 
that reveals, first, that personal or somatic experiences are the only 
true experiences, and second, that the emotional or spiritual ground 
of these experiences, when felt and shared, is the only true, holy, and 
worthy response to the ritual drama of human life. 
The Book of the Duchess and 
the Discourse of Sentiment 
The subject of the Book of the Duchess is, to use Chaucer's own 
carefully chosen word, "routhe." It is not in any traditional sense an 
elegy on the lately deceased wife of John of Gaunt, Blanche of Lan­
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caster, although her passing and the feelings of those left behind are 
surely its occasion. Instead of being an explicit memorial, the poem 
is a meditation on the problems of the language of sentiment on 
such occasions, a subtle examination of one of the crucial spheres in 
which language fails to represent the motives and the will behind its 
articulation.2 Thus, the Book of the Duchess is a deconstructive 
poem the program of which is to show language at work, to show it 
failing to meet the investigative, expressive, or rhetorical intentions 
for which it was invoked, and, finally, to show that its very failure 
affirms the commonality of intention that underlies it, affirms a 
community of individuals who together hold beliefs or values inex­
pressible in words. 
It is this final plank in the program, the dream vision's tacit and 
indirect assertion that there exists a feeling or belief in the poet and 
in the right readers of the poem of which the artifact is a failed 
expression, that technically disqualifies the dream vision as truly or 
thoroughly deconstructive, but the defect is not a serious one. This 
unspoken thematic core—"routhe" in the Book of the Duchess, 
"faith" in Pearl and in the Hous of Fame—is more a movement of 
the soul than a topic or a content. In keeping with a deconstructive 
program or movement, this thematic core is enacted rather than 
referenced: only one of the Book of the Duchess' 1333 lines is "the­
matic" in even this broad sense. Line 1309, "Is that youre los? By 
God, hyt ys routhe!" enacts the inadequacy of all that has gone before 
it: it asks a simple question about reality—a rhetorical question 
representing Geffrey's3 sudden intuition of the Black Knight's 
sorrow—and then responds with a simple, unadorned assertion of 
the will to sympathy. The line is not elaborate: its only figure, the 
oath "By God," invokes the Deity as witness to Geffrey's sincerity in 
a discourse from which all rhetorical or ornamental artifice has been 
stripped. All of the other lines of the poem (too numerous to quote) 
prepare the reader for this shattering moment by methodically de-
constructing the discourse of sentiment, leaving Geffrey and the 
readers with a failed artifact, a cuniculus figurarum whose failure 
and foolishness—and whose success—are perceptible only at its 
terminus. 
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The term "discourse of sentiment" deserves some brief elabora­
tion before I continue. By "discourse of sentiment" I mean language 
produced to express emotion and to betoken sympathy, two inten­
tions which are closely related but surely very different. As anyone 
knows who has written a letter to a friend who has lost a parent or 
child or spouse (for example), the expression of grief or sympathy is 
very easy and made even easier by the many universal cliches and 
conventional phrases guaranteed to send the appropriate signals. 
Paradoxically, it is this very ease of expression that makes it propor­
tionally difficult to broadcast or betoken sincere sympathy in the 
expression. To turn to another sentiment for a moment, the avail­
ability of mass-produced Christmas cards—with preprinted signa­
tures—devalues them as successful tokens of good wishes for the 
holidays. In the discourse of sentiment, it is almost worse to be a 
poet, a word crafter, one whose tools and currency are self-conscious 
and artifical expression and, worse yet, to be a medieval poet, one 
whose words and phrases nearly never ring with the simple expres­
sion of sincere feelings. In the age of Froissart and Machaut and 
Guillaume de Lorris and Petrarch, how does a poet both express 
emotion and betoken sympathy? In an age where the greatest poetry 
consists of passionate love protestations to women often unknown 
to the poets, full of artifical and grotesquely inflated expressions of 
sentiment, how does Chaucer write a poem to his patron and friend 
John of Gaunt on the occasion of Blanche's death? 
This is Chaucer's challenge in the Book of the Duchess. Faced 
with this impossible task, Chaucer hit upon a novel and daring strat­
egy: to write not an expression of sympathy but a demonstration of 
the hopelessness of such an expression, a poem that enacts the hol­
lowness of language and its inextricable entanglement in paradoxes 
of expression, intention, effect, and entailment.4 Taken as such a 
demonstration, the Book of the Duchess exposes the discourse of 
sentiment—all of it, the Black Knight's as well as Geffey's—for all 
its foolishness and inefficacy: all that survives the Book of the Duch­
ess' indictment of the discourse of sentiment is, captured in the 
gruff, old-fashioned "My God, hyt ys routhe,"5 the will to express 
emotions forever imprisoned in inadequate language. To reach this 
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still, tense moment of recognition, Chaucer the journeyman poet 
constructs a subtle structure which, in holding religiously to the 
conventions of contemporary French poetry, undermines those 
conventions. 
This feature, the conscious imitation of a set of conventions to 
expose those conventions and their shallowness, is one which 
Chaucer will exploit for comic and other purposes later in his career 
in Sir Thopas and in other of the Canterbury Tales—the tales of the 
Clerk, the Pardoner, and the Prioress come to mind—but here 
Chaucer's exploitation of conventional language and form reflects 
his sense of the operation of the dream vision, with its fabulous, 
labyrinthine, and finally pointless surface which nonetheless leads 
to an ultimate revelation of an identity between dreamer and reader. 
The Book of the Duchess illustrates nearly all of the structural and 
affective features of the form: the modal movement from lyric to 
narrative and back to lyric; the failed attempt to identify the dreamer 
by his distress; the splitting of the dreamer into a fallible character 
and a mysterious narrator; narrative normalization; and finally the 
reunification of the dreamer figures and the identification of the 
dreamer and readers in their common sympathy for John of Gaunt. 
This procedure must therefore begin with the introduction of a 
dreamer-narrator, one with a problem, setting up the poem's radi­
cal lyric expectations: 
I have gret wonder, be this lyght, 
How that I lyve, for day ne nyght 
I may nat slepe, wel nygh noght; 
I have so many an ydel thoght, 
Purely for defaute of slep, 
That, by my trouthe, I take no kep 
Of nothing, how hyt cometh or gooth, 
Ne me nys nothyng leef nor looth. 
Al is ylyche good to me— 
Joye or sorowe, wherso hyt be— 
For I have felynge in nothyng, 
But, as yt were, a mased thyng, 
Alway in poynt to falle a-doun; 
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For sorwful ymagynacioun 
Ys alway hooly in my mynde. 
(lines 1-15) 
Chaucerians have long recognized the conventionality of this open­
ing, especially its near-translation of Froissart's Le Paradys d'Am­
our. In his contribution to Chaucer and Chaucerians, D.S. Brewer 
reproduces the two texts side by side, italicizing examples of what he 
sees as Chaucer's "Englishness"; for similar purposes but different 
conclusions, compare the lines above with Froissart: 
Je sui de moi en grant merveille

Comment je vifs quant tant je veille

Et on ne point en veillant

Trouver de moi plus traveillant,

Car bien sacies que par veillier

Me viennent souvent travillier

Pensees et merancolies

Qui me sont ens au coer liies

Et pas ne les puis deslyer,

Car ne voeil la belle oublyer

Pour quele amour en ce travail

Je sui entres et tant je veil.

I am in great wonder about myself,

how I yet live, I've been awake so long.

One couldn't find anyone more belabored

than I in my long sleeplessness.

Know well that thoughts and sadnesses

often come to torture me;

they are bound inside my heart.

I cannot loose them

because I do not wish to forget that beauty.

For such a love, I am in this travail

and stay awake so long.6

Brewer's point in comparing the two passages is to emphasize 
Chaucer's stylistic departure from his French original, the fact that 
he adds distinctly English, conversational, or idiomatic "doublets 
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and alternatives, asseverations that are mild oathes, expletives and 
parentheses."7 Brewer is certainly correct in seeing these features as 
adding an English flavor to the poem—"routhe" in line 1309 comes 
to mind again—but what is the final rhetorical effect of these 
changes, the impact on the artifact of replacing the highly stylized 
French courtly idiom with something more closely resembling the 
idiom of everyday speech? Far from heightening the drama of the 
passage, the addition of phrases like "wel nygh noght," "by my 
trouthe," and "leef nor looth" tends to devalue the passage as an 
expression of sentiment by rendering it less taut, less hushed, less 
"pained." Without making a value judgment here (for emotional 
"realism" is rarely a virtue in this tradition), I believe we can say that 
Froissart sounds more realistically languishing than Chaucer does. 
In fact, this opening, like the unfinished Sir Thopas, is an example 
of Chaucer's adoption of a persona who knows and can imitate a set 
of conventions but who cannot quite reproduce them to the desired 
effect. To put it another way, Geffrey can use the discourse of senti­
ment for expressive purposes but cannot use it to betoken sincere 
sympathy. The addition of the conversational phrases, far from giv­
ing the passage color and character, mottle and flaw it as a conven­
tional and therefore legitimate expression of shared emotion.8 
This notion, by no means a new one, valorizes a long-standing 
negative judgment on the opening of the Book of the Duchess. The 
sleeplessness, the famous eight years' sickness, and the sentimental­
ized redaction of the story of Ceys and Alcion are all evidence for the 
belief that this is a totally conventional love allegory which includes 
all of the necessary details and makes all the right moves (though 
making them very flatfootedly). Geffrey's point in recalling the Ceys 
and Alcion story, it seems, is the magnitude and poignance of Al-
cion's grief and uncertainty, along with the boon granted her by the 
gods: he seems to miss the fact that the story ends rather unhappily.9 
After telling her that he is dead, Ceys' ghost counsels her to be of 
good cheer: 
"And farewel, swete, my worldes blysse! 
I praye God youre sorwe lysse. 
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To lytel while oure blysse lasteth!" 
With that hir eyen up she casteth 
And saw noght. "Alias!" quod she for sorwe, 
And deyede within the thridde morwe. 
But what she sayede more in that swow 
I may not telle yow as now; 
Hyt were to longe for to dwelle. 
My first matere I wil yow telle, . . . 
(lines 209-18) 
This "first matere," of course, is the favor granted to Alcion by the 
gods, the dream-visitation by her husband's spirit (or rather by 
Morpheus clothed in Ceys' "dreynt" body). Like a Browning per­
sona, Geffrey skates blithely over the pathetic story of the queen's 
death to get to more important business, ignoring life and death in 
his obsession with his "sicknesse." This is the same Geffrey, we shall 
see, who can hear the Knight's lament in a few lines and simply not 
attend to the fact that the fellow is mourning a death. Alcion's death 
is, for Geffrey, not the crucial part of the story: what is important is 
that Morpheus granted her a resolution of her distress through 
sleep and dream and, impressed though dubious, Geffrey prays for a 
similar visitation though he "knew never god but oon" (237).10 
Geffrey's prayer to Morpheus (or to "som wight elles, I ne roghte 
who" [244]) is one of the funniest passages in the poem. The gross, 
mercantile description of the bribe of the featherbed and the ob­
vious, clanking progress of the prayer is, more than any other pas­
sage in the poem, the broad comedy of Sir Thopas.11 Like that tale, 
the parody is funny in being both excessive and accurate, holding 
true to the prescribed conventions but botching their execution 
through tastelessness and excess: 
I wil yive hym a fether-bed, 
Rayed with gold, and ryght wel cled 
In fyn blak satyn doutremer, 
And many a pilowe, and every ber 
Of cloth of Reynes, to slepe softe; 
Hym thar not nede to turnen ofte. 
(lines 251-56) 
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Though there is precedent for such a gift—that of Machaut's La 
Fontaine Amoureuse—Geffrey's bourgeois advertisement seems 
silly next to the exotic bed of gyrfalcon feathers that Machaut offers. 
The additions here to the offer, specifically Geffrey's assurances of 
the high quality of the materials and his prediction that Morpheus 
will sleep surpassingly well, cross the line into parody. 
The thrust of such an opening is, clearly, to create radical lyric 
expectations in the reader. It is patently, even embarrassingly ob­
vious from even the first twenty lines of the Book of the Duchess 
what sort of poem it is to be: the broad comic parody announces 
itself to be a poem after the French school and invites—rather 
desperately—the reader to see its dream as the conventional lover's 
insomnium described disparagingly by Macrobius, an insomnium 
that will take, perhaps, the form of a love debat (after Machaut's two 
Jugement poems) in which two aggrieved lovers present their sor­
rows before a figure of authority who decides who suffers the 
most.12 
The early stages of the dream report reinforce these perceptions 
of bankrupt conventionality. Early in the dream, the whelp appears 
and disappears, a gratuitous, sentimental image: 
I was go walked fro my tree, 
And as I wente, ther cam by mee 
A whelp, that fauned me as I stood, 
That hadde yfolowed, and koude no good. 
Hyt com and crepte to me as lowe 
Ryght as hyt hadde me yknowe, 
Helde doun hys hed and joyned hys eres, 
And leyde al smothe doun hys heres. 
I wolde have kaught hyt, and anoon 
Hyt fledde, and was fro me goon; 
And I hym folwed, and hyt forth wente 
Doun by a floury grene wente 
Ful thikke of gras, ful softe and swete. 
(lines 387-99) 
While intended, I believe, to be seen as a clumsy transitional device, 
the whelp does serve nicely as an emblem of the generic identity of 
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the poem to this point, an identity that must be held clearly in mind 
if the next few crucial lines—the encounter with the Black Knight— 
are to be understood correctly.13 As I argued above, the whelp is pure 
and radical lyricism like the basting of the sleeves in the Roman; in 
the discourse of sentiment, the image is a qualified failure both as an 
expression of emotion (for, what does it mean?) and also a failure as 
a token of true and sincere feeling (in its artless conventionality). 
Nonetheless, the little dog succeeds in reinforcing the lyricism of 
the passage, as opposed to, say, its discursive possibilities: it is a clear 
signal that this is a love elegy, even a love debat, to the forum of 
which Geffrey is led by this pallid little descendent of the lion in 
Machuat's Dit. The consciously awkward, even bumbling exposition 
and expression to this point strain the readers' patience (as they do 
in Sir Thopas), as the readers surmise all too easily the tenor for 
which this dream vision is the vehicle.14 
And sure enough, the doggy leads Geffrey to the Black Knight, 
the figure surely meant to be his interlocutor in the debat: 
But forth they romed ryght wonder faste 
Doun the woode; so at the laste 
I was war of a man in blak, 
That sat and had yturned his bak 
To an ook, an huge tree. 
"Lord," thoght I, "who may that be? 
What ayleth hym to sitten her?" 
Anoon-ryght I wente ner; 
Than found I sitte even upryght 
A wonder wel-farynge knyght— 
By the maner me thoghte so— 
Of good mochel, and ryght yong therto, 
Of the age of foure and twenty yer, 
Upon hys berd but lytel her, 
And he was clothed al in blak. 
(lines 443-57) 
This moment is the first turning point in the Book of the Duchess, 
the beginning of "narrative normalization," the second stage of the 
dream vision structure. Beginning with the introduction of this cen­
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tral figure, the mode of the poem begins to change from the essen­
tially lyric situation of the lover's insomnium to a narrative one in 
which events take place or images are introduced which the reader 
can interpret independent of the dream frame. 
This stage is typically signalled by a mistake or misinterpretation 
on the part of the dreamer-character, and the Book of the Duchess is 
no exception to this rule. The mistake, of course, is Geffrey's failure 
to understand (hear?) that the loss which the Black Knight mourns 
is the death of his good Lady White, which he seems to make so 
abundantly clear: 
"I have of sorwe so gret won 
That joye gete I never non, 
Now that I see my lady bryght, 
Which I have loved with al my myght, 
Isfro me ded and ys agoon. 
Alias, deth, what ayleth the, 
That thou noldest have taken me, 
Whan thou toke my lady swete, 
That was so fair, so fresh, so fre, 
So good, that men may wel se 
Of al goodnesse she had no mete!" 
Whan he had mad thus his complaynte, 
Hys sorwful hert gan faste faynte, 
And his spirites wexen dede; 
The blood was fled for pure drede 
Doun to hys herte, to make hym warm— 
For wel hyt feled the herte had harm— 
To wite eke why hyt was adrad 
By kynde, and for to make hyt glad; 
For hit ys membre principal 
Of the body; and that made al 
Hys hewe chaunge and wexe grene 
And pale, for ther noo blood ys sene 
In no maner lym of hys. 
(lines 475-99) 
This is the key to the Book of the Duchess. Deferring for a time a 
discussion of the Black Knight's lament, consider the dreamer­
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character's outrageous reaction to the song. After hearing the com­
plaint, Geffrey spends fully thirteen lines in an accurate but inane 
dissertation on the physiology of the swoon, detailing the descent of 
the blood into the heart and reflecting with unbelievable coldness on 
the Knight's green coloring and eventual unconsciousness. His reac­
tion, to anticipate the argument a bit, is analogous to the readers' 
reaction to Geffrey's own languor: we recognize these symptoms, 
we know what is going on here—oh yes, this person is lovesick. For 
Geffrey, the Knight's lament is half-successful as discourse of senti­
ment. As far as Geffrey goes, the song is sincere without being ex­
pressive: Geffrey is clearly able to see that something is bothering 
the Black Knight but he can't figure out what that something is. 
This means that this song is exactly the opposite of Geffrey's pro­
logue, which was expressive but not credibly sincere, conventional 
but not genuine. 
Such thoughts begin to explain Geffrey's curious and obtuse 
response: 
"Me thynketh in grete sorowe I yow see. 
But certes, sire, yif that yee 
Wolde ought discure me youre woo, 
I wolde, as wys God helpe me soo, 
Amende hyt, yif I kan or may. 
Ye mowe preve hyt be assay; 
For, by my trouthe, to make yow hool, 
I wol do al my power hool. 
And telleth me of your sorwes smerte; 
Paraunter hyt may ese youre herte, 
That semeth ful sek under your syde." 
(lines 547-57) 
The critical literature abounds on this strange speech, with inge­
nious explanations why Geffrey does not understand or hear or react 
humanely to the Knight's wretched situation. It is possible, for ex­
ample, that Geffrey is playing dumb here, only tipping his hand 
slightly at lines 545-47, which could look forward to the balance of 
the poem.15 The perspective from which we are viewing the poem, 
however, offers only one sensible explanation for this crux. This is 
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the pre-eminent moment of narrative normalization, at which the 
dreamer-character makes a mistake which is recognizable by readers 
in their newly won independence from the interpretive prerogative 
of the "eyewitness." Given Geffrey's clear predilection for the love 
debat to this point, he assumes that the Black Knight is simply the 
other principal in the contest of sorrows to follow and, as such, the 
very last thing that this mysterious figure would be doing while 
leaning mournfully against his tree is telling the exactly literal 
truth.16 Geffrey's reaction to the story of Ceys and Alcion in the 
prologue has demonstrated that death to this dreamer is a sentimen­
tal, even bathetic experience, either a hyperbolic metaphor for a 
beloved's scorn or a boring and irrelevant detail in a love story. It 
seems perfectly natural, then, to assume that Geffrey would hear the 
Knight's lament and conclude that it is of the same courtly, fig­
urative patois that he himself uses. 
The readers, of course, know better. They have been wondering 
for five hundred lines or so what is to become of this odd, truant 
little poem, and now the answer becomes clear: this is not Geffrey's 
languishing love elegy, written in artificial homage to Joan of Kent 
or to whomever. It may still be a love debat: Machaut contrasted the 
sorrows of death and "l daunguere" in the Jugement du Roy de Be­
haigne and, in the Jugement du Roy de Navarre, even concluded that 
a beloved's death is the greater sorrow. 
So the appearance of John of Gaunt here reassures the reader that 
the Book of the Duchess is, if peculiar, perhaps not unprecedented. 
Perhaps Geffrey's mistake is not so much one about the content of 
the poem but rather one about the point of the poem, a mistaken 
view which the readers can now understand. Thus, Geffrey's request 
for plain talk after the Knight's complaint is based on the belief that 
the purpose of the dream is to compare two sorrows, two sentimen­
tal catastrophes, and the readers are now positioned to reject this 
view and to decide that the Book of the Duchess is a funereal elegy 
on Blanche of Lancaster, that Geffrey's insomnium is puff, and that 
this will be the emblematic story of the love of John and Blanche. 
For the record, remember that Geffrey is right and the readers are 
wrong (of which more later). 
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What is quite neatly set up in these lines is a clear-cut opposition 
between what seems to be the Black Knight's "real" sorrow and 
consequently righteous discourse of sentiment and Geffrey's artifi­
cial, ridiculous sorrow and faulty discourse. Forgetting the frame 
and the fact that this is, after all, Geffrey's dream, the reader em­
braces this opposition and so feels considerable pain as Geffrey says 
all the wrong things (such as, above, offering to make it all better). 
Unaware (as readers are not) that his questioning is painful to the 
Black Knight, the dreamer-character tries repeatedly to draw the 
figure out and learn the cause of his sorrow. The Knight for his part 
obliges, offering as explanation the famous metaphor of the chess 
game with Dame Fortune (perhaps drawn from the Zodiac) and the 
long, rather stylized rehearsal of his meeting and courtship with the 
lady. The Knight's discourse of sentiment, it seems, succeeds both 
expressively and affectively, for the readers both know and sympa­
thize with the pain he suffers. Ignoring Geffrey's obtuseness—we 
are not obtuse—the poem has a completely new locus (the Black 
Knight) and, as Chaucerians are fond of remarking, he is a far better 
poet than Geffrey. 
This last judgment, that the Black Knight's sorrow and discourse 
are inherently more worthy than Geffrey's, needs examination. In 
the spirit of many a naive reader of Chaucer who simply can't see 
that the Knight is a better poet, it needs to be said that he is not, or at 
least that he is not less mannered, artificial, and conventional than 
Geffrey. The Knight's heavily stylized imagery and diction may be 
better executed than Geffrey's, but they are not different in kind; for 
example: 
"But swich a fairnesse of a nekke 
Had that swete that boon nor brekke 
Nas her non sene that myssat. 
Hyt was whit, smothe, streght, and pure flat, 
Wythouten hole; or canel-boon, 
As be semynge, had she noon. 
Hyr throte, as I have now memoyre, 
Semed a round tour of yvorye, 
Of good gretnesse, and noght to gret. 
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"And goode faire White she het; 
That was my lady name ryght. 
She was bothe faire and bryght; 
She hadde not hir name wrong. 
Ryght faire shuldres and body long 
She had, and armes, every lyth 
Fattyssh, flesshy, not gret therwith; 
Ryght white handes, and nayles rede, 
Rounde brestes; and of good brede 
Hyr hippes were, a streight flat bak. 
(lines 939-57) 
This is fine poetry, but it is every bit as conventional as Geffrey's; it 
appears more excellent, perhaps, because it lacks some of Geffrey's 
"Englishness" and because its topic is "real,"not artificial. Still, 
Blanche's exemplary bone structure and her arms, "fattyssh, flesshy, 
not gret therwith," could easily have come from the muse that of­
fered the black satin bedclothes to Morpheus. Yet it is somehow 
heretical—and rightly so—to make this point, to compare the Black 
Knight's diction with Geffrey's, or at least to do so at this stage of 
the poem. The recognition of John of Gaunt and his "goode faire 
White" (948) and the comparison of her death with the eight years' 
sickness of Geffrey make such discriminations all but impossible at 
this point in the Book of the Duchess. An objective consideration of 
the Black Knight's discourse of sentiment literally cannot be made 
at this juncture, for any such judgment would be clouded by the 
readers' appreciation or apprehension of the good reasons for the 
Black Knight's grief. As I suggested above, the Black Knight's sor­
row is "real" while Geffrey's is "only conventional," a pair of inter­
pretations that will not be challenged until the conclusion of the 
Book of the Duchess. 
The remainder of the poem is an excellent illustration of narrative 
normalization, the pseudo-narrative in which the dreamer-character 
is divested of any special interpretive prerogative and one in which 
readers feel competent and comfortable. It is, we remember, a virtual 
monologue on the part of the Black Knight, punctuated only occa­
sionally by wrongheaded conclusions of the dreamer-character: 
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"But wherfore that y telle my tale? 
Ryght on thys same, as I have seyd, 
Was hooly al my love leyd; 
For certes she was, that swete wif, 
My suffisaunce, my lust, my lyf, 
Myn hap, myn hele, and al my blesse, 
My worldes welfare, and my goddesse, 
And I hooly hires and everydel." 
"By oure Lord," quod I, "y trow yow wel! 
Hardely, your love was wel beset; 
I not how ye myghte have do bet." 
"Bet? ne no wyght so wel," quod he. 
"Y trowe hyt, sir," quod I, "parde!" 
"Nay, leve hyt wel!" "Sire, so do I; 
I leve yow wel, that trewely 
Yow thoghte that she was the beste, 
And to beholde the alderfayreste, 
Whoso had loked hir with your eyen." 
"With myn? nay, alle that hir seyen 
Seyde and sworen hyt was soo. 
(lines 1034-53) 
Passages such as this are typically seen as examples of the pain to be 
felt in the Book of the Duchess, the pain inflicted on the suffering 
Knight by the obtuse Geffrey. The dreamer-character can seemingly 
say nothing right: in lines 1042-44, he agrees with the Knight, say­
ing that he cannot imagine him doing "bet" than the Lady White, to 
which the Knight responds in anguish and distraction that, indeed, 
no man could hope to do so well. Next come a few lines of throat-
clearing, after which (lines 1047-51) Geffrey attempts to initiate 
the debat format. He begins by courteously acknowledging that the 
Lady White was the "alderfayreste" to all who saw her through the 
Black Knight's eyes; to say more for Geffrey would be to admit that 
the Knight's lady was superior to his own. The Knight will have 
none of this, of course (lines 1052-53), and, refusing to play along, 
denies Geffrey any framework for comparing White to any other 
woman. Thus, Geffrey's "naive" attempt to impose the debat frame 
on the exchange intensifies the Black Knight's pain, while the 
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Knight's refusal to respond courteously to a brother-sufferer frus­
trates Geffrey. 
Frustrates him, and worse. Affecting sympathy with the dreamer-
character for a moment, we can easily see that, far from allowing 
room for Geffrey and his empty, conventional love languor, the 
Black Knight gives the poor fool no chance even to try and be sym­
pathetic or companionable to him: he constantly and sharply cor­
rects Geffrey's attempts to restate his ideas and gives him no credit 
for trying, according to his lights, to understand. Alongside fitful 
bursts of dialogue such as lines 1034-53, just quoted, we should 
consider the discourteous refrain of the poem: 
"Thow wost ful lytel what thow menest; 
I have lost more than thow wenest'— 
(lines 1305-06 and elsewhere) 
The reader who has embraced the Black Knight's perspective on the 
poem must certainly agree with this judgment: the dreamer-
character does not know what the Knight is talking about while the 
readers do. At the same time, however, from a longer perspective 
we should see the lines as a titillating and noncommunicative figure 
of speech, either aposiopesis, significatio, or innuendo, a locution to 
exactly the same effect as Geffrey's elliptical "physicien but oon 
That may me hele" (lines 39-40). Both statements, recalling my 
notion of the discourse of sentiment, fulfill the second requirement 
while failing utterly to address the first, for both statements betoken 
sentiment without expressing or specifying it; both statements as­
sert that the speaker is suffering grievously while also asserting that 
the nature of that suffering is beyond the hearer's ken. The fact that 
the reader is generally unable to make comparisons such as this one 
between Geffrey and the Black Knight is testimony to the success of 
the dislocation of the reader and of the power of narrative normali­
zation in the Book of the Duchess: at no point at which both charac­
ters are on stage does the text allow the reader sufficient distance to 
see that the Black Knight and Geffrey are comparable or that their 
comparison has any relevance or validity except to Geffrey, in his 
frustrated expectations of a love debat. 
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When the spell is broken at the end of the poem, the "Game is 
doon," as Geffrey says. When Geffrey finally gets the Black Knight 
to repeat explicitly the cause of his distress—that "she ys ded"— 
several perspectives shift suddenly and radically. In the stark and 
beautiful exchange of artless sympathy, 
"She ys ded!" "Nay!" "Yis, be my trouthe!" 
"Is that youre los? Be God, hyt ys routhe!" 
(lines 1309-10) 
the reader is (or should be) challenged to rethink all earlier judg­
ments about griefs and their expression in the poem.17 In light of 
such a humble, human empathy, we are made to see that, while 
Geffrey's discourse of sentiment is expression without sympathy, 
the Black Knight's was (at least for Geffrey) a "betokening" without 
expression and, in fairness, rather perversely teasing to the 
dreamer-character. The final explicit expression of the Black 
Knight's grief, by shocking Geffrey out of his courtly miasma, pre­
cludes the possibility of a love deb at—no man could contest with 
such a griever—but, more important, the simple statement also 
forces a realignment of the relationships among the reader, Geffrey, 
and the Black Knight, relationships that have obtained throughout 
the poem. In truth, the reader has failed to appreciate (or even per­
ceive) Geffrey's loss just as Geffrey failed to perceive the Knight's. 
Both failures—Geffrey's and the reader's—were due to the speak­
ers' conventional, artificial language, discourse that is sincere in in­
verse proportion to its expressiveness.18 As Geffrey feels with (and 
his always felt with) the Black Knight's loss without knowing it, the 
reader has known all along but has not felt with Geffrey's distress. 
When the Knight's loss is finally revealed to him, Geffrey's sym­
pathy is natural and automatic, but, insofar as he was able, he has 
sympathized throughout. Readers of the Book of the Duchess can­
not say this, however, for they have cast aside Geffrey's conven­
tionalized distress because it seemed so trite, so conventional. So the 
Book of the Duchess reveals its readers to be caught in a trap, the 
trap of judging the discourse of sentiment by a double standard: 
dismissing Geffrey's discourse because it is trite while accepting the 
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Black Knight's discourse because what it describes is famous and 
worthy. 
Ultimately, all human grief, we learn, is as impossible to express 
or to judge as Geffrey's eight years' sickness. We sympathize with 
the Black Knight because we know he is John of Gaunt; we fail to 
sympathize with Geffrey because we do not know the real grief of 
which his words are the expression or, even worse, brush aside that 
sorrow because its expression is so sloppily conventional. 
Both of these responses are central to the experience of the Book 
of the Duchess, which is finally a poem which expresses grief by 
proving that successful such expressions are impossible. The good, 
solid Anglo-Saxon word "routhe"—not "pitee," mind you—is the 
artless predicate that destroys all that has gone before it. Its artful 
but empty environment has invested it, paradoxically, with great 
rhetorical power because, when the discourse of sentiment has been 
examined and its two requisites set in unbreakable opposition to one 
another, that is all that can be said. "Is that youre los?" (recogni­
tion); "Be God, hyt ys routhe!" (sympathy): the discourse of senti­
ment is an excrescence, at best trite (Geffrey's) or egregious (the 
Black Knight's), at worst an obstruction to the wordless, interior, 
spiritual sympathy that makes the dream's noon bell our own mid­
night bell. 
Pearl and the Discourse of Eschatology 
Pearl is surely the Middle English poem least understood by mod­
ern critics, or at least the poem confidently understood. In more 
genteel days, Sir Robert Cotton's librarian catalogued the poem as 
Vetus poema Anglicanum, in quo sub insomnii figmento, multa ad reli­
gionem et mores spectantia explicantur. 
An old English poem wherein, under the fiction of a dream, many things 
concerning religion and morals are expounded. 
Modern criticism has done very little to enlarge on this simple but 
accurate formulation. While scholars have detailed the many spe­
cific doctrinal points raised in the poem and have identified them 
variously with contemporary orthodox and heterodox teachings, we 
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have neglected in large measure the nature of the medium in which 
"multa ad religionem er mores" are presented in the poem. We have 
yet to begin to appreciate how the poem is about "mores" as well as 
being about "religionem," about conduct as well as doctrine. Finally, 
we have not settled the issue of explicandum by way oiafigmentum, 
in a sphere in which both Macrobius and later Christian theorists 
alike frowned on the use of fabulous narratives. 
In other words, Pearl is an important test case of the sense of the 
dream vision developed in these pages. Unlike the Book of the Duch­
ess, the Hous of Fame, the Parlement of Foules, and even Piers 
Plowman, Pearl is, from first to last, a serious doctrinal poem con­
cerned with nothing other than crucial truths of eschatology. If any­
where, the Macrobean sanctions against the use of the fabulous nar­
rative in discussions of the highest truths ought to apply here. If 
anywhere, the argument that the dream vision is a f ictive apocalypse 
should prevail here, in a poem that concludes with a vision of the 
Procession of the company of the Lamb in Heaven. If anywhere, the 
sense of the dream vision as a perceptual puzzle issuing in communi­
ty, not revelation, should not apply here. 
The seriousness of these challenges is, I believe, a mark of the 
depth of our misunderstanding of Pearl. Pearlis not an exposition 
of the mysterious hierarchy of Heaven; not a presentation of the 
notion of democratic royalty (every man a king, every woman a 
queen in Heaven); not an argument on the salvation of baptized (or 
unbaptized) infants. It is not a Michelin guide to the other world, 
not a reasoned and logical disputation of theological controversy, 
and certainly not an elegy written by a wayward priest on his dead 
daughter Margery.19 What Pearl is is a deconstruction of the dis­
course of eschatology: a sophisticated presentation of a human dis­
course the purpose of which is to demonstrate the complete ineffi­
cacy of that discourse. Like the Book of the Duchess and the Hous of 
Fame, Pearl attempts to bring human discourse to bear on a subject, 
only to discover human discourse to be inadequate as a medium. 
Though this position is new and radical, it has its roots, not only 
in my own view of the dream vision and its background, but also in 
two sensitive attempts to remove Pearl from the worn-out elegy­
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doctrine controversy and to place it in relevant medieval contexts. 
The most extensive such attempt is a long chapter in A. C. Spear­
ing's The Gawain-Poet: A Critical Study, the style and manner of 
which tend to belie its importance in the history of Pearlcriticism.20 
Amplifying Schofield's remark that the pearl-image is "Protean" in 
its reference, Spearing suggests what is effectively a new reading of 
the poem, one which might truly be called "dramatic" rather than 
"elegiac" or "didactic" or doctrinal. In the subtle manipulation of the 
image of the pearl in the dialogue between the Pearl maiden and the 
narrator, Spearing sees a conscious movement from initial elegiac 
expectations to the wider perspective of the religious vision, a 
movement both masked and intensified by the conventional naive 
narrator of the medieval dream vision.21 In an important article in 
Traditio, Louis Blenker characterizes a similar movement from a 
personal to an eschatological orientation, as he notes three stages in 
the poem analogous to the three stages of contemplation.22 
What these two very different perspectives on Pearl share is a 
dynamic sense of the progress of the poem, a sense of movement 
from the personal, local, phenomenal, or sensory to the communal, 
universal, supernal, or spiritual. Both Spearing and Blenker are cor­
rect in their identification of the ground of this movement: the 
poem works on both levels, moving simultaneously outward and up­
ward, away from the self and the world and mutability and the 
senses and toward "unknowing." 
What neither writer suggests, however, is that the poem ulti­
mately critiques this dynamic itself. In the last analysis, Pearl is not 
even an eschatological poem: its intent or purpose or program is to 
undermine the discourse of eschatology through an exposition of its 
dependence on human language and human reason, and from this to 
encourage in place of such notional comprehension of Heaven a 
simple relationship with God based on faith and trust, not on 
thoughts and words. Such a sense of the poem eliminates the need 
for choosing between elegiac and didactic readings because it effec­
tively identifies Pearl as both and neither: by arguing that eschatol­
ogy is as misguided as a survivor's tears, such a reading turns Pearl's 
two interpretive poles into extremes, both of which are (similarly) 
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improper human responses to the facts of mortality and of the gra­
tuitous, irrational meed of salvation. This presentation of funereal 
grief as an analogue to eschatological speculation also brings the 
poem into line with the persistent medieval doctrina themes of per­
sonal slavation and the imcomprehensibility of redemption. Like 
Piers Plowman and other religious poems of the period, Pearl per­
ceived as an anti-eschatological poem becomes a profound state­
ment about the inescapable simplicity of the relationship between 
God and humanity, a relationship beclouded, not elucidated, by the 
discourse of eschatology.23 
Considering Pearl as a deconstruction also enables us to come to 
terms with the often contradictory contents of the poem. The doc­
trinal points made in Pearl are, as has often been noted, alterna­
tively conservative and radical, ranging from the fact of the Pearl 
maiden's salvation (conservative) to her unaccountably high posi­
tion in Heaven (radical). The only way these stances can be recon­
ciled is in rejecting them as contents and considering them as strate­
gies: all of the narrator's attempts to come to rational terms with the 
organization of Heavenly society are thwarted by the (often snap­
pish) rejoinders from his "daughter," who challenges him and the 
readers to put by the mysteries of eschatology and to embrace the 
single mystery that lies behind them and that makes consideration 
of them foolish and even sinful. The "message" of Pearl, then, is the 
Pearl maiden's persistent theme of Heavenly "cortaysye," the sweet, 
mysterious gentilesse that, understood and embraced, constitutes 
the poem's attack on the discourse of eschatology. 
The Pearl maiden approaches this effective goal through the 
carefully planned pattern of perceptions, hints, explanations, and 
denials that make up the body of the dream-vision dialogue. In about 
the middle of the poem, for example, the Pearl maiden makes the 
superficially outrageous claim that she is the Bride of the Lamb and 
thereby Queen of Heaven. The narrator, who has been resting com­
fortably in the realization that this visionary lady is his long lost 
"pearl," responds to her claim quite predictably, seeming a little 
scandalized and answering that he had always understood the Vir­
gin Mary to be the one and only Queen of Heaven. This common 
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sense response to the paradox is based, of course, on sound doctrine 
and tradition, and also on the presumably stable denotations of 
words like "queen": 
'Blysful', quod I, may ]?ys be trwe? 
Dysplese3 not if I speke errour. 
Art )?ou J?e quene of heuene3 blwe, 
[3at al J>ys worlde schal do honour? 
We leuen on Marye ]?at grace of grewe, 
jjat ber a barne of vyrgyn flour; 
f)e croune fro hyr quo mo3t remwe 
Bot ho hir passed in sum fauour?24 
In other words, the narrator reasons, owing to the nature of queen-
ship, that there may be only one queen per realm, and doctrine 
teaches us that the Queen of this Realm is the Virgin Mary. 
The Pearl maiden responds to this with a short prayer of Marian 
praise and then the crucial explanation of the "cortaysye" of 
Heaven: 
The court of \>e kyndom of God alyue 
Hat3 a property in hytself beyng: 
Alle }?at may ]?erinne aryue 
Of al \>e reme is quen o)?er kyng, 
And neuer o}?er 3et schal depryue, 
Bot vchon fayn of o}>ere3 hafyng, 
And wolde her coroune3 wern worf?e \>o fyue, 
If possyble were her mendyng. 
Bot my Lady of quom Jesu con spryng, 
Ho halde3 J?e empyre ouer vus ful hy3e; 
And pat displese3 n o n °f o u r e gyng> 
For ho is Quene of cortaysye. 
(lines 445-56) 
If this explanation seems hairsplitting or even casuistical, the fault, 
the Pearl maiden would say, is in our fallen minds and our fallen 
language: she has succeeded in removing the narrator's puzzlement 
by affirming the doctrine of the queenship of Mary alongside the 
doctrine of celestial courtesy at (for her) the negligible expense of 
the efficacy of language and logic. Effectively, the Pearl maiden says 
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here that the courtesy of Heaven is a contradictory one in which 
everybody is a monarch, Mary is a "meta-monarch," and, most im­
portantly, everybody is totally satisfied with his or her royal prerog­
ative over no one. 
Given the courtly diction of the poem and especially given the 
blithe tone and homely vocabulary of the Pearl maiden's answer, 
then, this is not much of an explanation. What she says is true, of 
course, and has a rich history in Christian apocalyptic writing, but 
we should not lose sight of the fact that what she says is also exceed­
ingly odd; especially considering the literalist, courtly preconcep­
tions of the narrator, this "explanation" seems intended more to 
confound by irrationality than to satisfy with simplicity. Like Or-
well's dictum that all pigs are created equal but that some are more 
equal than others, the Pearl maiden's assertion of universal queen-
ship is really a tease, a form of verbal unknowing that enacts the fact 
that, with the language at our disposal, explaining is the last thing 
that will explain. 
Perhaps guessing that the dreamer is not yet ready for such a 
frontal attack on sublunar logic and semantics—the discourse of 
eschatology—the Pearl maiden restates the paradoxical courtesy of 
Heaven in the next stanza, avoiding overt verbal paradox and allud­
ing to St. Paul's metaphor of the mystical body of Christ: 
'Of courtaysye, as sayt3 Saynt Poule, 
Al arn we membre3 of Jesu Kryst: 
As heued and arme and legg and naule 
Temen to hys body ful trwe and tryste, 
Ry3t so is vch a Krysten sawle 
A longande lym to pe Mayster of myste. 
t>enne loke what hate oj?er any gawle 
Is tached oj?er ty3ed J?y Iymme3 bytwyste. 
t>y heued hat3 nau]?er greme ne gryste, 
On arme o)?er fynger J?a3 j?ou bere by3e. 
So fare we alle wyth luf and lyste 
To kyng and quene by cortaysye. 
(lines 457-68) 
Once more, it is important to see these lines dramatically as well as 
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didactically. At the level of doctrine, Paul's corporeal metaphor is a 
perfect emblem of Christian unity and Heavenly parity, but, for the 
narrator, whose question was "sensible" in at least two senses of the 
word, the answer seems platitudinous and mildly evasive, not serv­
ing to answer a material question in material terms.25 Recall that the 
original concern was the Pearl maiden's obtrusive reference to her­
self as a queen and to a courtesy or courtliness that seemingly exists 
without the principles of monarchy and hierarchy on which every 
court is based. Courtesy is, after all, a function and an acknowledg­
ment of rank, and, without rank, the narrator reasons, there can be 
no courtesy. Thus, the Pauline metaphor of the mystical body of 
Christ serves to authorize or insulate the Pearl maiden's principles 
of royal parity and uncourtly courtesy, but it does not explain these 
mysteries in terms which are either coherent or comprehensible. 
The Pearl maiden's last attempt to characterize Heavenly "cor­
taysye" is by a direct and extended allusion to the New Testament, a 
degree of authoritarian evidence to which she has not resorted be­
fore. At the effective center of the poem, she rehearses and inter­
prets the parable of the vineyard workers from Matthew 20: 1-16 
and, true to the spirit of the parable, uses it not as an explanation of 
but as a celebration of God's irrational love for humankind. A gloss 
she offers toward the end of the discussion gives a good sense of the 
meaning that she draws from the narrative: 
More haf I of joye and blysse hereinne, 
Of ladyschyp gret and lyue 3 blom, 
t>en alle the wy3e3 in J?e worlde my3t wynne 
By \>e way of ry3t to aske dome. 
Whe]?er welnygh now I con bygynne— 
In euentyde into \>e vyne I come— 
Fyrst of my hyre my Lorde con mynne: 
I wat 3 payed anon of al and sum. 
(lines 577-84) 
Not even the long redaction of the parable—occupying nearly a 
hundred lines in the text—seems to satisfy the narrator's curiosity 
about the social architecture or protocol of the Heavenly society for, 
165 
APPLICATIONS: THREE DECONSTRUCTS E DREAM VISIONS 
ignoring the hortatory tone of the lines just quoted, he continues to 
treat the Pearl maiden's exhortations to peace and courtesy as posi­
tions to be understood and judged rationally and not merely to be 
accepted. At this point in the poem (if not much earlier), the two 
functions of narrative normalization, the splitting of the dreamer 
and the foregrounding of imagery, have acted to separate the dream-
experience from its somatic frame, and the readers begin (wrongly, 
as always) to believe that they understand what is going on in the 
text. Even if the Pearl maiden were once a human individual to 
whom this boorish narrator had some tie, she is certainly something 
else, something more, now. The Pearl maiden offers, it seems, a 
glimpse of Heavenly bliss and precious eschatological information, 
but the narrator, the readers' frustrating representative, refuses to 
learn what is to be learned about the world of light and argues with 
his visionary interlocutor. This misperception—that there is some­
thing new and true to be learned at all here—is a trap, as I suggested 
earlier, but traps are the result of narrative normalization, and the 
readers' hunger for eschatology will soon be proven to be as 
wrongheaded as the narrator's elegiac pouting. 
Nonetheless, the marked change in tone to be noted in the Pearl 
maiden at this point in the poem—just after the vineyard workers 
redaction—seems righteous, signalling her strategic shift from the 
relatively mild and patient invitation to accept the irrationality of 
her position to more aggressive tactic designed to undermine the 
narrator's stubborn, prideful rationality. The tonal change can be 
seen in the following lines, which appear about three stanzas after 
those quoted above ("More haf I of joye and blysse hereinne," etc.), 
but they are decidedly more shrill and their contents downright 
accusatory: 
Bot now \>ou mote3, me for to mate,

t>at I my peny haf wrang tan here;

t>ou say3 J?at I J?at com to late

Am not worj?y so gret fere.

Where wyste3 J?ou euer any bourne abate,

Euer so holy in hys prayere,

t>at he ne forfeted by sumkyn gate
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J3e mede sumtyme of heueneg clere? 
And ay J?e ofter, \>e alder J?ay were, 
J)ay laften ry3t and \vr03ten woghe. 
Mercy and grace moste hem ]?en stere, 
For |?€ grace of God is gret innoge. 
(lines 613-24) 
At first glance, these lines seem a startling violation of the very 
"cortaysye" that the Pearl maiden has been advocating; her notion 
that the older one gets, the more one sins is, though uncourteous, 
the perfect rejoinder to the narrator's position that long struggle is 
more meritorious than innocence. The last line of the Pearl maid­
en's attack, however—the tag line for this set of stanzas—will ulti­
mately help readers put her indictment of adult holiness into per­
spective. If, as she says, "be grace of God is gret inno3e," that is, 
sufficient in itself to save anyone, then all talk of merit and deserts is 
foolish and misdirected.26 The Pearl maiden's attack, then, shows 
readers that we may justly (but pointlessly) attack the merits of 
anyone, even of the saints, because none of us actually merits 
Heaven. 
In specific doctrinal terms, this obsession with justice and merit is 
the error of the Bradwardinians, who taught that unbaptized infants 
received a Heavenly reward perceptibly inferior to that of those who 
led complete lives of piety.27 In a larger sense, however, the error of 
the narrator (and ultimately the error of readers as well), who has 
concluded or judged anything at all about his pearl's fitness for her 
rewards, is the error of eschatology in general, the error inherent in 
seeking to comprehend the eternal and supernal joy of salvation in 
rational, logical terms. The wisdom of God (which may or may not 
be foolishness to men) is nowhere more evident than in His grant­
ing the gift of eternal salvation: both Piers the Plowman and the 
Pearl maiden take care to call it a "mede" or unwarranted gift, as 
opposed to a payment for services rendered.28 Such a notion cer­
tainly corrects the Bradwardinians, but it also challenges and invali­
dates all other eschatological positions as well: insofar as we are 
intellectually curious about the shape of the Heavenly society, this 
poem suggests, we imperil our eventual enjoyment of the simple 
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peace and happiness implicit in faith and hope, the joy in which is 
the source of the Pearl maiden's "cortaysye." 
This conflict, between courtesy and curiositas, is the central dra­
matic tension of the poem and, before examining its resolution 
through the dream vision form, we may digress momentarily to 
consider the background of the tension in contemporary mystical 
writings. At base, as Blenker points out, the positions of the dream­
er and the Pearl maiden represent, respectively, meditation and con­
templation. Blenker's source for this distinction, Hugh of St. Vic­
tor's Nineteen Homilies in Salomonis Ecclesiasten, makes the point 
nicely: 
Tres sunt animae rationalis visiones, cogitatio, meditatio, contemplatio. 
Cogitatio est, cum mens notione rerum transitorie tangitur cum ipsa res, 
sua imagine animo subito praesentatur, vel per sensum ingrediens, vel a 
memoria exsurgens. Meditatio est assidua et sagax retractatio cogitatio­
nis, aliquid, vel involutum explicare nitens, vel scrutans, penetrare occul­
tum. Contemplatio est perspicax, et liber animi contuitus is res perspi­
ciendas usquequaque diffusus. 
There are three modes of cognition (visiones) belonging to the rational 
mind: cogitation, meditation, contemplation. It is cogitation when the 
mind is touched with the idea of things, and the thing itself is by its 
image presented suddenly, either by entering the mind through sense or 
by rising from memory. Meditation is the assiduous and sagacious revi­
sion of cogitation, and strives to explain the involved, and penetrate the 
hidden. Contemplation is the mind's perspicacious and free attention, 
diffused everywhere throughout the range of whatever may be explored.29 
Blenker argues that each of these three stages is represented sequen­
tially in the poem in something close to the (chronologically) later 
Ignatian pattern of meditation of place, meditation of participation, 
and final contemplation. We have already seen, though, that this 
program is not precisely true to the dynamic of the poem: the con­
versation between the Pearl maiden and the narrator is anything but 
a smooth straight ascent and is only nominally a conventional oracu­
lar instruction by a figure of authority.30 The pair vigorously dispute 
in human and realistic ways, which suggests that the Pearl'vision is 
actually something closer to a struggle between meditation (or 
eschatology, represented by the narrator and the readers) and con­
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templation (or humble, graceful acquiescence, represented by the 
Pearl maiden). In English contemplative writing of this period and 
especially in the naive, populist tradition, this tension between med­
itation and contemplation was far more important than the less 
challenging "step approach" offered by Blenker and more closely 
associated with later continental writers. In The Cloud of Unknow­
ing, for example, meditation is described as an impediment to rather 
than as a stage of contemplation: 
Be sure that if you are occupied with something less than God, you place 
it above you for the time being and create a barrier between yourself and 
God. Therefore, firmly reject all clear ideas however pious or delightful. 
For I tell you this, one loving blind desire for God alone is more valuable 
in itself, more pleasing to God and to the saints, more beneficial to your 
own growth, and more helpful to your friends, both living and dead, than 
anything else you could do. And you are more blessed to experience the 
interior affection of this love within the darkness of the cloud of un­
knowing than to contemplate the angels and saints or to hear the mirth 
and melody of their heavenly festival.31 
In this text and elsewhere in mystical writings, contemplation of 
"the angels and saints" and of "their heavenly festival" of exactly the 
sort that the narrator and the readers seek from this dream is treated 
merely as a special case of the vain imaginings which prevent the 
soul's mystic union with God: 
These originate in a conceited, curious, or romantic mind whereas the 
blind stirring of love springs from a sincere and humble heart. Pride, 
curiosity, and daydreaming must be sternly checked if the contemplative 
work is to be authentically conceived in singleness of heart.32 
Such perception of the "conceited, curious" and "romantic" dreamer 
(and reader) of Pearl redefines the poem's fundamental tension and 
makes it virtually a new poem, a poem full of self-consciously insol­
uble intellectual puzzles. Throughout the vision, the dreamer and 
the readers he represents treat these puzzles as challenges: the nar­
rator attempts to gather information from the Pearl maiden toward 
their solution and assumes that his eschatologist's mind is sufficient 
to unlock their mysteries. This attitude, a stubborn unwillingness 
simply to rest in the presence of God, is treated with growing con­
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tempt by the Pearl maiden, who first seeks to amend the narrator's 
mind but finally comes to the more aggressive strategy of teaching 
humility by confounding intellectual pride with the wonderful irra­
tionality of God. This later strategy, seen first in her rhetorical at­
tack on adult holiness, reappears as she recollects her own call to 
Heaven: 
'My makele3 Lambe J?at alle may bete',

Quod scho, 'my dere destyne,

Me ches to hys make, al)?a3 vnmete

Sumtyme semed }?at assemble.

When I wente fro yor worlde wete,

He calde me to hys bonerte:

"Cum hyder to me, my lemman swete,

For mote ne spot is non in \>e."

He gef me my3t and als bewte;

In hys blod he wesch me wede on dese,

And coronde clene in vergynte,

And py3t me in perle3 maskelle3.

(lines 757-68) 
But this appeal, like all those that went before it, falls on deaf ears, or 
rather on ears that might as well have been deaf, for the narrator 
fails to appreciate the Pearl maiden's insistence on her humble un­
worthiness for brideship and, worse, mishears her crucial distinc­
tion between "makele3" and "maskelle3": 
Quat kyn ]?yng may be J?at Lambe

J5at qe wolde wedde vnto hys vyf ?

Ouer alle o|?er so hy3 }>ou clambe

To lede wyth hym so ladyly lyf.

So mony a comly on-vunder cambe

For Kryst han lyued in much stryf;

And |?ou con alle J?o dere out dryf

And fro J>at maryag al o)?er depres,

Al only )?yself so stout and styf,

A makele3 may and maskelle3.

(lines 771-80) 
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Clearly, the narrator still fails to understand that Heaven is beyond 
earthly conventions (such as merit or monogamy), but more impor­
tant at this later stage of the poem is his mistaken predication of 
both adjectives, "makele3" and maskelle3," to the Pearl maiden. In 
her response, she makes the difference between the two clear: 
"Maskelles" quod J?at myry quene, 
"Vnblemyst I am, wythouten blot, 
And \>at may I wyth mensk menteene; 
Bot 'makele3 quene' |?enne sade I not." 
(lines 781-84) 
The distinction, now underscored by the dangerous similarity of the 
two words, is one of the crucial ones of the poem: superior goodness 
or sanctity, indicated by "makele3," has no significance, is an empty 
eschatological fiction, while absolute goodness, the state of being 
untainted absolutely or "maskelle3" ("immaculate"), is the mark of 
the saved soul and especially of the soul that enters Heaven without 
having had even the opportunity to know sin. It is such souls that 
the Pearl maiden has in mind as ideals, souls that escaped unavoid­
able sin by their early absention from physical life, when she intro­
duces the most famous pearl of the New Testament, the margarita 
pretiosa: 
"Iesus con calle to hym hys mylde,

And sayde hys ryche no wy3 my3t wynne

Bot he com l?yder ry3t as a chylde,

O[>er elle3 neuermore com J?erinne.

Harmle3, trwe, and vndefylde,

Wythouten mote o)?er mascle of sulpande synne,

Quen such \>er cnoken on \>e bylde,

Tyt schal hem men \>e 3ate vnpynne.

t>er is \>e blys )?at con not blynne

t>at j?e jueler so3te pur3 perre pres,

And solde all hys goud, bo|?e wolen and lynne,

To bye hym a perle \vat3 mascelle3.

"This makelle3 perle, |?at bo3t is dere,
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t>e joueler gef fore all hys god, 
Is lyke |?e reme of heuenesse clere: 
So sayde \>e Fader of folde and flode; 
For hit is \vemle3, clene, and clere, 
And endele3 rounde, and blyj?e of mode, 
And commune to alle |?at ry3twys were. 
Lo, euen inmyddeg my breste hit stode." 
(lines 721-40) 
The beauty of this passage lies in the way it brings together dispa­
rate allusions from Scripture with motifs in the poem itself to de­
construct eschatology and to assert the courtesy of Heaven. Jesus' 
injunction to become "as a chylde" (Mark 10: 15, etc.) recalls the 
various senses of childhood in the poem: initially considered un­
worthy of eminence in Heaven (by the narrator), the child is now 
seen as having the essential purity that will "j?e 3ate vnpynne." 
The play on "makele3" and "maskelle3" in these lines looks for­
ward to the narrator's problem with these words a few lines later, 
but the confusion—essentially a semantic one—can already be seen 
as destroying the discourse of eschatology by showing (as the notion 
of common queenship did) that eschatology is finally beyond dis­
course. The pearl (here suggesting personal salvation) is "mas­
kelle3" by virtue of the soul's fastidiousness and also "makele3" or 
incomparable to any other possible reward for the avoidance of 
"sulpande synne." As if to underscore the inadequacy of the dis­
course of eschatology, note the recurrence of an earlier paradox im­
plicit in lines 721 and 739, the pearl's being both "makele3" and 
also "commune to alle ]?at ry3twys were," that is, the badge of 
membership in a peerless community of equals. 
Such is the nature of Heavenly courtesy, a special, ecstatic cour­
tesy that exists among the elect without the earthly prerequisites of 
rank and hierarchy. And this "cortaysye" is Pearl's critique of escha­
tology, a critique of meditation, intellection, and even of earthly 
dreams which conceptualize the afterlife in insufficient human 
terms. That the dreamer fails to learn this within the dream is evi­
dent from the dream's interruption: the dreamer's final act in the 
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dream is the fundamental violation of courtesy, a radical breaking of 
the rules specifically laid down by the Pearl maiden: 
Delyt me drof in y3e and ere, 
My mane3 mynde to maddyng make; 
Quen I se3 my frely, I wolde be J?ere, 
By3onde j?e water \>a.$ ho were wake. 
I t?O3t f?at nof?yng my3t me dere 
To fech me bur and take me hake, 
And to start in \>e strem schulde non me stere, 
To symme |?e remnaunt, ^  3 I J?er swalte. 
(lines 1153-60) 
The narrator's attempt to cross the river is in direct defiance of the 
third of the Pearl maiden's injunctions, the "three errors" specified 
in lines 289-300. Moreover, the dreamer's emphasis on his delight 
and his following of his curious "mane3 mynde" suggest that his 
awakening at this point is a signal of his unworthiness to cross. His 
desire to know, in place of what should be his desire to be, expels this 
still-ignorant intruder. 
It is only on awakening that the narrator's perspective of the vi­
sion begins to change from human to celestial: 
To paye \>e Prince ot?er sete sa3te 
Hit is ful e\>e to \>e god Krystyin; 
For I haf founden hym, bo}?e day and na3te, 
A God, a Lorde, a frende ful fyin. 
Ouer J>is hyul j?is lote I Ia3te, 
For pyty of my perle enclynin, 
And sy|?en to God I hit byta3te 
In Kryste3 dere blessyng and myn, 
l>at in \>e forme of bred and wyn 
\>e prest vus schewe3 vch a daye. 
He gef vus to be his homly hyne 
Ande precious perle3 vnto his pay. 
Amen. Amen. 
(lines 1201-13) 
As with those of the Book of the Duchess, these final lines require 
173 
APPLICATIONS: THREE DECONSTRUCTTIVE DREAM VISIONS 
readers to readjust their allegiances. Until this point, the narrator 
has been the fool who was offered a vision of the afterlife and ig­
nored it, the boor who was offered a sense of Heavenly courtesy and 
challenged and repudiated it. The poem's conclusion, however, 
gives evidence that the dreamer-poet—as opposed to the dreamer-
character—understands the courtesy of Heaven full well and knows 
it to be available in this world through humble service to the Prince 
and through sacramental intermediaries. This shift in perspective 
within the poem, discovering the tenor of the pearl-image (or at 
least its final tenor) to be salvation and not some little girl, redefines 
the anxiety or longing of the dreamer at the beginning of the vision, 
showing it to be the laudable and holy desire for membership in the 
community of the elect. That the dreamer was unable to compre­
hend this until this late point is not as important as the readers' 
analogous failure to recognize—again, before this—the futility of 
such dreams of the afterlife. Such are, Pearl teaches, as misdirected 
as the search for baby Margery, the attempt to make human sense of 
Heavenly society, and the desire to "preview" what is open and 
comprehensible only to those loosed from the discourse of escha­
tology. 
The Hous of Fame and the End of Lore 
I claimed above that the Book of the Duchess is a poem which says 
impossible words, a poem that expresses grief without succumbing 
to the trivial locutions required for such expression. The Hous of 
Fame expresses the inexpressible as well, for it is a poem that dem­
onstrates that poems lie. 
This is not by any means a new reading of the Hous of Fame', from 
among the many others who have shared some of the following 
perceptions, I should single out Sheila Delany's The House of Fame: 
The Poetics of Skeptical Fideism as an important source for this 
present discussion.33 After treatments of sceptical fideism and its 
poetics in early chapters of her book, Delany moves sequentially 
through the poem and traces a progressive dismantling of received 
wisdom in its Proem and three books. Defining fame as "the body of 
traditional knowledge that confronted the educated fourteenth­
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century reader," Delany perceives Chaucer to be fundamentally anx­
ious about the contingency of this body of knowledge but unable to 
perform the logical gymnastics necessitated by the late medieval 
crisis of authority: 
Despite its benefits, the distinction between kinds of truth was one 
which Chaucer was unable fully to accept as the basis for literary practice. 
The House of Fame shows that while Chaucer felt the dilemma which 
made the separation of truths necessary, he still preferred to transcend 
the choice between traditions rather than to commit himself whole­
heartedly to a single intellectual position or consistent point of view.34 
Delany is certainly correct in identifying the Hous of Fame as a 
sceptical poem, but her book leaves unanswered many crucial ques­
tions about Chaucer's perspective on this medieval scepticism and, 
in subtle but important ways, misjudges the poet. The anxiety of the 
Hous of Fame is unmistakable, but it is still a work of art produced 
not by its anxious dreamer but by its less anxious artist. We must 
take care not to confuse the two: it is Geffrey the dreamer-character 
who prays, 
"O Crist!" thoughte I, "that art in blysse, 
Fro fantome and illusion 
Me save!" 
(lines 492-94) 
and Chaucer the maker who writes these lines for him. The distinc­
tion, of course, is as old as Kittredge but, we shall see, the working 
distance between the dreamer-character and the dreamer-poet— 
and the distance between these two figures and Chaucer—is espe­
cially difficult to maintain in this, Chaucer's greatest dream vision. 
These slippery distinctions suggest the purpose or program of 
this poem, the undermining of lore itself, the deconstruction of, 
perhaps, discourse itself. To do this, Chaucer must produce a poem 
that implicates lore and poems, a very different project than that of 
merely decrying their contingency; to do this, Chaucer must use lore 
to its own destruction, use writing to deconstruct the tyranny of the 
written word. What must survive the Hous of Fame is a community 
whose perception of the contingency of this world and whose dis­
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trust of human language and human rational formulations are their 
common bonds. This is a much more ambitious program than that of 
the Book of the Duchess or of Pearl, which attacked only very lim­
ited discourses; the strategy, however, is the same. What the Hous 
of Fame will do is make its dreamer's insomnium our own insom­
nium as well and then wake us up. 
The poem begins with what seems a striking departure from con­
vention, a departure which, I suspect, has led Curry, Lewis, Koonce, 
and others to see the Hous of Fame as a somnium coeleste, a revela­
tory dream and no insomnium at all.35 Instead of elliptical autobiog­
raphy or hints at the dreamer's distress as in Pearl or the Book of 
the Duchess and other dream visions, the Proem to the Hous of 
Fame offers a long, rather panicked synopsis of dream lore: 
God turne us every drem to goode! 
For hyt is wonder, be the roode, 
To my wyt, what causeth swevenes 
Eyther on morwes or on evenes; 
And why th'effect folweth of somme, 
And of somme hit shal never come; 
Why that is an avisioun 
And this a revelacioun, 
Why this a drem, why that a sweven, 
And noght to every man lyche even; 
Why this a fantome, why these oracles, 
I not; but whoso of these miracles 
The causes knoweth bet then I, 
Devyne he; for I certeinly 
Ne kan hem noght, ne never thinke 
To besily my wyt to swinke, 
To knowe of hir signifiaunce 
The gendres, neyther the distaunce 
Of tymes of hem, ne the causes, 
Or why this more than that cause is; 
As yf folkys complexions 
Make hem dreme of reflexions; 
Or ellys thus, as other sayn, 
For to gret feblenesse of her brayn, 
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By abstinence, or by seknesse, 
Prison, stewe, or gret distresse, 
Or ellys by disordynaunce 
Of naturel acustumaunce, 
That som man is to curious 
In studye, or melancolyous, 
Or thus, so inly ful of drede, 
That no man may hym botc bede; 
Or elles that devocion 
Of somme, and contemplacion 
Causeth suche dremes ofte; 
Or that the cruel lyf unsofte 
Which these ilke lovers leden 
That hopen over-muche or dreden, 
That purely her impressions 
Causen hem to have visions; 
Or yf that spirites have the myght 
To make folk to dreme a-nyght; 
Or yf the soule, of propre kynde, 
Be so parfit, as men fynde, 
That yt forwot that ys to come, 
And that hyt warneth alle and some 
Of everych of her aventures 
Be avisions, or be figures, 
But that oure flessh ne hath no myght 
To understonde hyt aryght, 
For hyt is warned to derkly;— 
But why the cause is, noght wot I. 
(lines 1-52) 
While many claim that these lines are a tour de force reflecting 
Chaucer's wide knowledge of oneiromancy, this is clearly not their 
dramatic, radical lyric force.36 The lines bespeak familiarity with 
dream lore sure enough, but they emphasize this lore's eclectic, in­
conclusive, and aimless expanse and not its (arguable) status as a 
coherent body of knowledge. We have seen that such a sense of 
medieval oneiromancy is justified—as righteous as the almost ex­
clusive emphasis here on pathological or somatic causes for 
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dreams—but we should nonetheless beware of taking this precision 
and show of knowledge too seriously, for the passage as a whole 
shows that Geffrey's bewilderment is at least equal to his expertise. 
Taken as an example of the radical lyricism that begins the dream 
vision, the Proem is more outburst than dissertation, a frantic, ram­
bling speech enunciated by a nervous persona who has read the au­
thorities and has discovered that they cannot be made to agree. The 
long passage just quoted, a single 296-word sentence in the Robin­
son edition, hardly suggests the calm, measured, confident style of 
the author of the Treatise of the Astrolabe or the Equatorie of the 
Planets. The repeated prayer, "God turne us every dreme to goode!" 
which frames the Proem like praying hands bookends, adds to the 
sense that this is a dramatic production, the monologue of a "mased 
thyng" who (for once) is bewildered and anxious, even unnerved. To 
recall Delany's title, "fideism" here brackets "scepticism" and the 
structure holds only by the grace of God. And Geffrey asks God, not 
for inspiration, guidance, or wisdom in interpreting dreams, but 
only, naively, that He turn all our dreams to good event. He is thus 
far more serious than his namesakes in the Book of the Duchess, 
whose concerns seem banal by comparison: the stakes are much 
higher, somehow, here. 
Thus, the Proem to the Hous of Fame is actually not a departure 
from the convention of introducing the dreamer as distressed or 
anxious; it simply establishes this element through dramatic mono­
logue rather than through explicit statement or innuendo. After 
reading the Proem, the reader knows, just as surely as if Chaucer has 
said so outright, that this fellow has problems. Far from suggesting 
a Dantesque apocalypse or a somnium coeleste, this errant, quirky 
proem presents readers with a worried, confused persona who has 
discovered to his dismay just what we discovered for ourselves in 
chapter 2 above—that the dream authorities cannot be made to 
make any practical, usable sense. The nightmare has begun. 
Its end is not in sight. The three books that follow this proem 
constitute a steady, unrelenting accretion of evidence for a conclu­
sion that is, perhaps, inherent in that proem: that truth in this world 
is either unavailable or indeterminate.37 Like the nightmare expe­
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rience of fleeing an enemy but finding him again and again at every 
turn, or like the nightmarish experience of learned men of the four­
teenth century like Ockham or Abelard who found contingency in 
every branch of knowledge, this poem is a fictive record of Geffrey's 
dream of history, philosophy, and science, rehearsing his repeated 
attempts to find solid foundations for these three artes. Like all 
nightmares, this is a personal, even idiosyncratic vision; like all vi­
sions, its personal perspective comes to be fully shared by all who 
read and see aright. 
Book One of the Hous of Fame is an exercise in textuality, a reve­
lation of the contingency of history, a deconstruction of the dis­
course of history. In the temple of glass, Geffrey comes upon a text: 
But as I romed up and doun, 
I fond that on a wall ther was 
Thus writen on a table of bras: 
"I wol now singen, yif I kan, 
The armes, and also the man 
That first cam, thurgh his destinee, 
Fugityf of Troy contree, 
In Itayle, with ful moche pyne 
Unto the strondes of Layvne." 
And tho began the story anoon, 
As I shal telle yow echon. 
(lines 140-50) 
As the quotation suggests, history, the record of the adventures of 
Aeneas as inscribed by Vergil ("Arma virumque cano . . .") has 
become a story, one subject to rehearsal or retelling, one that can 
now be "told" yet again by Geffrey. Its stability seems, as it begins, to 
inhere both in its familiarity—no author is attached to the text— 
and equally by its being engraved in brass, solidity symbolizing 
stability. 
This very stability is immediately called into question in the next 
lines, as Geffrey's relationship with his source becomes less clear: 
First sawgh I the destruction

Of Troye, thurgh the Grek Synon,
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That with his false forswerynge, 
And his chere and his lesygne, 
Made the hors broght into Troye, 
Thorgh which Troyens loste al her joye. 
And aftir this was grave, alias! 
How Ilyon assayled was 
And wonne, and kyng Priam yslayn 
And Polytes, his sone, certayn, 
Dispitously, of daun Pirrus. 
(lines 151-61) 
The crucial question here is how we are to take the verb "sawgh."38 
Whether it is simply shorthand for "read" or a reference to repre­
sentational carvings is not clear, though if it is the latter, it is pecu­
liar that Chaucer fails to tell us directly. Whatever the correct sense 
may be, though, the word "sawgh" moves the narrative of events of 
the Aeneid away from Vergil's text. What is reported here is, to say 
the least, at several removes from the events being described: the 
destruction of Troy (through, notice, the lies of Sinon) as recorded 
by Vergil, as, it seems, reinterpreted by the mysterious artisan of the 
temple, as described by Geffrey. But this is a dream and, as such, the 
mind of Geffrey is the ultimate source of all he reports. Thus the 
double contingency of history is introduced: history (and especially 
medieval history) is a sequence of representations, each dependent 
on the accuracy of its predecessors and all dependent on the integrity 
of the human mind, here represented at its least trustworthy 
through the dream frame. 
The second, anterior contingency is emphasized more and more 
in the rehearsal of the Troy story in Book One, as Geffrey introduces 
value judgments and emotional expletives: 
And I saugh next, in al thys fere, 
How Creusa, daun Eneas wif, 
Which that he lovede as hys lyf, 
And hir yonge sone Iulo, 
And eke Askanius also, 
Fledden eke with drery chere, 
That hyt was pitee for to here; 
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And in a forest, as they wente, 
At a turnynge of a wente, 
How Creusa was ylost, alias! 
That ded, not I how, she was; 
How he hir soughte, and how hir gost 
Bad hym to flee the Grekes host, 
And seyde he moste unto Itayle, 
As was his destinee, sauns faille; 
That hyt was pitee for to here, 
When hir spirit gan appere, 
The wordes that she to him seyde, 
And for to kepe hir sone hym preyde. 
(lines 174-92) 
The random, nonsequential character of the narrative is evident 
from these lines; through Geffrey, Chaucer is intentionally giving 
readers a partial, impressionistic picture of a scene inspired by the 
Aeneid, a far cry from "I wol now singen" much closer to "yif I kan." 
The intrusive "That hyt was pitee for to here" (lines 180 and 189), 
like the intrusive "yif I kan," are emblems of contingency, of histo­
ry's dependence on fallible human historians. More than this, the 
mystery surrounding Creusa's death demonstrates that history is 
always subject to gaps and lacunae, which may be silently supplied, 
like emotional responses or moral judgments, by individual talents 
in the tradition. 
Inclusions and exclusions figure prominently in the climax of the 
Aeneid redaction—if it is still accurate to call it this—as the story of 
Aeneas suddenly takes on a decidedly un-Vergilian project, the re­
habilitation of Dido: 
But let us speke of Eneas, 
How he betrayed hir, alias! 
And lefte hir ful unkyndely. 
So when she saw al utterly, 
That he wolde hir of trouthe fayle, 
And wende fro hir to Itayle, 
She gan to wringe hir hondes two. 
"Alias!" quod she, "what me ys woo! 
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Alias! is every man thus trewe, 
That every yer wolde have a newe, 
Yf hit so longe tyme dure, 
Or elles three, peraventure? 
As thus: of oon he wolde have fame 
In magnifyinge of hys name; 
Another for frendshippe, seyth he; 
And yet ther shal the thridde be 
That shal be take for delyt, 
Loo, or for synguler profit." 
(lines 293-310) 
This speech is one of the most interesting in the Hous of Fame 
because it shows so clearly the nightmarish quality of this strange 
vision of contingency. First, of course, Dido never speaks these 
words in the Aeneid: Vergil is quite unforgiving to this woman who 
turned his hero's head. This, therefore, is a reprise of the "source 
problem"—words or sights?—introduced earlier. Where does this 
Dido come from? How is Geffrey hearing her? Whose words is she 
saying?39 Second, Dido's words themselves are subtly troublesome. 
The three women to whom she alludes can be safely identified as 
Creusa (fame), Dido herself (friendship, etc.), and lastly Lavinia (de­
light and profit)—of the last of whom Vergil's Dido was obviously 
unaware. This "Dido" whose complaint Geffrey duly records is, 
thus, a strangely ahistorical creature, not wholly Vergil's Dido by 
virtue of her foreknowledge (and her "freedom of speech") but not 
wholly un-Vergilian by virtue of her biography. In some ways, she is 
Ovid's Dido, of course, but if she is, she still is so in a redaction of the 
Aeneid and not of the Heroides, an alternate "authority" Geffrey 
will not mention until it is too late. 
As if to emphasize this very problem of sources and especially of 
the apparent sourcelessness of this prescient Dido, Geffrey inter­
rupts her speech at this very point to offer a curious but not terribly 
reassuring disclaimer: 
In suche wordes gan to pleyne 
Dydo of her grete peyne, 
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As me mette redely; 
Non other auctour alegge I. 
(lines 311-14) 
Such a statement dramatizes the readers' ambivalence with the 
mode of the dream vision, which hovers between lyric and narrative, 
between dream as emotional correlative and dream as story. This 
statement of "authority" is, by this point in the text, both true and 
false. It is true, of course, because, when all is said and done, this is 
Geffrey's insomnium, an experience for which there can be no "auc­
tour" or source other than the figmenta of the dreamer. It is simul­
taneously false, however, because this Dido—any Dido—is not 
wholly a creature of Geffrey's imagination: she is a creature of his­
tory given by Vergil to the world (and therefore an example of nar­
rative normalization, in that she is identifiable independent of the 
dream frame). She has never spoken these words before—"non 
other auctour alegge I"—but the matter of her complaint is just and 
familiar, at least to readers of the Heroides. Thus, Dido is a creature 
sprung contradictorally to life, a character seemingly free from tex­
tual contingency but in fact free only to bemoan that contingency: 
"O, wel-awey that I was born! 
For thorgh yow [Aeneas? Vergil?] is my name lorn, 
And alle myn actes red and songe 
Over al thys lond, on every tonge. 
O wikke Fame! for ther nys 
Nothing so swift, lo, as she is! 
O, soth ys, every thing ys wyst, 
Though hit be kevered with the myst. 
Eke, though I myghte duren ever, 
That I have don, rekever I never, 
That I ne shal be seyd, alias, 
Yshamed be through Eneas, 
And that I shal thus juged be— 
'Loo, ryght as she hath don, now she 
Wol doo eft-sones, hardely;' 
Thus seyth the peple prively." 
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But that is don, is not to done; 
Al hir compleynt ne al hir moone, 
Certeyn, avayleth hir not a stre. 
(lines 345-63) 
It is to the point here to mention that Dido is factually incorrect 
when she claims that her side of the story is untold. Aside from the 
Heroides (which Geffrey will mention at line 379), she is allowed 
her day in court in this present text, a fact which makes her com­
plaint untrue by virtue of its utterance. More than this, Dido is actu­
ally complaining not against Aeneas or even against Vergil but 
against Fame, an antagonist she unsuccessfully attempts to apostro­
phize in lines 349-50: because Vergil, the agent of Fame, has im­
mortalized her villainy in verse, she is doomed forever to do again 
what she did before (each time the Aeneid is opened and read) and 
so doomed to ever-renewed ill Fame.40 
Such maddening contradictions take their toll on poor Geffrey, 
who seems here to be searching for a stable ontological basis for his 
art of versecraft and for the source of the putative solidity of "tyd­
inges" among the "lesynges" of men's mouths. The bewildering ex­
perience with Dido calls even the sainted Vergil into question and, 
forsaking him who was Dante's first guide and master, Geffrey re­
sponds to the perplexity with calculated uncertainty: 
When I had seen al this syghte, 
In this noble temple thus, 
"A Lord!" thoughte I, "that madest us, 
Yet sawgh I never such noblesse 
Of ymages, ne such richesse, 
As I saugh graven in this chirche; 
But not wot I whoo did hem wirche, 
Ne where I am, ne in what contree. 
But now wol I goo out and see, 
Ryght at the wyket, yf y kan 
See owhere any stiryng man, 
That may me telle where I am." 
(lines 468-79) 
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The "rich and noble images," so awesome and yet so problematic, 
make the question of their authority and source all the more crucial 
to Geffrey, who flees the temple to get his bearings. Outside, he 
finds a trackless wasteland, the emblem of the contingent web of 
lore. Without markings or landmarks, either geographic or textual, 
Geffrey panics: 
"O Crist!" thoughte I, "that art in blysse, 
Fro fantome and illusion 
Me save!" and with devocion 
Myn eyen to the hevene I caste. 
(lines 492-95) 
In true nightmare fashion, this prayer for truth amid contingency is 
answered, not by the Second Coming of the Logos, but by the second 
coming of Dante's eagle, another contingent creature truant from 
its text. 
Book Two of the Hous of Fame is a new beginning, complete with 
a new invocation designed to leave behind the confusing clash of 
authorities manifest in the Dido debacle: 
Now faire blisfull, O Cipris, 
So be my favour at this tyme! 
And ye, me to endite and ryme 
Helpeth, that on Parnaso duelle, 
Be Elicon, the clere welle. 
O Thought, that wrot al that I mette, 
And in the tresorye hyt shette 
Of my brayn, now shal men se 
Yf any vertu in the be, 
To tellen al my drem aryght. 
(lines 518-27) 
Leaving behind Vergil, Ovid, and the myths of history, Geffrey 
grounds his vision once more in his own mind: in the dream, in what 
he "mette," and in his conscious mind, "thought," which records and 
processes his memories. The quest remains the same, but now, turn­
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ing away from the unstable authority of old books, Geffrey flies to­
ward a personal revelation. 
And this revelation can be found in Book Two in the words of the 
eagle, who begins his chirping dissertation with the significant 
command, "Awak!" The eagle calls on Geffrey to awaken indeed: to 
awaken from the dreamlike belief in words, to awaken to the cold 
light of reason and the axia of science. The eagle's carefully wrought 
disquisition on "kyndely enclynyng" (lines 729-864) is the perfect 
methodological counterpart to the chaotic experience of the temple 
of glass, throwing a stark backlight on the grim lessons learned in the 
confrontation with Dido. 
The revelation comes innocently enough. In explaining how the 
Palace of Fame can be the repository of all sound and thus of all 
speech, the eagle demythologizes verbal noise, reducing it to its un­
impressive essence: 
"Soun ys noght but eyr ybroken, 
And every speche that ys spoken, 
Lowd or pryvee, foul or fair, 
In his substaunce ys but air; 
For as flaumbe ys but lyghted smoke, 
Ryght soo soun ys air ybroke. 
But this may be in many wyse, 
Of which I wil the twoo devyse, 
As soun that cometh of pipe or harpe. 
For whan a pipe is blowen sharpe, 
The air ys twyst with violence 
And rent; loo, thys ys my sentence; 
Eke, whan men harpe-strynges smyte, 
Whether hyt be moche or lyte, 
Loo, with the strok the ayr tobreketh; 
And ryght so breketh it when men speketh. 
Thus wost thou wel what thing is speche." 
(lines 765-81) 
This "proves" inductively how it can be that all speech might reside 
in the Palace of Fame, but it does so at great cost. The cost, of course, 
is the truth that speech is nothing more than noise, a breaking of air 
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no different from the noise of the harp, the insensible accompani­
ment to the "noise" of the singer-poet. This explanation may eerily 
recall a passage from De Doctrina Christiana: 
Sed quia verberato aere statim transeunt, nee diutius manent quam so­
nant, instituta sunt per litteras signa verborum. Ita voces oculis ostendun­
tur, non per seipsas, sed per signa quaedam sua. 
But because vibrations in the air soon pass away and remain no longer 
than they sound, signs of words have been constructed by means of let­
ters. Thus words are shown to the eyes, not in themselves but through 
certain signs which stand for them.41 
When we recall that the resident of the Hous of Fame is the goddess 
who uses the craftsmen of the written word to lend solidity to the 
broken air of speech, we can see that the eagle is a true Augustinian 
who has simply replaced Augustine's written signs "instituta . . . 
per litteras" with the goddess who orders these engravings of the 
stammerings of fallible humans. 
In concluding his explanation, the eagle asks Geffrey if he is con­
vinced, not by rhetoric and figure but by the sheer logic and reason­
ableness of the argument: 
"Telle me this now feythfully, 
Have y not preved thus symply, 
Withoute any subtilite 
Of speche, or gret prolixite 
Of termes of philosophic, 
Of figures of poetrie, 
Or colours of rethorike? 
Pardee, hit oughte thee to lyke! 
For hard langage and hard matere 
Ys encombrous for to here 
Attones; wost thou not wel this?" 
And y answered and seyde, "Yis." 
(lines 853-64) 
The muttered "Yis" speaks volumes. In convincing Geffrey that the 
Palace of Fame is his wonted destination, the eagle has completely 
devalued the object of Geffrey's quest. Speech (true or lying speech) 
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is mere sonic stuff and hidden behind that quiet "Yis" is perhaps 
Geffrey's realization that the tidings for which he searches will not 
be quite so easy to find. 
In keeping with this sense of Book Two as the book of awakening, 
it contains several references to apotheoses and to the structure of 
the Platonic universe. From their shared vantage point, the eagle 
and Geffrey recall Alexander and, of course, Scipio: 
"Seest thou any toun 
Or ought thou knowest yonder doun?" 
I seyde, "Nay." "No wonder nys," 
Quod he, "for half so high as this 
Nas Alixandre Macedo; 
Ne the kyng, Daun Scipio, 
That saw in drem, at poynt devys, 
Helle and erthe and paradys; 
Ne eke the wrechche Dedalus, 
Ne his child, nyce Ykarus, 
That fleigh so highe that the hete 
Hys wynges malt, and he fel wete 
In myd the see, and ther he dreynte, 
For whom was maked moch compleynte." 
(lines 911-24) 
Echoing a now-familiar phrase from St. Paul, Geffrey expresses his 
new belief in the apotheoses of his fellow literati'. 
Thoo gan y wexen in a were, 
And seyde, "Y wot wel y am here; 
But wher in body or in gost 
I not, ywys; both God, thou wost!" 
For more clere entendement 
Nas me never yit ysent. 
And than thoughte y on Marcian, 
And eke on Anteclaudian, 
That sooth was her descripsion 
Of alle the hevenes region, 
As fer as that y sey the preve; 
Therfore y kan hem now beleve. 
(lines 979-90) 
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To which the eagle responds pointedly," 'Lat be,' quod he, 'thy fan­
tasye!' " (992). The references to Scipio, Martianus Capella, Alanus, 
and so on should not suggest that this is a Chaucerian apotheosis or a 
feigned somnium coeleste\ the eagle's rebuke and especially his call­
ing these musings "fantasye" preclude this. In referring all that he 
sees to books he has read, Geffrey shows that, like the Pearl narra­
tor, he has failed to learn the fundamental message of this expe­
rience, has not awakened from the dream of earthly truth and au­
thorial authority. To the eagle's offer to name the stars for him, that 
is, to tell him their true names, Geffrey demurs, leaving such mat­
ters to earthbound "authorities" inferior to his guide in intelligence 
as well as in vantage point: 
"No fors," quod y, "hyt is no nede: 
I leve as wel, so God me spede, 
Hem that write of this matere, 
As though I knew her places here; 
And eke they shynen here so bryghte, 
Hyt shulde shenden al my syghte, 
To loke on hem." 
(lines 1011-17) 
To which the eagle, again reassessing his ward, replies quietly, 
"That may wel be" (1017). Throughout this second book, Geffrey 
remains the naive, bookish fellow staring straight at the truth and 
refusing to recognize it or, as here, averting his eyes in fear that its 
brilliance will blind him. Like the dreamer of the Book of the Duch­
ess and even more of Pearl, this dreamer can be seen to lag far 
behind the readers, who have embraced the pseudonarrative and, at 
this stage, recognize John of Gaunt or desire to see the Procession of 
the Elect or yearn for knowledge of the "true" names of the stars. In 
repeated such moments of narrative normalization, Geffrey is con­
fronted again and again with the contingency of earthly knowledge, 
in which history is as transitory as Augustinian "vibrations of the 
air" or in which this world is as a mote in the universe and yet, at an 
epistemological distance at which even "touns" are no longer recog­
nizable, Geffrey fails to draw the Stoic lessons of Boethius or Troi­
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lus, turns his back on the truth, squints towards earth, and longs to 
get home to his old books. 
Book Three of the Hous of Fame begins with yet another pro­
logue, yet another attempt to reground the vision in the radical per­
sonal authority of the dream. Reminding readers rather backhand­
edly of his profession (and possibly echoing the eagle's humbling 
judgment on his artistry), Geffrey prays: 
O God of science and of lyght, 
Appollo, thurgh thy grete myght, 
This lytel laste bok thou gye! 
Nat that I wilne, for maistrye, 
Here art poetical be shewed; 
But for the rym ys lyght and lewed, 
Yit make hyt sumwhat agreable, 
Though som vers fayle in a sillable; 
And that I do no diligence 
To shewe craft, but o sentence. 
And yif, devyne vertu, thow 
Wilt helpe me to shewe now 
That in myn hed ymarked ys— 
Loo, that is for to menen this, 
The Hous of Fame for to descryve— 
Thou shalt se me go as blyve 
Unto the nexte laure y see, 
And kysse yt, for hyt is thy tree. 
Now entre in my brest anoon! 
(lines 1091-1109) 
By this point, intentions such as these (and an orientation towards 
discourse such as this) should have a decidedly hollow ring. Chas­
tened by his experiences with Dido and the eagle, Geffrey now has a 
more radical view of the poetic art and will now be content if the 
form is only "agreable" provided the sentence is accurate.42 This 
noble intention is devalued, however, as we remember that—"non 
other auctour alegge I"—the source of the vision and all its sentence 
is none other than Geffrey's dream. As if to underscore this increas­
ing hollowness of the authorial voice as the final vision of Fame and 
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Rumour approach, notice, as in the opening of the Book of the Duch­
ess, Chaucer's careful, self-effacing use of quotation here. Here, 
Chaucer's (or perhaps Geffrey's) source is Paradiso I (lines 13-27) 
and the translation is accurate but punctuated with asides and other 
elements which deflate its original high seriousness. Specifically, 
lines 1104-05, a stumbling appositive explaining to Apollo what he 
means, are an emblem of Geffrey's and the poem's increasing ner­
vousness with discourse, with the poetic art, and even with simple 
reference. Further, like "I have gret wonder, be thys lyght," in the 
Book of the Duchess, this eclectic moment in the Hous of Fame 
bungles its lush source with excess and indecorous detail: while 
Dante says that he will make himself a laurel crown in honor of 
Apollo, Geffrey promises to kiss the tree. 
Moments like these are not examples of Chaucer's fabled default 
of high seriousness: they are serious indeed, though their serious­
ness derives from Chaucerian sentence and not "craft," a poetic art 
that uses the dreamer-persona as a foil for the reader and not as a 
representative. Such moments are, again, moments of narrative 
normalization, moments when the perspective of the poetic per­
sona is gently subverted to involve the reader fully in the developing 
drama of the dream vision. 
It is hard to tell whether Apollo answers Geffrey's prayer here, 
but it is easy to see that the object of Geffrey's description is not 
conducive to pithy rime emphasizing sentence. Atop the mount of 
icy words—a perfect emblem for the contingency of language— 
Geffrey beholds the palace, itself all craft no sentence: 
And eke in ech of the pynacles 
Weren sondry habitacles, 
In which stoden, al withoute— 
Ful the castel, al aboute— 
Of alle maner of mynstralles, 
And gestiours, that tellen tales 
Both of wepinge and of game, 
Of al that longeth unto Fame. 
Ther herde I pleyen on an harpe 
That sowned bothe wel and sharpe, 
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Orpheus, ful craftely, 
And on his syde, faste by, 
Sat the harper Orion, 
And Eacides Chiron, 
And other harpers many oon, 
And the Bret Glascurion; 
And smale harpers with her glees 
Sate under hem in dyvers sees, 
And gunne on hem upward to gape, 
And countrefete hem as an ape, 
Or as craft countrefeteth kynde. 
(lines 1193-1213) 
The word "craft" here, which appeared with negative connotations 
only a hundred lines earlier in the Invocation (line 1100), empha­
sizes the richness and splendor of the palace, but it should also rep­
resent a caution to the reader. In each of the "pynacles" craft is 
visible counterfeiting not "kynde" but more craft—recall the several 
removes at which Geffrey received the Aeneid story. Further, it is 
relevant to note that the "smale harpers" of line 1209, playing the 
very instrument that the eagle used to illustrate the insubstantiality 
of sound, look up to and "ape" not real historical characters but 
Orpheus, Orion, Chiron, and Glascurion, figures from myth and 
literature. 
The events of Book Three, while spectacular, need not detain us 
here. They are, once more, a continuous emblem of the contingency 
and capriciousness of written, literary discourse, which bestows au­
thority on Augustine's "vibrations of the air" simply when the oral, 
airy words are written down, "authored." This intimation of the 
truth that has lain latent throughout the poem brings the Hous of 
Fame to a thematic, though not dramatic, climax. The descriptions 
of the Domus Dedaly and of the goddess Fame, with their rich and 
wondrous detail, are final proof for the reader that Fame is a capri­
cious lady who regales true or false noise as she will (the lesson of 
Book One), and that the raw material for such "befaming" is the 
sonic flotsam and jetsam merrily warehoused across the road from 
her palace (the lesson of Book Two).43 
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In the end, the Hous of Fame transcends even its own form. The 
poem ends, not with the reawakening of the dreamer and the conse­
quent return to the lyric mode, but with an ellipsis within the dream, 
making this poem quite literally the dream vision from which we do 
not awaken. Many argue sensibly that the poem is merely unfin­
ished and there is not solid evidence to settle the issue finally, but I 
am forced to side with those who see the poem as a complete work of 
art, even if it is unfinished grammatically: 
I herde a gret noyse withalle 
In a corner of the halle, 
Ther men of love-tydynges tolde, 
And I gan thiderward beholde; 
For I saugh rennynge every wight, 
As faste as that they hadden myght; 
And everych cried, "What thing is that?" 
And somme sayde, "I not never what." 
And whan they were alle on an hepe, 
Tho behynde begunne up lepe, 
And clamben up on other faste, 
And up the nose and yen kaste, 
And troden fast on others heles, 
And stampen, as men doon aftir eles. 
Atte laste y saugh a man, 
Which that y nevene nat ne kan; 
But he semed for to be 
A man of gret auctorite. . . . 
(lines 2141-58) 
I need not rehearse the several theories raised to explain these lines 
or, more improbably, to identify the "man of gret auctorite"; the 
controversy will endure as long will the Hous of Fame itself.441 wish 
only to suggest a rhetorical force for the lines, not a meaning but a 
strategy. As we have seen, the Hous of Fame is a series of failed 
attempts to locate fruit amidst the chaff, truth within the welter of 
authorities and, throughout, Geffey has been the naive, troubled but 
always intrepid searcher for these. We have watched his face fall as 
the Dido authorities dismantled themselves before his eyes, shared 
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his morbid curiosity as the eagle demythologized human language, 
and watched in knowing amusement his futile search for a stable 
basis for fame. The lessons have all been negative, and the reader 
has learned them all. 
Has Geffrey? The answer must be no. Disappointment after dis­
appointment has not daunted him: he has pressed on despite our 
growing surety that his search for stability amid contingency will be 
a failure. At the end of the poem, Geffrey is literally and figuratively 
incarcerated in his own nightmare world—the poem does not allow 
him to awaken—for Geffrey's dream of final authority and unpol­
luted truth in this world is one from which the mind does not allow 
escape. 
Awakening and escape can only come through the will, and the 
choice offered the free will of readers of the Hous of Fame can best 
be expressed in the terms that I introduced in chapter 4 above. The 
Hous of Fame has no third stage, no ultimate return to the lyric 
mode and reassertion of the identity of the two dreamer-figures. 
Thus, if a reader sees this poem as unfinished, then this reader is 
incarcerated, like Geffrey, in the dark irrelevancy of the cuniculus 
figurarum, trapped in the bowels of the poem instead of being liber­
ated at the terminus of the maze.45 Like Geffrey, this reader is 
doomed forever to follow the mob in the Domus Dedaly in search of 
the recognizable word of truth in all that noise. 
So the choice is to "stay" in the poem with Geffrey or to "Awak!" 
as the eagle commanded, to impose one's own personal lyric closure 
on this dream vision, to recreate Geffrey the dreamer and to under­
stand the futility of the quest, to forsake forever the search for truth 
among men, even those of "gret auctorite . . . ." 
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T | or a variety of reasons, the dream vision is a late medieval 
J ^ ^  ' phenomenon: while poems of this form can be found in 
 J ancient and modern literature alike, they lack for the most 
part the vigor and immediacy of those written in the fourteenth 
century. 
In part, as I have argued, this flowering of the form is the result of 
a confluence of literary and philosophical currents, notably the ma­
turity of the notion of the fabulous narrative, the derivative nature 
of medieval dream lore, the rise of conceptualism. These factors 
came together in the later Middle Ages to offer new challenges and 
new freedoms to poets. Most crucial to dream vision poets, however, 
was the freedom to depict simultaneously the way of the world and 
the way of the mind, to offer a speculum mundi whose images were 
dangerously ambivalent. Were these images true reflections of the 
world observed and captured in the consciousness of the dreamer-
poet? Or are they waves and imperfections in the glass and thus 
revelatory more of the glass' character than of the scene reflected? 
The dream vision was a way to exploit this ambivalence and, as 
we have seen, the great dream visions of the fourteenth century 
returned insistently to this theme of authority and vision, reflection 
and refraction, personal and universal revelation. Chaucer especially 
found in the dream vision a useful device for evading authorial au­
thority: his Geffreys speak with the authority only of dreamers, and 
require their readers to decide whether they have any claim to 
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broader revelations. We must decide in part by intuiting how like we 
are to these Geffreys (is this glass imperfect as ours is?) and in part 
by judging how well the vision coheres with ours (is the scene 
viewed through the glass familiar to us?). 
Seen in this way, the fourteenth century dream vision is a won­
drous authorial disappearing act, the sceptical poetic form which 
requires readers to pass simultaneous judgment on vision and vi­
sionary. Unlike the traditional allegorical forms of the Middle Ages, 
the dream vision made the personality (and occasionally the pathol­
ogy) of the poet-dreamer as central to the experience as the icono­
graphic terrain of the vision. This insistence—on the imperfections 
in the speculum—is what gives the dream vision its stunningly cir­
cular experience: we can know the vision only if we accept the dream­
er, while we can know the dreamer only in accepting the dream (see 
above, pp. 9 and 14). 
Apart from its rhetorical effectiveness, this interdependence of 
dream and dreamer is a profound gesture of respect for readers, 
invited but not required to partake of the visions of Pearl or of the 
fair field full of folk or of the palace of fame. As I have suggested 
above, the evasive lyricism of the form is the source of this libera­
tion: neither quite a narrative nor quite a lyric, the dream vision 
draws drama and objectivity from the former, passion and involve­
ment from the latter, and allows the reader to choose which 
responses—which mode, in effect—to accept. 
This subtlety, even fragility, of the dream vision is the subject of 
this epilogue. I will examine here a very few late medieval and post-
medieval poems which seem to have lost or misplaced some of the 
energy we have seen in the form. This examination may then sug­
gest reasons why the form's flowering was so short-lived, and spe­
cifically why Renaissance dream visions and related poems seem 
pale and errant compared to the masterpieces of the fourteenth cen­
tury. These exemplary theses can only suggest and illustrate—not 
demonstrate—the erosion of the form: the currents under discus­
sion here are too broad to permit a thorough examination. 
The anonymous satire "Mum and the Sothesegger," written 
probably within ten years of the death of Chaucer, strikingly illus­
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trates the fragility of the form. The dream vision included in the 
poem begins at line 875, after a lengthy debate between the narrator 
and "Mum," a personification of silence in the face of abuses in the 
Henrican court. Weakened by the confrontation, the narrator wan­
ders until he nearly drops from exhaustion: 
Yit was I not the wiser for way that I wente, 
This made me all mad, as I moste nede, 
And well fleuble and faint, and fell to the grounde, 
And lay down on a linche to lithe my bones, 
Rolling in remembrance my renning aboute 
And alle the perillous pathes that I passed had, 
As priories amd personages and pluralites, 
Abbayes of Augustin and other holy places, 
To knightes courtes and crafty men many, 
To mayers and maisters, men of high wittes, 
And to the felle freres, alle the foure ordres, 
And other hobbes a heep, as ye herd have, 
And nought the neer by a note! This noyed me ofte, 
That thurgh construing of clerkes that knewe alle bokes 
That Mum sholde be maister most upon erthe.1 
The weight of these thoughts induces sleep and the dream of the 
Sothesegger: 
And ere I were ware, a wink me assailled, 
That I slepte sadly seven houres large. 
Thenne mette I of mervailles mo than me luste . . . 
(lines 869-71) 
These "mervailles" ultimately center on the "Truthteller" who, like 
Justinus in the Merchant's Tale, can say what needs to be said, and 
whose example inspires the narrator to disclose his "bag of truths" 
to the king. 
Even given the fact that the dream frame is here only part of a 
larger and looser satiric framework, we can clearly see that "Mum 
and the Sothesegger" is out of touch with the subtlety and complex­
ity of the Chaucerian dream vision. Most obviously, personification 
and realism interpenetrate the dream-world and the waking world: 
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the disputation with Mum precedes the dream, a nicety forgivable in 
political satire certainly, but one not to be found in Pearl or Piers 
Plowman. This detail—which shows that the dream does not repre­
sent a modal shift from the phenomenal to the figmental—is a cru­
cial one. If Mum is recognizable in the waking world, then there is 
no psychological or artistic reason requiring the dream frame for the 
introduction of the Sothesegger. More than this, the dream frame 
here lacks the ambivalence of the more traditional pattern: because 
Mum is our waking experience in common with the dreamer's, we 
have no reason to entertain suspicions that the Sothesegger is a 
figmentum, that momentary uncertainty that is so central to the 
dream vision. If, simply depressed at the corruption of the court, the 
narrator dreamed of the Sothesegger, the reader could wonder for a 
moment if the dream were a wish fulfillment. We are not allowed 
that moment here. 
Further, the crucial motif of the "dreamer's distress" is, paradoxi­
cally, missing here. The diatribe of lines 854-68 certainly indicates 
distress, but the dreamer's discomfiture has none of the psychic 
energy that empowers the classical dream vision. Closest to the sur­
face, this passage differs from the "dreamer's distress" in that the 
source of the distress is identified: unlike readers of the Hous of 
Fame or the Book of the Duchess, for example, we know precisely 
what is troubling this narrator because he tells us. As I have argued 
above, the mystery surrounding the introduction of this "dreamer's 
distress" is central because it isolates the dreamer-poet from the 
reader and creates the tensions that motivate the dream vision. Be­
cause the "dreamer's distress" here is indistinguishable from reason­
able and laudable political diatribe, the passage does not separate the 
dreamer from the readers as do the mysterious ailments of Long 
Will, the jeweler, or the various Geffreys: because it is specified and 
righteous, the distress actually unifies the dreamer and the reader. 
This man's sensibilities are ours. 
I am not suggesting here that "Mum and the Sothesegger" is a bad 
poem or that it would have been a better poem if it were a more 
classic dream vision. I am suggesting that it is a poem whose author 
was acquainted with the dream vision but who was out of sympathy 
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with it. There are easily enough traditional motifs here to illustrate 
that the poet of "Mum and the Sothesegger" knew Piers Plowman 
(for example); the use of these motifs here shows equally clearly 
that the poet did not appreciate the subtle conceptual hold which 
Piers Plowman exerts on its readers. For this satirist, the dream is 
simply a vehicle for solving his narrator's problem: there is no hint 
here of the ambivalence that haunts the Hous of Fame or Piers 
Plowman. Like The Kingis Quahir (the Parlement of Foules) or 
Lydgate's "Complaynt of a Loveres Lyfe" (the Book of the Duchess), 
this poem seems inarguably inspired by a dream vision but only in 
the most superficial ways. The complex arrangement of parts and 
the fragility of their operation are lost on this poet, for whom they 
have become merely traditional or conventional motifs. 
As a second example of the obsolescence of the dream vision, we 
can turn to The Temple of Glass, a poem religiously adherent to the 
conventions of the form and to its undisguised model (the Hous of 
Fame), but for all this, a poem unable to capture the spirit and com­
plexity of its original. The Temple of Glass begins with a virtual 
precis of the state of the dreamer in the Hous of Fame: 
For thou3t, constreint and greuous heuines,

For pensifhede, and for hei3 distres,

To bed I went nov \>is o\>ir ny3t

Whan J?at Lucina wij? hir pale li^t

Was ioyned last wij? Phebus in Aquarie,

Amyd Decembre, when of Ianuarie

Ther be kalendes of \>e nwe yere,

And derk Diane, ihorned, noting clere,

Had hir bemys vndir a mysty cloude . . ?

The difference between this opening and "God turne us every 
drem to goode" nicely typifies the difference between medieval and 
Renaissance dream visions. Chaucer's character embodies what 
Lydgate's only describes: Lydgate's opening strains to include all of 
the salient diagnostic details at the expense of a credible patient, 
while Chaucer, fully in touch with his form, simply allows his dream­
er to take shape on his page. The real problem with the Lydgate 
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dreamer is thus his meticulousness: with a stunning vocabulary and 
nicely measured phrases, he declares in stark, objective, clinical 
terms that he is beset to the point of distraction. The point of the 
"dreamer's distress" is, again, to awaken suspicions as to his credibil­
ity and visionary fitness: this dreamer sounds, his assertions not­
withstanding, just fine, nothing like the haggard Geffrey, blessing 
himself and rambling about the uncertainty of dreams. Lydgate stud­
ied the form so well that he missed its point. 
But Lydgate continues his imitation of the Hous of Fame: 
Wi f>in my bed for sore I gan me shroude, 
Al desolate for constreint of my wo, 
The longe ny3t waloing to and fro, 
Til atte laste, er I gan taken kepe, 
Me did oppresse a sodein dedeli slepe, 
WiJ?in J?e which me [?ou3te \>at I was 
Rauysshid in spirit in a temple of glas— 
I nyste how, ful fer in wildirnes— 
That foundid was, as bi liklynesse, 
Not opon stele, but on a craggy roche, 
Like ise ifrore. 
(lines 10-20) 
And so the dream begins, indistinguishable from the popular icon­
ographic visions, waking and sleeping, that are so common in fif­
teenth century English poetry. There are neither characters nor dia­
logue for over three hundred lines, at which the Lady, involved in an 
adulterous love triangle, begins an ornate appeal to Venus. In the 
course of the entire poem, the narrator remains an observer, anx­
ious only that he might forget crucial details of the vision (lines 
1369-77). 
In many ways, The Temple of Glass is the subtlest and most faith­
ful of the fifteenth century dream visions: its only departure from 
the paradigm is in its one-dimensional narrator, a figure all but for­
gotten once the dream begins. There is in Lydgate none of the lyri­
cism of the Chaucerian personae, for, in truth, the poems are no 
longer about these figures and their relationship to the readers. 
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These poems and the visions of Hoccleve, Henryson, Dunbar, and 
Spenser are truly obsolescent dream visions, poems that keep alive 
the forms of the old poetic kind without the energy that produced it. 
Why did the dream vision grow so old, look so tattered, so soon? 
Among the reasons we could consider might be the rise of science 
and the parallel collapse of Scholasticism and the oneiromantic tra­
dition which was a part of it. The Renaissance was, if anything, 
more inquisitive and credulous about dreams, visions, and the occult 
than the fourteenth century sceptics were and, with the withdrawal 
of a church which forbade revelation in dreams, the Renaissance 
could fantasize more freely than the Middle Ages did.3 
A related cause is the rapid decline in speculative philosophy, espe­
cially conceptualism. We have seen that the dream vision works 
only within a very carefully articulated psychology, one associated 
with only the first and second generation or conceptualists and nom­
inalists in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. As Gordon Leff 
and others have shown, later developments in conceptualist or nom­
inalist thought, those of Nicholas of Autrecourt or John of Mire-
court, for example, degraded what was initially a carefully conceived 
critique of Platonism into riddles, conundra, and attacks on the pos­
sibility of a divine nature. Fifteenth century nominalists at the uni­
versities, speaking their own language of contradiction and absur­
dity, become the butts of student satires and ultimately, the 
personifications of a senescent theology ridiculed, attacked, and fi­
nally forsaken by the Reformation. 
With conceptualism, the Renaissance lost the conceptualist im­
age of communion or communication as the synonymy of two per­
sons' figmenta, and without this notion, there is no drama in 
another man's dream. In the instant when one mind embraces the 
icons of another, the conceptualists revealed a sympathy more pow­
erful than any that mere rhetoric could produce. Without this psy­
chology of the individual, the by-product of Scotus and Ockham, the 
dream vision had no purpose. 
The most compelling reason for the dramatic disappearance of 
the dream vision was not political or philosophical or psychological: 
it was a literary reason. Put simply, the Renaissance rediscovered 
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lyricism, the immediate depiction of powerful emotions in verse, a 
discovery which made the fragile, complex, allusive structure of the 
old dreams useless. Of what use are feints and slights, self-
effacement and misdirection, frames and persona, in an age whose 
poetic herald is Thomas Wyatt: 
They fie from me that sometyme did me seke 
With naked fote stalking in my chambre. 
I have sene theim gentill tame and meke 
That nowe are wyld and do not remembre 
That sometyme they put theimself in daunger 
To take bred at my hand; and nowe they raunge 
Besely seking with a continuell chaunge.4 
This is neither the vulnerable voice of Geffrey nor the cold voice of 
Lydgate: this persona boldly drops without warning into extended 
metaphor. He knows the reader cares about his life and his feelings; 
he feels no need to assert higher or universal import to his expe­
riences. They are here presented—emotions, experiences, mem­
ories—in a new dramatic language which needs no frame. 
Thancked be fortune, it hath ben othrewise 
Twenty tymes better; but ons in speciall, 
In thyn arraye after a pleasaunt gyse, 
When her lose gowne from her shoulders did fall, 
And she me caught in her armes long and small; 
Therewithall swetely did me kysse, 
And softely saide, dere hert, howe like you this? 
(lines 8-14) 
The lyric continues, creating its persona as a character neither by 
description nor by dream report; what we learn of this man we 
surmise, from errant turns of phrase, from the erupting bitterness 
as the metaphor (among other things) is dropped, from the sudden, 
passionate encounter. The picture of the embittered lover that 
Wyatt creates here in seven lines would have taken Chaucer a poem 
the size of the Book of the Duchess to achieve—though only because 
this new lyricism would have seemed to Chaucer a brash and vulgar 
shorthand. 
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It was no dreme; I lay brode waking. 
But all is torned thorough my gentilnes 
Into a straunge fasshion of forsaking; 
And I have leve to goo of her goodenes, 
And she also to use new fangilnes. 
But syns that I so kyndely ame served, 
I would fain knowe what she hath deserved. 
(lines 15-21) 
Thus, what for Chaucer would have been a "straunge fasshion" 
and "new fangilnes" is a poetry written by and for people who are 
ready to express, accept, and sympathize with the deepest and most 
powerful emotions, writers and readers who do not need the device 
of the shared dream to knit together their individual sensibilities. A 
tide had turned, the oldest verities had been questioned and even 
forsaken, a new poetry had replaced the old. 
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Introduction 
1. Compare Tzvetan Todorov's sense of the requirements for responsible genre 
criticism: 
[A genre study] must constantly satisfy requirements of two orders: 
practical and theoretical, empirical and abstract. The genres we de­
duce from the theory must be verified by reference to the texts: if our 
deductions fail to correspond to any work, we are on a false trail. On 
the other hand, the genres which we encounter in literary history 
must be subject to the explanation of a coherent theory; otherwise we 
remain imprisioned by prejudices transmitted from century to cen­
tury, and according to which (an imaginary example) there exists a 
genre such as comedy, which is in fact a pure illusion. The definition of 
genres will therefore be a continual oscillation between the descrip­
tion of phenomena and abstract theory. 
Tzvetan Todorov, The Fantastic: A Structural Approach to a Literary Genre, tr. 
Richard Howard (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975), 21. 
2. "Convention as Structure: The Prologue to the Canterbury Tales" MP 49 
(1952): 172-81; reprint in Tradition and Poetic Structure: Essays in Literary His­
tory and Criticism (Denver: Alan Swallow, I960). 
3. See Donald R. Howard, The Idea of the Canterbury Tales (Berkeley: Univer­
sity of California Press, 1978), 30-35. The earlier tradition, that sees the reference 
to "some comedye" as Chaucer's promise of a treatment of love's saints to match 
the Troilus (making the "comedye" a reference to the Legend of Good Women), is 
articulated in J. S. P. Tatlock's classic essay, "The Epilog of Chaucer's Troilus" MP 
18 (1921): 625-59. 
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4. See F. X. Newman, "Somnium: Medieval Theories of Dreaming and the 
Form of Vision Poetry" (Ph. D. diss., Princeton, 1963), 253-331, for a complete 
discussion of typical or frequent motifs in dream-poetry, including the naive dream­
er, the book as a soporific, the locus amoenus, the river, and many others. It is 
impossible to quarrel with Newman's collection of such motifs, but, as I argue 
above, their presence needs to be shown to be necessary for the operation of the 
poem, or at least integral to its technique. For another discussion of the motif of the 
dreamer reading, see Sheila Delaney, Chaucer's House of Fame: The Poetics of 
Skeptical Fideism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 40. 
5. This distinction is itself a good index to the eclectic diversity of the form. The 
talking birds of the Parlement of Foules seem to be descendents of earlier talking 
animals in the French love visions of the thirteenth century (and possibly as well of 
talking birds in folk literature and allegories of the "Owl and Nightengale" variety). 
The eagle of the Hous of Fame, however, is a comic Chaucerian version of Dante's 
eagle (and therefore derived ultimately from the iconography of the Apocalypse), 
all of which makes it unlikely that even this frequent or common motif is pre­
scribed. All dream visions contain odd, and, in fairness, preternatural things, but 
the fact that the sources of these additions are so various and diverse—allegory, folk 
literature, eschatology, etc.—suggests that their inclusion in the poems is a device 
of dream-verisimilitude or "dream mimesis" rather than a conventional signpost of 
some sort. 
6. The list of such studies is daunting. Among earlier essays on the figure of the 
dreamer, see James R. Kreutzer, "The Dreamer in the Book of the Duchess" 
PMLA 66 (1951): 543-71; Donald C. Baker, "The Dreamer Again in the Book of 
the Duchess" PMLA 70 (1955): 279-82; Stephen Manning, "That Dreamer Once 
More," PMLA 71 (1956): 540-41; R. M. Lumiansky, "The Bereaved Narrator in 
Chaucer's The Book of the Duchess" TSE9 (1959): 5-17; and so on. Similar bibli­
ographies can be generated for Pearl, the Hous of Fame, and Piers Plowman. Per­
haps the best general discussion can be found in A. C. Spearing's Medieval Dream-
Poetry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976),especially 4-5,28-29, and 
73ff. For additional bibliography and a reinterpretation of the problem of the Book 
of the Duchess narrator, see Barbara Nolan, "The Art of Expropriation: Chaucer's 
Narrator in the Book of the Duchess" in New Perspectives in Chaucer Criticism, 
ed. Donald Rose (Norman: Pilgrim, 1981), 203-22. 
7. M. Tullius Ciceronis, De Re Publica, ed. K. Ziegler (Leipzig: Teubner, 1969), 
126; tr. H. A. Rice in The Norton Anthology of World Masterpieces, ed. Maynard 
Mack et al, 4th ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1979), I, 572-73. 
8. See Newman, pp. 70-77, on Macrobius' acceptance of the Somnium Scipionis 
as a comprehensive philosophical vision, and Paule Demats, Fabula: Trois Etudes 
de Mythographie antique et medievale (Geneva: Droz, 1973), 19 ff. for discussion. 
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9. See Ziegler's introduction, pp. xxxvi-xxxix, for the manuscript history. 
10. Ziegler, pp. 135-36; tr. Rice, pp. 578-79. 
11. Cf. Newman, pp. 326-31, on the dazed, naive dreamer, and how this allows 
the dream vision to depict truths freed from the personal credibility of this dreamer. 
12. Discussions of the notion alluded to here, that ancient and medieval people's 
minds work in ways qualitatively different from ours, range in expression from 
Carolly Erickson's measured meditation in The Medieval Vision: Essays in History 
and Perception (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), through the careful 
collaborative research of Jacques LeGoff in Time, Work, and Culture in the Middle 
Ages, tr. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), to the 
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not mark its whereabouts on any map. And, when we stand at the 
doorway of Hell and look back to where we were before, if we ask 
207 
NOTES TO PAGES 18-22 
ourselves where that was, we know that we may not exactly say. But 
that is not the important point. The point is that the scene was de­
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2. Todorov, The Fantastic, 25. 
3. Cf. Giuseppi Mazzotta: 
208 
NOTES TO PAGES 23-33 
The poem [the Commedia], it must be stressed, is neither the imita­
tion of God's way of writing nor a prodigious crystal, an idolatrous 
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Dante: Poet of the Desert: History and Allegory in the Divine Comedy (Princeton: 
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12. A survey of Church Fathers on this subject can be found in Morton Kelsey, 
God, Dreams, and Revelation: A Christian Interpretation of Dreams (Minneapo­
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18. PL 32, col. 692; tr. Ryan, 91. 
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Caillois (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), especially 304; and E. R. 
Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
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17. On the interpretation of dreams in this work, see Artemidorus of Daldis, 
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Doubleday Image, 1960), 83. 
24. PL 40, cols. 591ff. 
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be found in the writings of Richard Rolle: 
The fyrste comandement es, "Thy Lorde God bou sail loue and til 
him anely bou sail serve." In this comandement es forboden all maw­
matryse, all wychecrafte and charemynge, the wylke may do na 
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form itself is ambiguous, either "the product of divine inspiration or . .  . the ex­
pression of a merely human mood or fantasy" (p. 5). 
2. Guillaume de Lorris et Jean de Meun, he Roman de la Rose, ed. Felix Lecoy 
(Paris: Librarie Honore Champion, 1965), 1,4; tr. Geoffrey Chaucer in The Com­
plete Works of Geoffrey Chaucer, ed. Fred Norris Robinson, 2nd ed. (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1961), 566. 
3. Viktor Shklovsky, "Tristram Shandy Sterna: Stili stick e sky kommentary" in 
Sterniiteoriya romana (Petrograd, 1921); tr. as "Stern's Tristram Shandy: Stylistic 
Commentary" by Lee T. Lemon and Marion J. Reis, eds., Russian Formalist Criti­
cism: Four Essays (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1965), esp. 57: 
The idea of plot is too often confused with the description of events— 
what I propose provisionally to call the story. The story is, in fact, only 
material for plot formulation. The plot of Eugene Onegin is, there­
fore, not the romance of the hero with Tatyana, but the fashioning of 
the subject of this story as produced by the introduction of disrupting 
digressions. 
Such a distinction works quite nicely for the dream vision, the plot of which, ulti­
mately, is similarly the fashioning of a subject—the dreamer—a figure which will 
become both subject and object in the final analysis. 
4. Lecoy, 1,44-45; Chaucer, 579. See Kevin Brownlee, Poetic Identity in Guil­
laume de Machaut (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1977), 12 on "dedou­
blement" in Guillaume de Lorris. 
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5. Lecoy, 1, 45; Chaucer, 579. 
6. Lecoy, 1, 47; Chaucer, 579. 
7. John Fleming makes this point—the irrelevance of the well's sentence as 
interpreted by Amant—quite forcefully: The glossator's perspective on the well 
"has much in common with that which sees Othello as a warning that ladies should 
look after their linen." The Roman de la Rose: A Study in Allegory and Iconog­
raphy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 96. 
8. Lecoy, 1, 47; Chaucer, 579. 
9. Compare Sheila Delay: The dream vision form " . .  . involved the reader 
more intimately than straightforward narrative, for the reader becomes both the 
interpreter of the dream and the judge of its truth," Chaucer's House of Fame: The 
Poetics of Skeptical Fideism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 38. In 
fact, as I show below, the involvement of the reader is more intimate and complex 
than even this quotation suggests, since the status of the dream (and hence of the 
dreamer) are yet two more separate but interdependent interpretive problems for 
the reader. 
10. William Langland, Piers Plowman: The Prologue and Passus I-VIIofthe B 
Text as Found in Bodleian MS. Laud 381, ed. J. A. W. Bennett (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1972), 1, lines 11-20. 
11. Pearl, ed. E. V. Gordon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953, rpt. 1972), 
9-10, lines 241-52. 
12. The Dream Thought of Piers Plowman (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1974), 25. 
13. Cf. Paul Piehler, The Visionary Landscape: A Study in Medieval Allegory 
(Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1971), 19, 144-62 (the chapter on 
Pearl), for the dream allegory as a therapeutic experience. 
14. Compare Kirk: 
In places this method succeeds in transmitting to the reader the vivid 
immediacy and almost intolerable pressure of actual dreams, in which 
we are taken possession of by something we can recognize as our own 
experience but stripped of the controls and modulations conscious­
ness can always impose on empathy. In such states, complete empathy 
and total strangeness coexist. {Dream Thought, p. 181] 
Chapter Five 
1. I argue this in detail in "Lady Meed, Parsons, and the Piers Plowman Visio," 
Mediaevalia 5 (1982): 239-57. 
2. This is a fairly radical departure from the critical tradition on the Book of the 
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Duchess. In his diplomatic survey of the critical literature on the poem in Compan­
ion to Chaucer Studies (ed. Beryl Rowland [New York: Oxford University Press, 
1968]), D. W. Robertson can legitimately begin, "The Book of the Duchess is an 
elegy for Blanche, Duchess of Lancaster, who died of the plague on September 12, 
1369" (p. 332). Although Robertson's survey shows that there has been consider­
able movement within this basically elegiac definition—notably his own and Ber­
nard Huppe's Fruyt and Chaf—we are only now beginning to question this funda­
mental view of the poem. See, for example, Barbara Nolan, "The Art of 
Expropriation: Chaucer's Narrator in The Book of the Duchess in New Perspec­
tives in Chaucer Criticism, ed. Donald Rose (Norman: Pilgrim Books, 1981), 
203-22; R. A. Shoaf," 'Mutatio Amoris': 'Penitentia' and the form of The Book of 
the Duchess," Genre 14 (1981): 163-89; "Stalking the Sorrowful H(e)art: 
Penitential Lore and the Hunt Scene in Chaucer's The Book of the Duchess" JEGP 
79 (1980): 313-24. 
3. Throughout this discussion and that of the Hous of Fame, I will consistently 
refer to the Chaucerian dreamer-narrator and dreamer-character as "Geffrey" 
when there is no reason to distinguish between character and narrator. I will use 
"Chaucer" consistently to refer to the poet. 
4. Cf. Nolan, "The Art of Expropriation" and John Gardner, "Style as Meaning 
in the Book of the Duchess," Language and Style 2 (1969), for whom the Book of 
the Duchess is a dilation on "the uplifting force of love" (p. 145) developed through 
a critical dramatization of the artificial courtly language of French poetry. 
5. "Routhe" or "reuthe" is, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, a word 
with a decidedly Anglo-Saxon flavor. The OED's earliest entries for the word are in 
the twelfth century, but the root of "routhe," probably Old English "reccan" ("to 
care") is much older. There is, of course, no hard evidence that Chaucer deliberately 
chose "routhe" over the newer, French "pitee" to emphasize plainness or rusticity, 
but, given the overall French flavor of the Book of the Duchess, the word does jar. 
6. Quoted in D. S. Brewer, ed., Chaucer and Chaucerians: Critical Studies in Mid­
dle English Literature (University: University of Alabama Press, 1967), 2; my 
thanks to Professor Rupert Pickens of the University of Kentucky for help with the 
translation. See also Nolan, "The Art of Expropriation," especially 209, and Phillip 
Boardman, "Courtly Language and the Strategy of Consolation in the Book of the 
Duchess" ELH1A (1977): 567-79. 
7. Brewer, 3. 
8. Charles Muscatine (in Chaucer and the French Tradition: A Study in Style and 
Meaning [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957]) sees this double thrust of 
the conventionality of the poem: 
The style of the Book of the Duchess, then, shows two concurrent 
movements in the light of the French tradition: one toward a func­
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tional use of courtly convention, the other toward a realism that sug­
gests comic disenchantment, (p. 107) 
9. See Nolan, "The Art of Expropriation," 217, for Ceys and Alcion. 
10. Mother Angela Carson, O. S. U., in "Easing the 'Hert' in The Book of the 
Duchess," Chaucer Review 1 (1966): 156-66 sees the story of Ceys and Alcion as 
told "matter-of-factly and at a quick tempo" with "the impression of indifference 
rather than compassion on the part of the narrator" (p. 157). 
11. Compare Muscatine: 
To "thilke Morpheus" he [Geffrey] makes a comically literal offer of a 
featherbed, then throws into the bargain an array of bedroom finery 
that would do credit to a mercer's apprentice; for sleep he will pay 
Juno too. Here are the makings of him who rimed the tale of Sir 
Thopas. (p. 104) 
This may overstate it a bit—the bed comes from Machaut—but Muscatine is correct 
that Geffrey thoroughly botches the detail with tastelessness and a bourgeois nose 
for the price tag. 
12. R. A. Shoaf in "Stalking the Sorrowful H(e)art," (p. 316), sees the whelp as 
an image of the penitent's conscience, which chases the fox (sins) into its den (the 
heart of the penitent). On this point he cites Le Uvre de Seyntz Medecines of Henry 
de Gourmont, father of Blanche of Lancaster. If this association is intended, then 
the whelp is clearly more than a transitional device, though finally these penitential 
associations do not argue against this present reading. If the Book of the Duchess is 
about communication and communion, then the whelp, in bringing together Gef­
frey and the Black Knight, represents the wordless will to sympathy. 
13. In conventional expectations, see Muscatine, especially 98-101; Alfred 
David (in The Strumpet Muse: Art and Morals in Chaucer's Poetry [Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1976]): "[In the Book of the Duchess] . . . the audience 
is prepared to hear an allegory of love" (p. 18); and W. H. French (in "The Man in 
Black's Lyric," JEGP, 56 [1957]): "He [Geffrey] is a confirmed lover on the most 
approved courtly model . . . " (p. 236). 
14. For another view, see John M. Steadman, "Chaucer's 'Whelp': A Symbol of 
Marital Fidelity," Notes and Queries, 1 (1956): 374-75. 
15. For the various views on the reaction to the lament, see note 4 to the Intro­
duction above; Robertson {Companion to Chaucer Studies), especially 333-34; 
A. C. Spearing, Medieval Dream-Poetry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1976), esp. 66-68; and Muscatine, who describes the narrator's " . .  . kinship 
with the Man in Black—they are both disappointed lovers,—but his characteriza­
tion is such that we cannot take his affairs so seriously" (p. 103). 
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16. French, p. 241: 
Himself a person out of the pages of Ovid, Guillaume de Lords, Ma­
chaut, Froissart and the rest, he supposed he saw before him another 
of the same breed. 
17. Compare Nolan: 
As the argument of the Duchess proceeds, we come to understand that 
this plea for common sense (lines 16-21) points to the poem's most 
serious themes. We will learn that the poetry of feeling and the plati­
tudes of bookish, high-toned consolation cannot fully encompass or 
assuage personal grief. One is faced, finally, with the undecorated 
statement of fact, "She is ded." ["The Art of Expropriation," p. 213] 
18. Compare Gardner: 
Ironically, his [Geffrey's] art is as obscure as the Knight's allegory of 
Fortune. Though we understand his unhappiness in love, just as the 
narrator understands the Knight's grief when he first overhears him 
lamenting in the woods, Chaucer's narrator has failed to make the 
necessary open statement, relinquishing art for self-surrender. ["Style 
as Meaning," p. 170] 
19. For useful summaries of the origins of the formal and doctrinal controversies 
concerning Pearl, see Rene Wellek, "The Pearl: An Interpretation of the Middle 
English Poem," Studies in English by Members of the English Seminar of Charles 
University (1933), rpt. in Sir Gawain and Pearl: CriticalEssays, ed. Robert J. Blanch 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1971), 3-10, and A. C. Spearing, The 
Gawain-Poet: A Critical Study (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 
129, note 1. In brief, the earliest students of the poem, notably ten Brink, Gollancz, 
and Osgood, saw it as an elegy satisfying the father's wish to know that his little 
daughter is in Heaven. Reacting to this view (which grew to encourage excessive 
biographical speculation), a group of critics including Carleton Brown ("The 
Author of Pearl Considered in Light of His Theological Opinions," PMLA, 19 
[ 1904]) and Sister Mary Madeleva (Pearl: A Study in SpiritualDryness [New York: 
Appelton, 1925]) began to treat the poem as allegorical, doctrinal, apocalyptic, or 
otherwise homiletic. Most contemporary analyses of Pearl must by rights be con­
sidered broadly "allegorical," though I single out the discussions of Spearing and 
Blenker below. 
20. The Gawain-Poet: A Critical Study, 96-170. 
21. The Gawain-Poet: A Critical Study, 128. 
22. "The Theological Structure of Pearl" Traditio 24 (1968): 43-75; rpt. in 
Pearl: Critical Essays, ed. John Conley (South Bend: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1970), 220-71. 
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23. On formal similarities between Pearl and the Piers Plowman Visio, see J. 
Stephen Russell, "Meaningless Dreams and Meaningful Poems: The Form of the 
Medieval Dream Vision," Massachusetts Studies in English 7 (1980): 20-32. 
24. Pearl, ed. E. V. Gordon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953, rpt. 1972), 
16, lines 421-28. Hereafter cited in text by line numbers. 
25. On the egotism and self-absorption of the Pearl narrator early in the poem, 
see Lynn Staley Johnson, The Gawain Poet (Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1984), 165ff. 
26. See Johnson, The Gawain Poet, 188-89, on the special appropriateness of 
this tag line. 
27. See Wellek, "The Pearl . . . ," and D. W. Robertson, Jr., "The 'Heresy' of 
Pearl: The Pearl as Symbol," MLN 65 (1950): 152-62, rpt. in Conley, 291-96, 
which illustrate the complexity of the poem's response to the Bradwardinians. 
28. The point of the Visio, in fact, seems to be the irrational and gratuitous 
"mede" of salvation and the challenge this concept presents to the human mind; 
even in his attack on the strumpet Lady Meed in Passus Four, the strait-laced 
character Conscience seems compelled to admit that there is most certainly a sense 
of meed in bono: God's meed of salvation. See Russell, "Lady Meed, Pardons, and 
the Piers Plowman Visio." 
29. PL 175, cols. 116-17; tr. Henry Osborn Taylor, The Medieval Mind (Cam­
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1949), 2, 388-89, quoted in Blenker, 227-28. 
30. I use the term "oracular" here in its technical sense in medieval oneiromancy. 
Spearing, in The Gawain-Poet, 145-52, discusses this context, noting the poignance 
of the inverted parent-child relationship. 
31. The Cloud of Unknowing and the Book of Privy Counselling, ed. William 
Johnston, S. J. (Garden City: Doubleday Image, 1973), 60. For another suggestion 
on mystical connotations in Pearl, see Spearing, The Gawain-Poet, especially 
107-17; Spearing cites Richard of St. Victor on sleep as a metaphor for the true 
contemplative's spiritual openness to divine visitation (p. 115). The conventional 
frame narrative of the apocalypse, however, regularly insists that the visionary is 
not asleep, not even in a "sleep of the senses and passions." 
32. The Cloud of Unknowing, 52. Contemporary "Cloud mysticism," called 
"centering prayer," still emphasizes this emptying of the mind of even excellent 
thoughts and images. Basil Pennington, O. S. C. O., a teacher of centering prayer, 
tells the story of an old Trappist who sought him out troubled after reading injunc­
tions against thoughts and images in prayer. "Does this mean," he asked, "that I 
should struggle against ecstatic visions of Jesus?" Father Basil answered yes. 
The anecdote is relevant because, under the rubric of the dream vision that I am 
suggesting, both the dream and the poem are thrilling impediments to true spirit­
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ual communion. If I am correct about Pearl's deconstruction of the discourse of 
eschatology, then the final lesson of the poem is to cast it away. 
33. Chaucer's House of Fame: The Poetics of Skeptical Fideism (Chicago: Uni­
versity of Chicago Press, 1977). See also Piero Boitani, Chaucer and the Imaginary 
World of Fame (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1984) and Laurence K. Shook's 
"The House of Fame" in Companion to Chaucer Studies, ed. Beryl Rowland (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 241-54, which summarizes the relation­
ships among Syferd, Patch, Ruggiers, and Koonce. 
34. Delany, 3, 34-35. 
35. Walter Clyde Curry, Chaucer and the Mediaeval Sciences (New York: Barnes 
and Noble, 1926, rev. I960), 240; Clive Staples Lewis, The Discarded Image: An 
Introduction to Medieval and Renaissance Literature (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1971), 63-64; and B. G. Koonce Chaucer and the Tradition of Fame: Symbol­
ism in the House of Fame, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 5,46,55. 
36. The fullest account of the Proem to the Hous of Fame is in B. G. Koonce's 
Chaucer and the Tradition of Fame . . . , 45-56. Koonce explicates the Proem 
very carefully, providing patristic analogues for Chaucer's statements about the 
variety of causes for dreams, showing, not surprisingly, that there are solid Scrip­
tural and scientific bases—auctores—for all of Chaucer's contradictory theories 
about dreams. This scholarship is undercut, it seems to me, by Koonce's implicit 
trust in Geffrey's identification of this particular dream as an avisioun and by just 
what this identification might mean. 
Koonce is equally unclear on precisely what the status of a feigned or fictive visio 
or somnium coeleste or what have you might be; real visiones are prophetic, cer­
tainly, but feigned ones, Koonce says, require interpretation (pp. 5-6). This does 
not speak to the status of the content of the dream but addresses only its allegorical 
form. If, as Koonce claims, the Hous of Fame is a fictive visio or somnium, then its 
contents are somehow fictively prophetic, a category rather inscrutable in either 
medieval or modern terms. In any case, even stipulating that Geffrey identifies this 
dream as an avisioun tells us nothing really, for the statement is made rather back­
handedly in a Proem that displays, at best, random oneiric knowledge—including 
six terms for Macrobius' five varieties—and prays twice that everything will turn 
out all right. 
Delany's discussion of the Proem (pp. 36-44) is fittingly more diffuse and ambi­
valent than Koonce's: she claims (as Spearing does in Medieval Dream-Poetry, 
p. 75) that the Proem is an ironic deviation from traditional truth topoi, which 
complicates rather than settling questions of authenticity. 
37. Compare Delany: 
The House of Fame takes us to what, for the poet, is the heart of 
pluralism: the tradition itself. Not incoherency but incongruity is the 
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characteristic of the House of Fame: indeed it is its subject, because 
incongruity is the essence of Fame. (p. 35) 
38. See Larry Sklute, Virtue of Necessity: Inconclusiveness and Narrative Form 
in Chaucer's Poetry (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1984), 138, on "saugh 
I grave." 
39. Compare Boitani, who nicely captures the peculiarly participatory nature of 
the Dido episode: 
Thus Dido's words and the laments resound, not in space, but in the 
mind, in an absolute physical silence. They echo in thought, which can 
then digress and extend to famous cases of betrayed heroines: Chaucer 
drops the formula 'saugh I grave' precisely at the beginning of the 
Dido episode, picking it up again as soon as the latter is finished. In 
silence the Aeneid is recreated and lives on the walls, inscribed by the 
poet's pity, external and intimate at the same time. 
Chaucer and the Imaginary World of Fame (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1984), 
10. 
As a maker himself, Geffrey is implicated or involved in the implicit attack on 
authority and tradition in the Dido episode. See also Jesse Gellrich, The Idea of the 
Book in the Middle Ages (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), especially 184, 
on deciding between Vergil's and Ovid's Dido. 
40. Compare Delany: [In attempting to face the conflicting senses of the histor­
ical Dido,] " . .  . Chaucer grants the validity of conflicting truths and confronts 
the problem with no way of deciding between them" (p. 57). I would agree that 
conflicting claims and their as yet unassailable authority are the themes of this 
poem, but I question Delany's sense that deciding between them is the ultimate 
issue or that the poem counsels acquiescence to double truth. If the Hous of Fame is 
Chaucer's "art poetical" as many have claimed, then it would be more consonant 
with that sense of the poem to hope that Geffrey and the reader might come to 
decide beyond rather than between conflicting authorial claims. I agree, in fact, with 
Donald Howard (in The Idea of the Canterbury Tales [Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1978], 330-32) that the pluralism which emerges in the Hous of 
Fame, both here and especially at its conclusion, make it a fitting introduction or 
preamble to the Canterbury Tales, in which pluralism is an organizing principle as 
well as a theme. 
41. PL 34, col. 38; St. Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, tr. D. W. Robertson, 
Jr., Library of Liberal Arts (New York: Bobbs Merrill, 1958), 36. 
42. Compare Robert B. Burlin: 
The dreamer-narrator listens in a literal-minded way; he sees and 
describes without comment, reads and transcribes without engaged 
224 
NOTES TO PAGES 192-99 
response. He may occasionally be moved to pity and terror, but never 
for long or with sustained seriousness. He resides innocently upon the 
surface of his experiences, shaping and containing them by his pres­
ence, but rarely interpreting or generalizing the powerful sensations 
forced upon him. The dreamer's reactions are arrested at the first 
stage of perception, the Thomist experimentum; he stands before a 
brave new world not of his making, though nominally his by virtue of 
the dream fiction. 
Chaucerian Fictions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 27. 
43. Compare Boitani: 
Chaucer's Fame, suspended between heaven, earth and sea, between 
life and death, does not stand at the end of time, but in a prehistorical, 
eternal present. She creates history by determining who and what will 
survive in the memory of men, and with which connotations. Her 
'dom,' her a-moral judgement, is not history, but historiography. 
(Chaucer and the Imaginary World of Fame, p. 172) 
44. Boitani (Chaucer and the Imaginary World of Fame) cites Inferno IV, line 
113 as an analogue (p. 83). 
45. Compare Boitani (Chaucer and the Imaginary World of Fame): 
When the man of great authority appears in the poem's last line, we 
are back at square one. The auctoritates with whom Geffrey has iden­
tified himself and into whom he has refused to incarcerate himself— 
Virgil, Ovid, Dante—rise again. Chaucer, as the last line's derivation 
from Inferno IV testifies, is about to enter another Castle of Limbo. 
The House of Fame, like a short story by Borges, would repeat itself 
forever, (p. 208) 
and Gellrich (The Idea of the Book in the Middle Ages): 
The "man of gret auctorite" must be anonymous. To search for his 
name is to go in the wrong direction. Chaucer has led in the last line of 
the poem to the origin that myths always lead to: they are anonymous, 
(p. 198) 
Epilogue 
1. "Mum and the Sothesegger," in English Verse: 1300-1500, ed. John Burrow 
(London: Longmans, 1977), 258-59, (lines 854-68). Hereafter cited in text by line 
numbers. 
2. The Temple of Glass in John Lydgate: Poems, ed. John Norton Smith, Claren­
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don Medieval and Tudor Series (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), 67, (lines 1-9). 
Hereafter cited in text by line numbers. 
3. As evidence of this improbable thesis, consider that there are no witches or 
warlocks in Chaucer's poetry and at most one ghost—depending on how one inter­
prets Dido in the Hous of Fame. Now consider Shakespeare. The reason for this is 
certainly not that the Middle Ages was a more rational period than the Renais­
sance: I suspect the reason devolves to Macrobius once more—only respectable, 
decent, and plausible fictions were available to poets and rhetors in the mainstream 
medieval tradition. 
4. The Anchor Anthology of Sixteenth Century Verse, ed., Richard S. Sylvester 
(Garden City: Doubleday Anchor, 1974), 138-39, (lines 1-7). 
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Mum and the Sothesegger, 196-98

Muscatine, Charles, 219n.8,

220n.ll

Mutual valorization of dreamer

and dream, 9; in the Dream of

the Rood, 14; in Le Roman de

la Rose, 14, 16

Name of God, in Augustine,

100-101

Narratio fabulosa. See Fabulous

narrative

Narrative normalization, 120-27,

133-34; in Le Roman de la

Rose, 123-24; in the Book of

the Duchess, 133, 145, 150, 153,

155, 157; in Pearl, 166; in the

Hous of Fame, 191

New Testament, 31-33

Newman, F. X., 206n.4, 211n.2O

Ninsun, 23

Nolan, Barbara, 221n.l7

Nominalism, 109-14, 201

Nomine s, 112

Ockham, William. See William of 
Ockham

Old Testament, 29-31

Oneirocriticon (Artemidorus),

58-60

Oneiromancy, 50-81, 211n.l,

212n.l3

Oneiros, in Artemidorus of Daldis,

59

On Prophecy in Sleep (Aristotle),

54

Oraculum: in Macrobius, 60; in St.

Augustine, 66-67

Orion, in the Hous of Fame, 192

Orpheus, in the Hous of Fame,

192

Ovid, 182

Parable of the vineyard workers, 
165-66

Paradiso (Dante), 191

Parlement of Foules, The.

(Chaucer), 206n.5 
Paul, Saint, 41-42, 46; corporeal

metaphor in Pearl, \6A-61); in

the Hous of Fame, 188

Pearl, 79, 125-26, 159-74; and

the discourse of eschatology,

141, 160; in the Cottonian li­

brary catalog, 159; doctrine in,

162; courtesy in, 162-67, 172;

queenship in, 163-64; makele3

and maskelle3 in, 170-72

Pearl maiden, 162-67

Peck, Russell, 113

Pennington, Basil, O. S. C. O.,

222n.32 
Peri Enypnion {On Dreams) 
(Aristotle), 53-54

Peter Lombard, 131

Piers Plowman, 2, 78, 125-26,

140, 199

Pilate's wife, dream of, 26, 32

Plato, 51-53

Platonic visionary tradition, 43-44

Platonism, 109

Plot. See Story and Plot

Polycraticus (John of Salisbury),

71-72

Protestantism, 18

Psychological realism, 26-27

Psychomachia (Prudentius), 45
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Radical lyric expectations, 117, in

the Book of the Duchess,

145-46, 149-50; in the Hous of

Fame, 178

Reading, 84-102; as diagnosis,

132-33

Reawakening device, 6; in the

Book of the Duchess, 127; in

Pearl, 128, 173

Religion of love, 106-7

Republic (Cicero), 6

Republic (Plato), 7, 52-53

Rhabanus Maurus, 68

Robertson, D. W., Jr., 208n.l

Rolle, Richard, 213n.3O

Routhe, in the Book of the Duch­

ess, 142-43, 158,219n.5

Sceptical fideism, 174-75, 178

Scepticism, 140

Scipio Africanus the Younger,

7-9,188-89

Schofield, W. R, 161

Scrooge, Ebeneezer, 27

Shklovsky, Viktor, 118-19, 129,

217n.3

Shoaf,R. A.,220n.l2

Simple lyric perception, 133

Sleep, 21 ln.20,222n.31

Singleton, Charles, 207n.20

Sir Thopas (Chaucer), 145, 147,

148, 150

Socrates, dreams of, 52

Somnium: in Macrobius, 60-62; in

Artemidorus of Daldis, 62; in

St. Augustine, 66-67. See also

Oneiros

Somnium coeleste, the Hous of

Fame as, 176, 178, 189

Somnium Scipionis (Cicero), 7-10,

76, 102; as day-residue dream,

8; as encyclopedia, 60, 93; rela­

tionship to Le Roman de la

Rose, 105-6

Sound, 186-87

Spearing, A. C, 161, 208n.l,

210n.20,217n.l,222n.31

Speculum, 195-96

Speech, as sound, 186-87

Splitting of the dreamer, 120-27,

133-34; in Pearl, 125-26, 131,

166; in the Book of the Duch­

ess, 133, 145

Story and Plot (Shklovsky's

terms), 119, 120-27, 128-29; in

the Book of the Duchess, 133

Summa Theologicae (Aquinas),

69-70

Suspension between real catego­

ries, 22

Swoon, physiology of the, 152

Temple of Glass, The (Lydgate),

199-201

Theogonic dreams, 23

Therapeutic visions, 136

"They flee from me" (Wyatt),

202-3

Tidings, 184, 187-88

Timaeus (Plato), 52

Todorov, Tzvetan, 21-2, 2O5n.l

Traill, David, 44

Tristram Shandy, 134

Truth in fiction, 95-98; in Le

Roman de la Rose, 107

Universals, 109; in William of

Ockham, 111-12
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Unknowing, in Pearl, 161, 164

Uti and frui, 84, 88

Valorization. See Mutual 
valorization

Venus, 200

Vergil, 33-37, 210n.l9. See also

Aeneas; Aeneid, The 
Visio: in Macrobius, 60-61; in 
Augustine, 66-67. See also 
Oneiros

Visio Episcopus Goliardis, 44-45

Visio Sancti Pauli, 41-42, 46

Visio Wettini (Strabo), 43-44

Vision of Er (Plato), 7,45

Visionary: character of the, 39-40;

purity of the, 44, 47-48, 78

Visum, 32-33; in Macrobius,

60-61

Walahfrid Strabo, 43-44

Wet dreams, 56, 70

William of Ockham, 109-14,131,

179. See also Nominalism 
Wish fulfillment, 62. See also Day 
residue dream

Wyatt, Thomas, 202-3

Xerxes, in Herodotus' History, 
27-29. 
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